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IS CONSENT NECESSARY? AN EVALUATION OF THE
EMERGING LAW OF COHABITANT OBLIGATION
Marsha Garrison
In the United States today, unmarried cohabitants have no obligations to each
other unless they have contracted to assume such obligations. "Conscriptive" rules
that base the obligations of cohabitants on status instead of contract have been
adopted in a number of other nations, and the American Law Institute has
advocated adoption of the conscriptive approach in the United States. This Article
analyzes the desirability of such a shift in legal standards and concludes that the
evidence does not support the claim that marriage and cohabitation are functionally
equivalent. Instead, the evidence shows that married and cohabiting couples tend
to behave and view their relationships quite differently: Cohabitants are much less
likely than married couples to share or pool resources; cohabitation usually
functions as a substitute for being single, not for being married. Cohabitation thus
does not imply marital commitment, the accepted basis of marital obligation. Nor,
given its typically short duration and limited sharing, is it likely that cohabitation
generally induces dependency or leads to unjust enrichment. Because of these
differences, it would be unfair to impose marital obligations on cohabitants simply
because a relationship has survived for a legislatively determined time period.
Individualized inquiry into the nature of a couple's relationship is also undesirable
as it is likely to produce uncertain and inconsistent results.
Conscriptive reforms are not needed to protect marital investments or avert
unjust enrichment. The private commitments of cohabitants can be honored through
a revivified common law marriage doctrine and some type of voluntary registration
or marriage option for same-sex couples. Unjust enrichment can be averted through
traditional equitable remedies. Conscription also entails serious public policy dis-
advantages; it would introduce discordant values into the law of relational
obligation, diminish personal autonomy, and falsely signal that marriage and
cohabitation are equivalent states. Because marriage is advantageous for both adults
and children, legal standards should foster marital commitments; by diminishing
their importance, the conscriptive approach risks harm to individual interests and
the public good. For all of these reasons, policymakers should affirm the role of
commitment in the imposition of marital obligation and reject proposed conscriptive
reforms.
* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. Research for this Article was supported by
Brooklyn Law School's Faculty Research Fund.
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INTRODUCTION
Marriage is based on mutual consent. The content of the marital agree-
ment has varied widely from time to time and from place to place. But marital
obligation has invariably been predicated on the voluntary assumption of
rights and duties; marriage partners say "I do," or they have not entered the
married state.
Marital commitment explains why married couples have legal obliga-
tions to each other when unmarried couples do not. Unmarried couples, like
their married counterparts, may establish a home, family, and life together;
they may be sexually faithful to each other and may share the expectation
that their relationship will endure. But they have not publicly and mutually
agreed to assume the legally binding obligations of marriage. Indeed, they
have decided not to publicly assume those obligations.
It is possible, of course, for an unmarried couple to define their obligations
to each other in an individually negotiated agreement. Courts traditionally
refused to honor such agreements based on the perceived desirability of
channeling both sex and sex-linked obligations into state-defined marital
relationships. But as the incidence' and social prominence2 of cohabitation
have increased, the law of cohabitant obligations has shifted, too. Although
some American courts have adhered to the traditional view that even explicit
written contracts between unmarried cohabitants are unenforceable,3 the
majority now permit former cohabitants to recover based on both explicit
promises made during the relationship and implicit agreements derived from
1. The incidence of cohabitation has increased dramatically over the past thirty years.
Between 1970 and 2000, the number of unmarried-cohabitant households in the United States rose
almost ten-fold, from 523,000 to 4,880,000. See JASON FIELDS & LYNNE M. CASPER, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, AMERIcA'S FAMILIES AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS 2000: POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS
(Current Pop. Rpts. P20-537, 2001), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/p20-53 7 .pdf.
The number of individuals who have ever cohabited has also risen sharply. See R. Kelly Raley, Recent
Trends and Differentials in Marriage and Cohabitation: The United States, in THE TIES THAT BIND:
PERSPECTIVES ON MARRIAGE AND COHABITATION 19, 23 tbl.2.1 (Linda J. Waite ed., 2000)
[hereinafter THE TIES THAT BIND] (among women born between 1950-1954, 24 percent cohabited
before marriage; among women born between 1965-1969, 55 percent cohabited before marriage).
2. "[Slince the 1970s, cohabitation outside of marriage, which had previously been confined
to the poor, has become increasingly common and acceptable among the general population. It has
emerged as an important part of the union formation process, often preceding first marriages and
sometimes substituting for them." Andrew J. Cherlin, Toward a New Home Socioeconomics of Union
Formation, in THE TIES THAT BIND, supra note 1, at 126, 127.
3. See, e.g., Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204 (Ill. 1979); Thomas v. LaRosa, 400 S.E.2d
809 (W. Va. 1990).
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conduct.4 This shift reflects a sense that social mores have "changed so radically
in regard to cohabitation that we cannot impose a standard based on alleged
moral considerations... apparently... abandoned by so many."' It has produced
a new body of law under which cohabitants may assume enforceable obligations
to each other if they choose to do so. Like marriage law, this new body of law
assumes that obligation flows from commitment. Only when a cohabitant can
show an express contract "or some other tacit understanding" may he recover.'
At the same time U.S. courts were developing a contractual approach to
cohabitant obligations, courts and legislatures in a number of other indus-
trialized nations were fashioning a "conscriptive" model that bases cohabitant
obligation on status.' The conscriptive model imposes on the cohabiting couple
that has chosen to avoid marriage some or all of the obligations the couple
would have incurred had they chosen to marry. Several Canadian provinces, for
example, now impose a support obligation on cohabitants who have
lived together for periods ranging from one to three years.8 All of the Australian
4. This approach was pioneered in Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976). It has since
been adopted in a number of states. See generally J. THOMAS OLDHAM, DIVORCE, SEPARATION AND
THE DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY § 1.02 (2002) (listing decisions following Marvin); Joel E. Smith,
Annotation, Property Rights Arising From Relationship of Couple Cohabiting Without Marriage, 3 A.L.R.
4th 13 (1979 & Supp.) (surveying states). Some states have accepted the Marvin court's contractual
approach but limited the means by which an agreement may be established: Some permit recovery
based on an express contract but not one implied from the parties' behavior. See, e.g., Tapley v.
Tapley, 449 A.2d 1218 (N.H. 1982); Morone v. Morone, 413 N.E.2d 1154 (N.Y. 1980). A few
permit recovery based only on an express, written contract. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 513.075 (West
2002); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 1.108 (Vernon 1998); Posik v. Layton, 695 So. 2d 759, 762 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1997); Kohler v. Flynn, 493 N.W.2d 647, 649 (N.D. 1992).
5. Marvin, 557 P.2d at 122.
6. Id. at 110.
7. I have used the term "conscriptive" to emphasize the fact that the obligations imposed by
laws of this type are both compulsory and involuntary. The Canadian Law Commission has referred
to such laws as ascriptive, emphasizing the fact that they impute marital status to the unmarried. See
LAw COMM'N OF CANADA, BEYOND CONJUGALITY: RECOGNIZING AND SUPPORTING CLOSE
PERSONAL ADULT RELATIONSHIPS (2001), http://www.lcc.gc.ca/en/themes/pr/cpra/report.asp
[hereinafter BEYOND CONJUGALITY].
8. See Nicholas Bala, Controversy Over Couples in Canada: The Evolution of Marriage and
Other Adult Interdependent Relationships, 29 QUEEN'S L.J. 41, 45-53 (2003) (describing provincial support
rules). The only exception is Quebec. See id. at 48-49. Canadian law was fueled by two important
decisions of the Canada Supreme Court. In Miron v. Trudel, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 418, the Court ruled that the
exclusion of a long-term, unmarried cohabitant from the statutory definition of "spouse" was, for
purposes of an automobile insurance policy, discriminatory and contrary to section 15 of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms. In M. v. H., [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3, the Supreme Court ruled, on the same
basis, that any support right available to heterosexual couples must also be extended to homosexual
couples. But in Nova Scotia (Attorney General) v. Walsh, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 325, the Court held that, with
respect to property acquired during the relationship, it is not discriminatory to treat cohabitants
differently from married couples as cohabitants have chosen to avoid the consequences of marriage.
A cohabitant right to share property accrued during the relationship appears to be available only to
couples in the Northwest Territories. See Family Law Act, R.O.N.W.T., ch. 18, §§ 1, 36 (1997).
states have adopted legislation that extends marital property rights to
cohabitants who have a common child or have lived together for at least two
years. Italy and Norway are considering legislation that would grant some
inheritance rights to surviving cohabitants, regardless of contrary provisions
in the decedent cohabitant's will.' ° And New Zealand has extended all of the
rights and obligations of marriage to couples who have been "de facto partners"
for three years."
Only one American high court has thus far adopted a conscriptive
approach to cohabitant obligation, 2 but the American Law Institute (ALl)
has recently urged the states to abandon contract in favor of the conscrip-
tive alternative. The ALI's position
reflects a judgment that it is usually just to apply to [cohabi-
tants] ... the property and support rules applicable to divorcing
spouses, that individualized inquiries are usually impractical or unduly
burdensome, and that it therefore makes more sense to require parties
to contract out of these property and support rules than to contract
into them.'
4
Is the ALI's judgment sound? Undeniably, adoption of the conscriptive
approach would represent a radical departure from traditional principles of
family obligation. Such a dramatic change in legal standards-particularly
9. The provinces variously extend property rights to couples in "domestic" or "de facto" relationships.
Some, but not all, of the provincial statutes apply to homosexual as well as heterosexual couples. Some
require a minimum period of cohabitation. See DOROTHY KOvAcS, DEFACTO PROPERTY PROCEEDINGS
IN AUSTRALIA 10-11 (1998); Lindy Willmott et al., De Facto Relationships Property Adjustment Law-
A National Direction, 17 AUSTi. FAM. L. 1, 2-5 (2003) (describing differences in state rules).
10. See Sarah Lyall, In Europe, Lovers Now Propose: Marry Me, a Little, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15,
2004, at A3. The Norwegian legislation would extend inheritance rights to cohabitants who have
lived together for five years or have a common child and would permit a surviving partner to retain a
shared residence regardless of a contrary disposition in the decedent partner's will; the Italian legislation
would permit a surviving cohabitant to remain in a shared residence for a period equal to the length
of the relationship.
11. Property (Relationships) Amendment Act, 2001 (N.Z), a ilable at http',/www.legislation.govt.nl.
For descriptions of the legislation and its development, see Bill Atkin, The Challenge of Unmarried
Cohabitation-The New Zealand Response, 37 FAM. L.Q. 303 (2003); Virginia Grainer, What's Yours Is
Mine: Reform of the Property Division Regime for Unmarried Couples in New Zealand, 11 PAC. RIM L. &
POL'Y J. 285 (2002).
12. See Connell v. Francisco, 898 P.2d 831 (Wash. 1995). An Oregon appellate court has also
held that judges have "equitable powers" to reach a "fair result" at the end of a period of cohabita-
tion. See Wilbur v. DeLapp, 850 P.2d 1151, 1153 (Or. App. 1993).
13. AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS ch. 6 (2002) [hereinafter ALl PRINCIPLES].
14. Id. § 6.03 cmt. b.
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one that runs counter to values permeating many related areas of law-
requires a substantial justification. As Justice Cardozo put it:
I am not to mar the symmetry of the legal structure by the introduction
of inconsistencies and irrelevancies and artificial exceptions unless for
some sufficient reason, which will commonly be some consideration of
history or custom or policy or justice. Lacking such a reason, I must be
logical, just as I must be impartial, and upon like grounds. 5
Cardozo reminds us that, although changes in family form may fuel
changes in family law, a shift in legal standards must also satisfy basic prin-
ciples of justice: Like cases must receive like treatment; rules must uniformly
reflect the relevant policy goals; and policy goals must express current percep-
tions of relational obligation.'6 Only a family law that meets these standards
can accurately and adequately express contemporary family values.17 Only a
family law that meets these standards is capable of garnering broad public
support and enduring allegiance."
This Article investigates the extent to which adoption of a conscriptive
approach to cohabitant obligation would "mar the symmetry of the legal struc-
ture" and examines those "considerations of history or custom or policy or justice"
that might justify an asymmetrical law of family obligation. It explains why our
law has relied on commitment as a determinant of marital obligation and
evaluates possible justifications for the conscriptive approach. It concludes
15. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 33 (1949).
16. 1 have previously argued that new issues in family law should be approached from an
interpretive perspective that explicitly strives for coherence with the rules and principles applicable
to related cases. This approach not only promotes consistency, but it comports "with the widely held
view that the expression of contemporary beliefs and values is one of family law's most important
functions... [and] embodies the notion, pervasive within our legal system, that 'the very concept of
the rule of law' demands 'continuity over time' and 'respect for precedent."' Marsha Garrison, Law
Making for Baby Making: An Interpretive Approach to the Determination of Legal Parentage, 113 HARV.
L. REV. 835, 842-43 (2000) (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992)); see
also Marsha Garrison, Autonomy or Community? An Evaluation of Two Models of Parental Obligation,
86 CAL. L. REV. 41, 46-47 (1998) [hereinafter Garrison, Autonomy or Community] (arguing in favor
of interpretive approach to child support policy).
17. A number of family law scholars have argued that this expressive role is one of family
law's most important functions. E.g., MILTON C. REGAN, JR., FAMILY LAW AND THE PURSUIT OF
INTIMACY 176-84 (1993); Carl E. Schneider, The Channelling Function in Family Law, 20 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 495 (1992); Carol Weisbrod, On the Expressive Functions of Family Law, 22 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 991 (1989); Jennifer Wriggins, Marriage Law and Family Law: Autonomy, Interdependence, and
Couples of the Same Gender, 41 B.C. L. REV 265, 293-301 (2000). See generally Cass R. Sunstein, On
the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021 (1996).
18. See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 178 (1990) (concluding, based on
extensive empirical research, that "people .. . evaluate laws and the decisions of legal authorities in
normative terms, obeying the law if it is legitimate and moral and accepting decisions if they are fairly
arrived at"); Tom Tyler & Robyn M. Dawes, Fairness in Groups, in PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON
JUSTICE 87, 89-90 (Barbara A. Mellers & Jonathan Baron eds., 1993) (summarizing research).
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that those justifications are clearly inadequate to support conscriptive rules
for cohabitants who do not have common children and that, while the case of
cohabitants with common children is more complex, conscriptive rules would
almost certainly work more harm than good even for this limited group.
Finally, it sketches the legal reforms that seem most likely to serve the
interests of cohabitants, their children, and the public.
Part I describes the traditional view of marital obligation. It also describes
and evaluates other possible justifications for both private and public rela-
tional obligations. Part II describes various justifications that have been
offered for the conscriptive approach, analyzes the evidence relevant to those
justifications, and outlines some public policy disadvantages inherent in the
conscriptive model. Part III describes and evaluates the intuitions about
marriage and cohabitation that seem to underlie the movement in favor of
conscription and that might offer additional justifications for it. Part IV
describes and evaluates alternatives to conscription.
I. SOURCES OF RELATIONAL OBLIGATION
A. Marriage: Obligation From Commitment
Marital obligation is based on mutual consent. 9 The identities of the con-
tracting parties have varied; the consent of brides, grooms, guardians, and even
feudal lords has at one time or another been required." The content of the
marriage agreement has also varied widely across centuries and societies;
marriage has accommodated polygamy as well as monogamy and suttee as well
as no-fault divorce. But at all times marriage has been predicated on an explicit
agreement to assume marital roles and obligations. A "de facto" marriage is
19. See, e.g., 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *434 ("[O]ur law considers marriage
in no other light than as a civil contract"); JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT
319 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690) ("[C]onjugal society is made by a voluntary
Compact between Man and Woman"). One commentator has urged that,
[iun premodern English law, the use of the term contract was often synonymous with
marriage, and it was from the law of spousals that many of the doctrines of modem contract
law were first taken. In particular, rules relating to capacity, to duress, to consideration, to
offer and acceptance in praesentia and in absentia, to present and future intent, and to the
plea of non est factum have all developed out of the law of marriage.
Peter Goodrich, Habermas and the Postal Rule, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 1457, 1470 (1996).
20. Anthropologists describe marriage as a "contract between kin groups... themselves.., whereby
a man acquires sexual and reproductive rights while his wife acquires some entitlement to his resources,
for the support of herself and her children." Martin Daly & Margo I. Wilson, The Evolutionary
Psychology of Mariage and Divorce, in THE TIES THAT BIND, supra note 1, at 91, 98-100 (summarizing
anthropological sources).
thus an oxymoron. Unless marriage partners say "I do," they are not married
and have assumed no marital obligations to each other.
The consensual nature of marriage holds constant even if the parties
forgo a ceremonial marriage. Common law marriage traditionally depended
not only on the fact of cohabitation and holding out a marital relationship
to the community, but also on a marriage agreement.2 Even a marriage agree-
ment was insufficient if it did not manifest a present intention to marry, and
some courts went so far as to require proof of intention by clear and
convincing evidence.22
The consensual nature of marriage is also evident in the rules for exiting
a marital relationship. The grounds for annulment-incapacity, based on
mental state or age; fraud, based on a material misrepresentation or physical
incapacity; duress, either physical or mental-are all contract defenses. A
judgment that a marriage should be annulled thus represents a determination
that the "meeting of minds" necessary for a valid marriage did not take place.
Fault-based divorce requirements differ from annulment grounds in that they
represent contract breaches rather than defenses, but the consensual concep-
tion of marriage is still central. Although modem no-fault divorce has
expanded the content of the marriage agreement to include spousal compatibil-
ity in addition to the traditional elements, it has not altered the view of
marriage as a legally binding contract that can neither be imposed without
consent nor exited without risk of legal sanctions.
The contractual view of marriage is not unique to the common law tradi-
tion. Under the civil law, marriage is and was contractual.23 Under Catholic,
Jewish, and Islamic law, marriage is and was contractual.24 Under Roman
law, marriage was contractual." Even the Babylonian Code of Hammurabi
21. See 55 C.J.S. Marriage § 10 (1998) ("[AII that is required is that there should be an actual
and mutual agreement to enter into a matrimonial relation ... between parties capable in law of
making such a contract, consummated by their cohabitation as man and wife or their mutual assump-
tion openly of marital duties and obligations.").
22. See id. § 6; HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES 48 (2d ed. 1987).
23. See SAMUEL PUFENDORF, OF THE LAW OF NATURE AND NATIONS bk. 6, ch. 1, §§ 12, 14
(Basil Kennett trans., Oxford 1803) (1672) ("[Clonsenting and not Bedding, makes a Marriage."); see
also Hans W. Baade, Marriage Contracts in French and Spanish Louisiana: A Study in "Notarial"
Jurisprudence, 53 TUL. L. REV. 3 (1978); Rodolfo Batiza, The Actual Sources of the Marriage Contract
Provisions of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1808: The Textual Evidence, 54 TUL. L. REV. 77 (1979).
24. See REUVEN P. BuLKA, JEWISH MARRIAGE: A HALAKHIC ETHIC 23-24 (1986); DAWOUD
SUDQI EL ALAMI & DOREEN HINCHCLIFFE, ISLAMIC MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE LAWS OF THE ARAB
WORLD 5-6 (1996); JOHN WITTE, JR., FROM SACRAMENT TO CONTRACT: MARRIAGE, RELIGION
AND LAW IN THE WESTERN TRADITION 25-26 (1997).
25. See Susan Treggiari, Divorce Roman Style, in MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, AND CHILDREN IN
ANCIENT ROME 31 (Beryl Rawson ed., 1991); see also Batiza, supra note 23, at 14-15 (describing
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provided that, "[i]f a man take a wife and does not arrange with her the
proper contracts, that woman is not his legal wife."26
Despite the weight of history and tradition, advocates of conscriptive
rules sometimes argue that marital obligation is not really based on contract or
commitment after all. For example, the Canadian Law Commission urges that:
Individuals in close personal relationships who are not married... may
have many of the characteristics of economic and emotional interdepen-
dency that ought to give rise to rights and responsibilities. To fail to include
these individuals may undermine the state's interests in recognizing
and supporting the fill range of committed, mutually supportive personal
adult relationships.
27
Ira Ellman, chief reporter for the ALL Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution
(ALl Principles), also contrasts the "bargained-for exchange" between a res-
taurant and a patron with the "social reciprocity" that leads one friend to pick
up the lunch tab today because the other did so yesterday. He argues that,
while marriages (and domestic partnerships) are quite obviously more
like friendships than hamburgers, they also give rise to legally enforce-
able obligations, which lead some people to forget the obvious and
think they are like hamburgers after all. The error apparently arises
from the mistaken assumption that the legal obligations arising from
marriage must have their source in a bargained-for exchange.... But
we must remain clear about the difference. Lunch with my friend may
leave me with a sense of social debt that is real, but non-specific. Our
debt to the restaurant... involves paying $23.37. Now. So legal
obligations are well-defined in both time and nature, while the
reciprocities expected in close social relationships are not.28
Of course, Ellman is right that the marital contract is much less precise
than the typical commercial contract. Marital obligations have seldom been
based on individual negotiation;29 even the transfer of funds upon marriage,
Roman roots of civil law marriage concept); Goodrich, supra note 19, at 1470 (explaining that in
medieval England "marriage was subject to the jurisdiction of ecclesiastical courts and judges trained
in civil law, and it is that Roman inheritance which the common lawyers subsequently admitted into
English law").
26. Babylonian Code of Hammurabi, quoted in HARRY E. KRAUSE ET AL., FAMILY LAW:
CASES, COMMENTS, AND QUESTIONS 33 (5th ed. 2003).
27. BEYOND CONJUGALITY, supra note 7, ch. 3, pt. 1, § 4 (emphasis added).
28. Ira M. Ellman, "Contract Thinking" Was Marvin's Fatal Flaw, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1365, 1373-74 (2001).
29. Thus the Restatement of Contracts warns that "the marital relationship has not been
regarded by the common law as contractual in the usual sense. Many terms of the relationship are
seen as largely fixed by the state and beyond the power of the parties to modify." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 190 (1981).
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in the form of dowry or bride price, represented an exchange for entering
marriage rather than an alteration of its terms and conditions. ° For this reason,
family law scholars have variously described marriage as a relational contract,
status contract, partnership, or covenant. 1 Undeniably, marital commitment
differs from a commercial transaction like the purchase of lunch.
Ellman and the Canadian Law Reform Commission are wrong, however,
in suggesting that marriage partners have legal obligations to each other because
they enjoy a close social or personal relationship. First, a close relationship
does not imply legal obligations: Ellman was not legally obliged to buy Friend's
lunch, even if Friend had purchased many meals for Ellman; Ellman would
not owe anything to Friend if he terminated their relationship, even if the
friendship was longstanding and intimate; Ellman would not owe anything to
Friend even if he and Friend had been roommates who experienced "economic
and emotional interdependency." We ascribe moral obligations to close per-
sonal relationships, but not legally binding obligations.
Second, marriage is not just a close personal relationship, nor does
marital obligation arise either from relational intimacy or economic inter-
dependency. Marriage is a public commitment. "In the marriage ceremony
the public recognizes and supports the couple's reciprocal bond, and guarantees
that [the couple's] . . . commitment.., will be honored as something valuable
not only to the pair but to the community at large." The couple who exchange
vows "agrees to be subject to a complex set of behavioral expectations defining
the roles of spouse and parent, expectations that will restrict their freedom
and guide their behavior in the relationship."33 Entrance into marriage legally
forecloses other marital opportunities; the role expectations attached to
marital status also inhibit participation in other sexual and economic
30. See Daly & Wilson, supra note 20, at 97-99.
31. See MARGARET F. BRINIG, FROM CONTRACT TO COVENANT: BEYOND THE LAW AND
ECONOMICS OF THE FAMILY 6 (2000) (arguing that "covenant is a preferable concept for describing
families.., for, in brief, the covenant implies unconditional love and permanence"); Sanford N.
Katz, Marriage as Partnership, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1251,1271-72 (1998) (urging that marriage is
not just a contract but also a partnership); Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Marriage as Relational
Contract, 84 VA. L. REV. 1225 (1998) (urging that marriage is best described as a relational contract);
Ariela R. Dubler, Note, Governing Through Contract: Common Law Marriage in the Nineteenth
Century, 107 YALE L.J. 1885, 1907-08 (1998) (describing marriage as status contract).
32. NANCY F. COTT, PUBLIC VOWS: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION 2 (2000).
There is evidence that community expectations can play an important role in molding both social
and business relationships. The public aspects of marriage thus reinforce internalized marital norms.
See Scott & Scott, supra note 31, at 1292-93 (describing the impact of community expression of norms).
33. Elizabeth S. Scott, Social Norms and the Legal Regulation of Marriage, 86 VA. L. REV. 1901,
1907 (2000); see also Eric A. Posner, Family Law and Social Norms, in THE FALL AND RISE OF
FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 256, 259-62 (F.H. Buckley ed., 1999) (describing influence of social norms
on marital behavior); Scott & Scott, supra note 31, at 1288-92 (same).
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relationships. Spousal role expectations represent consideration for the marital
agreement. 4 They serve to induce detrimental reliance on continuation of the
marital relationship.35
The pattern of relational obligation that arises from marital commitment
is not unusual; virtually all other legally enforceable role responsibilities-
guardian to ward, conservator to incompetent, trustee to beneficiary-arise,
not by default, but from the voluntary assumption of a particular role in relation
to a particular individual. 6 As with marriage, the role expectations attached
to these various statuses inhibit other relational opportunities and induce
detrimental reliance: Neither the beneficiary with a trustee nor the ward with
a guardian can easily replace the individuals who have assumed fiduciary
obligations toward them; the assumption of these statuses precludes their
assumption by others and induces reliance on role performance.
While marriage law retains its emphasis on role-based commitment as a
source of obligation, the marriage contract has become more variable. Mar-
riage partners may now individually negotiate with respect to their property
rights and, to a lesser but still significant extent, their support obligations.37
A handful of jurisdictions have even empowered prospective marriage partners
to vary the grounds for divorce.38 These developments do not diminish marriage
law's emphasis on commitment as a source of obligation but instead enhance
it; today, one spouse's marital commitment may represent an exchange for
the other's willingness to forgo the typical benefits of marriage or, conversely,
to assume enhanced marital obligations.
34. Sociologist Guy Moors found that women who married between his first and second inter-
views with them valued autonomy in the first interviews to a slightly higher, although not significant,
degree than women who entered cohabitation or decided not to marry during the same period, but
that, by the second interview, the married women's "urge for 'autonomy'... drops considerably after
gaining security in and through marriage." Guy Moors, Values and Living Arrangements: A Recursive
Relationship, in THE TIES THAT BIND, supra note 1, at 212, 222-23 tbl.1 1.3.
35. See Michael J. Trebilcock, Marriage as a Signal, in THE FALL AND RISE OF FREEIOM OF CONTRACT,
supra note 33, at 245,248-55 (describing application of "market signaling theory" to norms of marriage).
36. Scholars disagree on whether fiduciary duties are purely contractual. Compare Frank H.
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J.L. & ECON. 425, 427 (1993)
(urging that there is nothing special about fiduciary obligations and positing that fiduciary obligations
arise from "contractual" (and thus consensual) relations) and John H. Langbein, The Contractarian
Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625, 629 (1995) ("The rules of trust fiduciary law mean to
capture the likely understanding of the parties to the trust deal .... ), with Victor Brudney, Contract
and Fiduciary Duty in Corporate Law, 38 B.C. L. REV. 595, 597 (1997) ("mo say that a relationship is
contractual 'only begins analysis; it gives direction to further analysis ....'). They do not disagree
that fiduciary obligations arise from a voluntary undertaking.
37. See KRAUSE ET AL., supra note 26, at 178-79 ("Today all states agree that a premarital
agreement is enforceable if it meets certain requirements .... ).
38. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-901 (West Supp. 2003); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 9-11-
803, 9-11-808 (Michie 2003); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:293, 9:307 (West 2004).
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Modem marriage law thus shows no sign of abandoning the traditional
view that marital obligation derives from marital commitment. More than ever,
the law defines and limits spousal obligations by formal marriage agreements.
B. Dependency-Causation as an Alternative Source
of Relational Obligation
1. The Basis of Parental Obligation
The law of parental obligation offers a notable exception to the general
pattern of commitment-based obligations. Some societies have permitted con-
tractual transfers of parental rights and obligations, and courts have sometimes
held that an individual who tacitly or explicitly agrees to act as a parent may
be estopped from denying parental status. 9 But initial determinations of
parentage have flowed from consanguinity or status. The woman who gives
birth to a child bears all the rights and obligations of parenthood whether she
wants to or not; even rape, although it may provide a basis for obtaining an
abortion, does not serve as a defense to the obligations of motherhood. Legal
fatherhood, too, is based on consanguinity or marriage to the child's mother,
not parental commitment.4
39. When a nonparent consents to act as a parent and the child's interests would be harmed
by termination of the parental relationship, the nonparent is estopped from disclaiming the respon-
sibilities he has assumed. See, e.g., W. v. W., 779 A.2d 716 (Conn. 2001) (stepparent); Watts v.
Watts, 337 A.2d 350 (N.H. 1975) (same). The estoppel principle has also been used against a same-sex
partner. See LS.K. v. H.A.N., 813 A.2d 872 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) (same-sex partner who encouraged
mother to utilize artificial insemination to bear a child).
40. The common law presumption of legitimacy historically ensured that the husband of a
married mother would be treated as her child's legal father whether or not he was its biological pro-
genitor and whether or not he had consented either to the mother's extramarital affair or to provide
support for her offspring. The presumption could be rebutted only by proof that the husband was
incapable of procreation or had no access to his wife during the relevant period. See 1 BLACKSTONE,
supra note 19, at *454-59. Under Lord Mansfield's Rule, first enunciated in Goodright v. Moss, 98
Eng. Rep. 1257 (K.B. 1777), neither spouse could testify to nonaccess by the husband. Both the
presumption and its accompanying evidentiary restrictions appear to have stemmed from the desire
to protect children from the stigma and legal disadvantages of illegitimacy, coupled with the hope of
promoting marital harmony, "a goal that is obviously impaired by facilitating suits against husband
and wife asserting that their children are illegitimate." 2 KENT'S COMMENTARIES *175 (1827),
quoted in Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 125 (1989).
All states retain some form of the legitimacy presumption. See ALl PRINCIPLES, supra note 13,
§ 3.02A cmt. d (listing states). Although the presumption is now rebuttable in a range of circum-
stances, this shift reflects the advent of highly accurate paternity tests, which mean that a successful
contest by the mother's husband is highly likely to be coupled with an unsuccessful defense by the
child's biological father. See Jeffrey W. Morris & David Gjertson, The Scientific Status of Parentage
Testing, in MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 19-2.0 (David Faigman et al. eds., 1997).
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The nonconsensual nature of parental obligation is particularly evident
in paternity law, which historically offered unmarried fathers few oppor-
tunities to establish their paternity even when they wished to do so.4' Indeed,
as late as 1972, Peter Stanley, an unmarried father who had lived with and
supported his children since their birth, was forced to go all the way to the
U.S. Supreme Court to obtain a ruling affirming his parental status.4" Despite
Stanley, many states continue to restrict unmarried fathers' opportunities to
assert their paternity.43 They also continue to impose parental responsibility
without consent: Courts have uniformly imposed parental responsibilities on
men who were legally incapable of consenting to sexual intercourse' and those
who had been tricked into fathering a child;45 they have refused to honor
nonpaternity agreements whether made before or after the child's conception.46
41. During this period, "the law hardly considered the possibility that an unmarried father
might seek to assert paternity rather than escape it, and procedures for such actions were often not
available." IRA M. ELLMAN ET AL., FAMILY LAW: CASES, TEXT, PROBLEMS 1063 (3d. ed. 1998).
42. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
43. For example, the Uniform Parentage Act, adopted in more than a third of the states,
grants standing to commence a paternity action only to the child, the mother, and her husband
unless the putative father married or attempted to marry the mother or, during the child's minority,
"receive[d] the child into his home and openly... [held] out the child as his natural child"; the
opportunity to bring an action is also limited to "a reasonable time after obtaining knowledge of
relevant facts." UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §§ 4, 5(b), 6(a), 9B U.L.A. 299-312 (1987). The Uniform
Parentage Act was revised in 2000 and 2002. Under the revised Act, a putative father can no longer
gain a right to establish his paternity by "receiv[ing the child into his home and openly hold[ing] out
the child as his natural child" at any point during the child's minority. Instead, the putative father
must, "for the first two years of the child's life .... reside[ ] in the same household with the child and
openly [hold] out the child as his own." UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204(a)(5) (amended 2002), 9B
U.L.A. 16 (Supp. 2004) (emphasis added). State courts have upheld such restrictions against constitu-
tional challenges. See, e.g., In re Paternity of C.A.S., 468 N.W.2d 719, 727 (Wis. 1991) ("The best
interests of the children are the ultimate and paramount considerations in this case, and reflect a
strong public policy of this state."); A v. X Y & Z, 641 P.2d 1222, 1225 (Wyo. 1982) ("[A] child has
a right to legitimacy and that right is one the State is bound to protect during minority."). In Michael
H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989), a plurality of the Supreme Court held that the states may prefer
the interests of the mother's husband to those of the biological father, even if the biological father has
evidenced his commitment to his child by living with the mother and their child in a family unit.
44. See, e.g., County of San Luis Obispo v. Nathaniel J., 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 843 (Ct. App.
1996); Kansas ex rel. Hermesmann v. Seyer, 847 P.2d 1273 (Kan. 1993); Jevning v. Cichos, 499
N.W.2d 515 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993); In re R.A.S., 826 S.W.2d 397 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992).
45. The most frequently cited cases are Stephen K. v. Roni L., 164 Cal. Rptr. 618 (Ct. App. 1980)
and Pamela P. v. Frank S., 59 N.Y.2d 1 (1983). See generally Anne M. Payne, Annotation, Parent's
Child Support Liability as Affected By Other Parent's Fraudulent Misrepresentation Regarding Sterility or
Use of Birth Control, or Refusal to Abort Pregnancy, 2 A.L.R. 5th 337 (2002); Anne M. Payne,
Annotation, Sexual Partner's Tort Liability to Other Partner for Fraudulent Misrepresentation Regarding
Sterility or Use of Birth Control Resulting in Pregnancy, 2 A.L.R. 5th 301 (2002); Diane H. Carlton,
Note, Fraud Between Sexual Parmers Regarding the Use of Contraceptives, 71 KY. L.J. 593 (1983).
46. See UNIF. PARENTAGE AT § 6(d), 9B U.L.A. 287, 303 (1987) (declaring invalidity of
agreements regarding paternity); Peregood v. Cosmides, 663 So. 2d 665 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995);
Straub v. B.M.T., 645 N.E.2d 597, 598 (Ind. 1994) (holding that an agreement providing the father
Most scholars thus justify parental obligation on the basis of causation
instead of consent. As Blackstone put it, "by begetting... [, parents] have
entered into a voluntary obligation to endeavour, as far as in them lies, that
the life which they have bestowed shall be supported and preserved."' Chil-
dren are dependent on the care of others for many years; unless infants receive
physical care they will die, and emotional and educational care is necessary if
they are to grow into responsible and productive adults. The risks that children's
dependence impose on both individuals and communities necessitate the iden-
tification of responsible caregivers, and parents are the obvious candidates
because they-and they alone-caused the state of dependency that mandates
care-giving.
2. Harmonizing Dependency-Causation and Commitment
as Sources of Obligation
Although the conventional view is that marital obligation derives from
commitment and parental obligation from dependency-causation, it is possible
to describe parental obligation in terms of consent. Thus Judith Jarvis Thomson
argues that, if "parents do not try to prevent pregnancy, do not obtain an
abortion, and then at the time of birth of the child do not put it out for
adoption.., then they have assumed responsibility... and.., cannot now
withdraw support."' Conversely, marital obligation can be described in terms
of dependency-causation. For example, Robert Goodin notes that marriage
historically created wifely dependence and argues that "[it was this traditional
dependency of women upon men for support that gave rise to the responsibilities
that figure most centrally in the so-called marriage contract." 9 On this view,
would "not be held responsible financially or emotionally" for any child born as a result of the
relationship with the mother was contrary to public policy and void); G.E.B. v. S.R.W., 661 N.E.2d
646, 650 (Mass. 1996) (holding that a child is not estopped from maintaining a paternity action even
though her mother "acting on her own behalf and on behalf of a daughter born to her" and the
defendant had eight years earlier signed a settlement agreement under which the defendant was to
pay the mother $25,000 in exchange for the mother's assent to a stipulation stating that the
defendant was not the child's father); Estes v. Albers, 504 N.W.2d 607 (S.D. 1993); State ex rel. TRL
v. RLP, 772 P.2d 1054 (Wyo. 1989).
47. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 19, at *447. The unique bond between parent and child
provides another reason for imposing care-giving obligations on parents instead of other community
members; almost invariably, parents are the individuals who will be most highly motivated to fulfill
those obligations and fulfill them well. Indeed, Blackstone held that the "insuperable degree of
affection" between parent and child obviated the need for legal nonsupport sanctions. See id.
48. Judith Jarvis Thomson, A Defense of Abortion, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 47, 65 (1971)
(emphasis added).
49. ROBERT E. GOODIN, PROTECTING THE VULNERABLE: A REANALYSIS OF OUR SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITIES 76 (1985).
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it is the fact that marriage causes disadvantage to women that justifies the
husband's traditional obligation of support, not the husband's commitment to
his wife.5" Goodin thus urges that "[tihe reason marriage partners owe each
other what they do is not that they have made each other certain promises in
the wedding ceremony. It is instead that they have placed themselves,
emotionally and sometimes physically and economically as well, 'in another's
power."''5' Seen in this light, commitment is but one species of dependency-
causation.
Whether we view commitment as dependency-causation or dependency-
causation as commitment, there is little controversy that either is adequate to
produce obligation. Thus the common law, which imposed no general duty
to come to the aid of another, makes an exception both for the defendant
who voluntarily assumes a duty toward the plaintiff and the defendant who
causes the plaintiffs peril."
C. Should the Sources of Relational Obligation Be Expanded?
Should relational obligations be imposed without commitment or
dependency-causation? Goodin urges that vulnerability alone should produce
obligation. In his view, "[wihat is crucial... is that others are depending upon
us. They are particularly vulnerable to our actions and choices. That... is the
true source of all the standard special responsibilities that we so readily
acknowledge." 3
Were obligations to arise simply from vulnerability, however, all of us
would be responsible for every case of dependency. Acknowledging this
difficulty with his thesis, Goodin argues that,
[as] the connection between my actions or choices and their potential
injuries becomes increasingly tenuous, my responsibilities in respect of
them are also correspondingly attenuated. Thus, I have less respon-
sibility for rescuing someone drowning on a distant shore than someone
drowning at my feet.... I have no responsibility at all for rescuing
",54
someone drowning half a continent away....
50. Id. at 91.
51. Id. at 79. Goodin nonetheless sees commitment as the source of "especially strong" obliga-
tions because "people ordinarily come to rely upon the promises and contracts of others." Id. at 205.
52. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 322, 323 (1965).
53. GOODIN, supra note 49, at 11. Goodin reduces this perception to a moral principle and
asserts that, "[ilf A's interests are vulnerable to B's actions and choices, B has a special responsibility
to protect A's interests; the strength of this responsibility depends strictly upon the degree to which B
can affect A's interests." Id. at 118.
54. Id. at 122.
Even with a proximity constraint, Goodin's vulnerability principle would
produce far more extensive obligations than those the law has traditionally
acknowledged. Every first-year law student knows that the common law
imposes no duty to rescue even the swimmer drowning at one's feet. Instead,
"[tihe expert swimmer... may sit on the dock, smoke his cigarette, and watch
the man drown.""5  Unsurprisingly, this extreme stance has been subject to
frequent criticism. Prosser and Keeton observe that "[slome of the decisions
have been shocking in the extreme,"56 and Mary Ann Glendon sees in the
no-duty rule evidence for her claim that Americans tend to "stat[e] rights
claims in a stark, simple, and absolute fashion" and neglect "responsibility
talk."57  Glendon also notes that the civil law nations typically impose
criminal sanctions for a rescue failure even though they follow the common
law with respect to tort liability."8
Some American jurisdictions have statutorily adopted a criminal-sanction
approach, but such modifications of tort law's no-duty rule are extremely
narrow. In Vermont, for example,
[a] person who knows that another is exposed to grave physical harm
shall, to the extent that the same can be rendered without danger or
peril to himself or without interference with important duties owed to
others, give reasonable assistance to the exposed person unless that
assistance or care is being provided by others. 9
Tort law does impose rescue obligations on those with a "special" rela-
tionship to the plaintiff. The first group of special-relationship cases concerns
actors with special knowledge about the risks posed by a dangerous individual;'e
the second concerns business relationships, for example, that of landlord and
tenant, hotel and guest, or university and student.6' But nowhere does tort
55. WILLIAM A. PROSSER ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 375 (5th
ed. 1984) ("[One is not] required to play the part of Florence Nightingale and bind up the wounds
of a stranger... or even to cry a warning to one who is walking into the jaws of a dangerous machine.").
56. Id.
57. MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE
107 (1991) ("The problem was seen in Europe[ I ... as one involving civic duties rather than private
rights-and thus the natural solution seemed to be to establish criminal sanctions .... Maximum
fines in the European statutes are set low enough to emphasize that the purpose of the legislation is
chiefly hortatory.").
58. Id. at 84.
59. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519 (2004).
60. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315(a) (1965).
61. See id. § 315(b). "In these cases the defendant may be called upon to guard against
various contingencies from the simple loss or destruction of property entrusted to its care, to the
defective conditions of premises under its control, or today to the criminal act of a third party."
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 548 (7th ed. 2000).
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law--or any area of law-recognize a duty to protect another based solely
on friendship, intimacy, or economic interdependence.
Of course, the law could be changed: although Ellman and the
Canadian Law Reform Commission are wrong in their claim that the law
has recognized relational duties based on intimacy or interdependence, the
law could be rewritten to recognize such obligations. But there are sound
reasons why the law has not thus far taken this approach.
The first problem is definitional. Because closeness measures degrees
of proximity, it is difficult to define categorically, and without a categorical
definition, it would be extraordinarily hard to differentiate those who should
be subject to a closeness duty from those who should not. Ellman and the
Canadian Law Reform Commission seem to view cohabitation as the
prototypical example of close relationship. But is the typical cohabiting
relationship of, say, three years' duration really closer than the relationships
of parents and their adult children? Of adult siblings? Of grandparents and
grandchildren? Of lovers who have a long and durable relationship but do
not live together? Of old and close friends? If closeness is the test, it is not
obvious which of these relational types are close enough. Even if we could
agree on the relational categories, the diversity of relationships within each
category would militate against black-letter rules applicable to all cases.
Economic interdependence-sharing resources or expenses-is easier to
define and captures a smaller pool of potential obligors. But there are still
definitional problems: Must the interdependent pair share all of their
resources to trigger an obligation, or only some? If only some sharing is
necessary, how much is required and over what period must it extend? Even
if one demands both intimacy and sharing, the range of cases is still extremely
diverse, including not just cohabitants, but parents and adult children, college
roommates, young adult friends sharing a first apartment, and elderly friends
sharing their final days. Sometimes such arrangements are mutually advanta-
geous; sometimes the benefit runs in only one direction. Among this large
and diverse set of cases, it is not obvious why one would single out cohabitants
for special treatment or how one would define a larger category of sharing
relationships that merit the imposition of legal obligations.
Interdependent relationships also provide important public benefits that
might be lost or reduced were obligation based on past sharing. Sharing
arrangements reduce the number of needy individuals who might otherwise
require public aid; they contribute both to patterns of social cooperation
and to individual self-help. But the risk of continuing obligation should
significantly deter entrance into such individually and publicly beneficial
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arrangements: Who would ask a needy friend to share one's home temporar-
ily if such a good deed invited the risk of inescapable future obligations?
More fundamentally, it is hard to see why past sharing justifies an obli-
gation to share in the future. In keeping with this perspective, both the common
law and civil law systems have avoided the imposition of private obligations
based on the fact of dependency, even if coupled with a close relationship or
economic interdependence. Good Samaritanism has been required only in
narrowly defined, typically life-threatening situations: even in such cases, duty
has typically been cast as a public obligation, not privately enforceable; it has
been limited to aid that can be rendered without peril or undue interference
with other obligations and plans. Nowhere can we find evidence that the law
has imposed private obligations based simply on the existence of a close
relationship or state of mutual dependency. Nowhere can we find convincing
reasons that it should.
D. Public Duties and Their Transformation Into Private Obligations
While private obligations are based on dependency-causation or com-
mitment, public obligations arise purely from participation in civil society.62
This distinction explains why the statutory rescue duties imposed in some
U.S. states and civil law nations take the form of criminal sanctions instead
of private rights. Indeed, in the public sector, status-based, conscriptive duties
are the norm: The obligation to pay taxes, to serve on juries, and to comply
with a military draft notice all arise, not from consent, but from membership
in the body politic. Although conscriptive public obligations can be avoided
by leaving the body that would impose them, individuals born into a particular
society are not always able to leave it. Nor is advance notice of conscriptive
rules typically available. "The liberal ideal of contract [thus] fails us here, for
only by a wild leap of metaphor could one say that growing up in a country,
failing to leave when one has the chance, constitutes a voluntary commitment
to be faithful."'63
Although public obligations do not derive from personal commitment,
they may nonetheless be phrased in terms of private relationships. Thus the
English Poor Laws authorized the state to seek support from a wide range of
62. See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, LOYALTY: AN ESSAY ON THE MORALITY OF RELATIONSHIPS
53 (1993) ("[Mlarriage is a voluntary commitment. One expects fidelity from a spouse because he or
she undertakes to be faithful. There is no comparable commitment, voluntarily contracted, that
grounds the duty to be loyal to one's country.").
63. Id. at 55.
relatives if an individual became a public charge64 and, even today, the relative-
responsibility laws of some states impose support obligations on the grandpar-
ents or stepparents of welfare-eligible children6" and on adults whose parents
are destitute. 66  Federal rules governing college loan eligibility evidence a
similar pattern. Although most states impose no private support obligation
on stepparents, the federal rules nonetheless assume that the income of
stepparents is available to support college education; to qualify for federal loans,
college students must submit their custodial parents'-and stepparents'-tax
returns. 7 In a similar vein, when the federal government guaranteed public
assistance benefits to needy children, the law "deemed" the income of a
stepparent to be available to a child resident in the stepparent's householdS 61
and limited the child's eligibility accordingly.
Public obligations may even be phrased as private duties. Until the
nineteenth century, the common law held that husbands had a legal duty to
support their wives and children, but granted neither type of dependent a
private right to enforce that duty; only the state could enforce the husband's
support obligation through the Poor Law. This enforcement pattern reflected
the prevailing conception of the family as a unified entity in which the legal
identities of wives and children were merged with that of the family patriarch.69
As the patriarchal conception of the family lost ground, legislatures extended
the reach of the Poor Law by giving wives and children the right to privately
enforce the husband's support obligation.
64. 43 Eliz. 1, c. 2, §§ I, V (1601). The manner and rate of reimbursement were determined
by county Justices of the Peace; default resulted in a standard penalty of twenty shillings per month.
Id. c. 2, VI. See generally SIDNEY WEBB & BEATRICE WEBB, ENGLISH POOR LAW HISTORY, PART I:
THE OLD POOR LAW (1927); Jacobus tenBroek, California's Dual System of Family Law: Its Origin,
Development, and Present Status (pt. 1), 16 STAN. L. REV. 257-87 (1964).
65. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-936 (West 2004) (parents of unwed minor parents);
N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 101 (McKinney 2003) (stepparents).
66. In 2001, thirty states had filial responsibility laws. See Seymour Moskowitz, Filial Respon-
sibility Statutes: Legal and Policy Considerations, 9 J.L. & POL'Y 709 (2001) (listing and categorizing
statutes). But the laws on the books are rarely utilized. A recent survey found eleven states with laws
that seemingly "have never been invoked." See Katie Wise, Note, Caring for Our Parents in an Aging
World: Sharing Public and Private Responsibility for the Elderly, 5 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 563,
574 (2001-2002). Filial responsibility laws appear to be in decline worldwide, and "[most... industrialized
countries have abolished their family responsibility laws altogether." Id. at 591.
67. 20 U.S.C. § 1087oo(f) (2000).
68. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(31), (a)(3 8 ), (a)(39) (1994) (repealed 1996).
69. See CLARK, supra note 22, at 287-88; Garrison, Autonomy or Community, supra note 16,
at 49-50.
70. This new enforcement right retained the Poor Law's emphasis on dependence and worthi-
ness; wives who had given their husbands grounds for divorce and children who refused to obey reason-
able parental commands were no more entitled to parental support than were the able-bodied to public
funds. But it also expanded the support obligation to require maintenance at the family's customary
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Thus, while marital obligation has invariably required mutual consent,
the marriage contract to which spouses assent contains state-defined terms
that reflect contemporary patterns of family life and the public interest in
ensuring protection of dependent persons: Women lost their property and
even their legal identities under the common law marriage contract because
they lived in a patriarchal society that viewed wifely subservience as a good
thing; modem women retain their identities and property but assume support
obligations to their husbands because they live in a more egalitarian society
in which men and women are often economic equals.7
However, even when the terms of private relational obligations are
imposed by the state, the fact of obligation has been derived from dependency-
causation or commitment. Obligations arising purely from status are owed
directly to the state; the Poor Laws and their modem counterparts have
imposed on a wide range of relations public-reimbursement obligations, but
not private obligations running directly in favor of the dependent relative.
I. THE CASE FOR CONSCRIPTIVE COHABITANT OBLIGATIONS
A. Justifications for the Conscriptive Approach
1. Traditional Justifications: Commitment and Dependency-Causation
Traditional justifications for relational obligation suggest two different
arguments for the imposition of marital obligations on cohabitants. The first
argument is based on cohabitation as an indicator of commitment: If the
fact of cohabitation invariably, or even typically, represented an act of commit-
ment in the nature of marriage vows, logic would support treating the two
types of relationships as equivalent. This argument would claim that "those
who live together without marriage are just as committed as those who are
married."72 It would represent cohabitation as a species of common law
living standard instead of a subsistence-based stipend. See CLARK, supra note 22, at 287-88, 496-
98; Garrison, Autonomy or Community, supra note 16, at 49-52.
71. Statutory divorce laws and the Married Women's Property Acts emerged during the same
period as the alimony and child support entitlement, evidencing the same shift away from the earlier
view of the family as a unified legal entity. See, e.g., CARL N. DEGLER, AT ODDS: WOMEN AND THE
FAMILY IN AMERICA FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE PRESENT (1980); MICHAEL GROSSBERG,
GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1985);
Richard H. Chused, Married Women's Property Law: 1800-1850, 71 GEO. L.J. 1359 (1983). See generally
Roscoe Pound, Individual Interests in the Domestic Relations, 14 MICH. L. REV. 177, 196 (1916).
72. Milton C. Regan, Jr., Unmaried Partners and the Legacy of Marvin v. Marvin: Calibrated
Commitment: The Legal Treatment of Marriage and Cohabitation, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1435,
1437 (2001).
marriage, in which cohabiting couples eschew formal marriage because "they
reject the baggage that goes along with that legal status..., [such as] the
gender assumptions that have been so prominent a feature of marriage as a
social institution."73 The commitment argument would, of course, depend on
a showing that most cohabitants view their relationships as marital and
intend to assume marital obligations; without such a showing, marriage and
cohabitation could not fairly be treated as equivalent.
The second argument is based on cohabitation as a relational form that
causes dependency. Parental obligation arises because procreation produces
infantile dependency, and marital obligation has at times been justified
because marriage historically produced wifely dependency. If cohabitation
typically produced dependency on the part of either or both partners, then a
similar case could be made for the imposition of cohabitant obligations. Like
the commitment argument, the dependency-causation argument is fact-based.
If cohabitation usually produces dependency, then it would be fair to
impose an obligation to relieve that dependency on the individual responsi-
ble for it; if cohabitation is not typically associated with dependency, then the
dependency-causation argument fails.
It is also worth noting that the coresidential relationship of cohabitants
could be used to justify consistent treatment of cohabitants and married couples
with respect to particular public obligations and benefits. If the income of a
stepparent or spouse is relevant to public assistance eligibility because shared
living expenses will reduce overall household expenditure, then the income
of a resident cohabitant who shares expenses with a partner should also be
relevant." If married couples' income is taxed at a higher rate because of the
economies of scale that they obtain from sharing a home, then the income of
cohabitants who share one, exclusive residence should be taxed at that same
rate." But the fact that the underlying purposes of some public laws demand
similar treatment of married and cohabiting couples does not establish that
73. Id.
74. Because the evidence shows that cohabiting couples do not typically pool their resources,
see sources cited infra note 99, the fact of cohabitation alone is not an adequate basis for assuming
that a cohabitant's income is available to the public-benefit applicant, see Kurt J. Bauman, Shifting
Family Definitions: The Effect of Cohabitation and Other Nonfamily Household Relationships on Measures
of Poverty, 36 DEMOGRAPHY 315 (1999).
75. For a similar view, see Harry D. Krause & David D. Meyer, What Family for the 21st Century?,
50 AM. J. COMP. L. 101,109 (2002) (stating that "tax significance should be seen in the actuality of
ability to pay that is increased by economies of scale or reduced by children"). Tax policy may even
affect the decision to marry or cohabit. See Leslie A. Whittington & James Aim, Tax Reductions, Tax
Changes, and the Marriage Penalty, 54 NAT'L TAxJ. 455,456 (2001); Eric P. Voight, Note, Reconsidering
the Mythical Advantages of Cohabitation: Why Marriage Is More Efficient Than Cohabitation, 78 IND. L.J.
1069 (2003).
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marriage and cohabitation are equivalent in terms of private support obliga-
tions; the law of private obligations has different purposes, and each body of
law must serve those purposes for which it was enacted.
2. The Claims of Conscription's Advocates: Equity, Equivalence,
and Practicality
So, what are the claims of conscription's advocates? Given that the
extension of marital obligation to nonmarital cohabitation represents a sig-
nificant break with both current law and legal tradition, one would expect
the judicial opinions, legislative reports, and law reform commentary to
provide a detailed justification. Surprisingly, they do not. The Washington
Supreme Court adopted the view that marriage-like obligations attach to
nonmarital cohabitation piecemeal and with almost no policy discussion.76
Legislatures that have adopted conscriptive laws have also been disinclined to
explain their reasoning. In New Zealand, for example, legislative reform was
apparently based "on the assumption, largely untested by reference to factual
data, that the property situations of persons in de facto relationships were
identical to those in marriages."77 Advocates of conscriptive reforms empha-
sized fairness, but fairness was simply "equated with the same treatment for
both married and de facto couples,"78 without explanation or justification.
Even the ALI is curiously uninformative on the justification question.
Indeed, it notes that "society's interests in the orderly administration of justice
and the stability of families are best served when the formalities of marriage are
observed."79 If order and stability favor marriage, then why treat cohabitation
76. In In re Marriage of Lindsey, 678 P.2d 328 (Wash. 1984), the Court held that property
acquired before marriage was subject to equitable distribution at divorce if the property was "community
in character." Mr. and Mrs. Lindsey had cohabited for approximately two years before their five-year
marriage; in reaching the conclusion that property before marriage was subject to division, the
Lindsey court relied primarily on a Washington statute permitting the division of premarital assets.
The Washington statute relied on in Lindsey is representative of the so-called "hotchpot" approach to
property distribution at divorce. Under this approach, the divorce court may take into account and
distribute assets that would not be categorized as community property in order to effect a just and
equitable asset distribution. Although the hotchpot approach to divorce distribution is a minority
approach, it is followed by thirteen other states. In these other states--and indeed in Lindsey itself-
the application of the approach is dependent on the establishment of a legal marriage. In Connell v.
Francisco, 898 P.2d 831, 835-36 (Wash. 1995), the Washington Supreme Court-noting only that
"[a] meretricious relationship is not the same as a marriage"-extended the Lindsey ruling to a couple
that had never married, but limited their entitlements "to property that would have been character-
ized as community property had the parties been married."
77. Grainer, supra note 11, at 301.
78. Id. at 300.
79. ALL PRINCIPLES, supra note 13, § 6.02 cmt. a.
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as equivalent to marriage? The ALl rests its case on the claim that "the
absence of formal marriage may have little or no bearing on the character of
the parties' domestic relationship and on the equitable considerations that
underlie claims between lawful spouses at the dissolution of a marriage":
This Chapter is premised on the familiar principle that legal rights
and obligations may arise from the conduct of parties with respect to
one another, even though they have created no formal document or
agreement setting forth such an undertaking. 0
Although this is a vague statement that fails to specify the forms of
conduct that might give rise to obligations, the ALl is certainly right that
legal obligations, even marital obligations, may arise without a "formal docu-
ment or agreement." The common law marriage doctrine undeniably permits
establishment of a marriage without a formal, or even a written, agreement.
But it does require evidence of an agreement. The ALl approach does not.
The ALl Principles clearly specify that they do
not require, as a predicate to finding the existence of a domestic
partnership, that the parties had an implied or express agreement, or
even that the facts meet the standard requirements of a quantum
meruit claim. It instead relies, as do the marriage laws, on a status
classification: property claims and support obligations presumptively
arise between persons who qualify as domestic partners, as they do
between legal spouses, without inquiry into each couple's particular
arrangement, except as the presumption is itself overcome by contract."
Why not require evidence of an agreement? The ALL notes that few
cohabitants seem to make them. More to the point, it argues that "[diomestic
relationships that satisfy [its] ... criteria... closely resemble marriages in function,
and their termination therefore poses the same social and legal issues as does the
dissolution of a marriage.""2 The ALl approach thus
reflects a judgment that it is usually just to apply to separating cohabitants
the property and support rules applicable to divorcing spouses, that
individualized inquiries are usually impractical or unduly burdensome,
and that it therefore makes more sense to require parties to contract
out of these property and support rules than to contract into them.8"
80. Id.
81. Id. § 6.03 cmt. b.
82. Id. § 6.02 cmt. a (emphasis added). In a similar vein, the ALl urges that "the absence of
formal marriage may have little or no bearing on the character of the parties' domestic relationship
and on the equitable considerations that underlie claims between lawful spouses at the dissolution of
a marriage." Id.
83. Id. § 6.03 cmt. b.
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Other advocates of the conscriptive approach make similar claims.
Willmott et al., arguing that the Australian national government should extend
the full range of marital rights and obligations to "de facto couples," contend
that "individuals in de facto relationships possess interests identical to [those
of] married couples" and urge that "sociological differences between the two
relationships... do not merit denying redress to de facto individuals who
need it."" The objection that "some de facto couples might not want the... law
extended to them" is, in their view "easily accommodated" as "any de facto
couple who want to determine their own distribution of property... [are] free
to do so."" In a similar vein, New Zealand's conscription advocates argued
that rules distinguishing married and cohabiting couples were inherently
discriminatory. For example, in debating the new law, Associate Minister of
Justice Margaret Wilson rhetorically demanded:
Why should people in de facto or same-sex relationships be treated
differently from married couples? They are a very large and impor-
tant part of New Zealand society. They accrue assets during their
relationships in the same manner as their married counterparts, and
therefore have a right to the same legal protection. Fundamentally,
86they have a right to a fair deal, too.
Picking up the fairness theme, Green Party MP Keith Locke argued that,
"[j]ust because someone is in a de facto relationship.., does not mean to say
that person's rights... should be any less than those [of individuals] who are
formally married.,
87
All of these claims are vague and conclusory. They specify neither
commitment nor dependency-causation as a source of cohabitant obligations.
They allege discrimination based on dissimilarity in the law's treatment of
married and cohabiting couples without identifying any reasons why similarity
of treatment is warranted. They allege that cohabitation and marriage are
functionally equivalent without evidence of equivalence. They assert that "it
makes more sense to require parties to contract out [of marital obliga-
tions] ... rather than to contract in" without any analysis of the costs and
benefits of these alternatives.
84. Willmott et al., supra note 9, at 9.
85. Id. at 10.
86. Property (Relationship) Amendment Bill: Third Reading (Mar. 29, 2001) (statement
of Hon. M. Wilson, Associate Minister of Justice), quoted in Grainer, supra note 11, at 300 n.97.
87. Property (Relationship) Amendment Bill: Third Reading (Mar. 29, 2001) (statement of
K. Locke), quoted in Grainer, supra note 11, at 301-02 n.97; see also Grainer, supra note 11, at 300-01
n.98 ("[It is time we stopped discriminating in our legislation against these de facto and same sex
couples." (quoting Property (Relationship) Amendment Bill: Report of Select Committee (May 4,
2000) (statement of Hon. M. Wilson, Associate Minister of Justice))).
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B. Equity, Equivalence, and Practicality: The Evidence
1. Are Cohabitation and Marriage Equivalent States?
The lack of evidentiary support for the claimed functional equivalence
of marriage and cohabitation should not be interpreted to mean that evi-
dence is unavailable. In fact, the increased incidence of cohabitation has
spurred a wave of research on cohabitant characteristics and behavior. But
none of the evidence produced by that body of research supports the equiva-
lence claim. To the contrary, it shows that cohabitants typically behave and
describe their relationships very differently than married couples. Even more
importantly, it shows that cohabitants rarely make marital commitments or
engage in sharing behavior that might induce dependency.
The first significant fact established by recent research is that cohabi-
tation is typically brief or leads to marriage. Although the likelihood that
cohabitation will lead to marriage is declining,88 approximately 60 percent of
all cohabitants and 70 percent of those in a first, premarital cohabitation
marry within five years.89 More tellingly, only about 10 percent of cohabi-
tants who do not marry are still together five years later.' By contrast, 80
percent of first marriages survive at least five years and two-thirds survive for
at least ten years. Cohabitation thus tends to be a relatively short-lived state
that, for most couples, represents a transitional stage on the way to either
marriage or separation."
Cohabitants and married couples also present different demographic
profiles. Despite lower proportions of youthful cohabitants in recent years,93
88. See Larry L. Bumpass, The Changing Significance of Marriage in the United States, in THE
CHANGING FAMILY IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE: ASIA AND THE UNITED STATES 63, 71
(K.O. Mason et al. eds., 1998) ("There is clear evidence now.., that the probability of marrying
following cohabitation is declining, as is the probability of marrying a cohabiting partner.").
89. See M.D. BRAMLETT & W.D. MOSHER, COHABITATION, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, AND
REMARRIAGE IN THE UNITED STATES 22 & tbl.9 (2002).
90. See Larry Bumpass & Hsien-Hen Lu, Trends in Cohabitation and Implications for
Children's Family Contexts in the United States, 54 POPULATION STUD. 29, 33 (2000); see also
BRAMLETT & MOSHER, supra note 89, at 22 & tbl.15 (stating that 49 percent of first premarital
cohabitations, including those which lead to marriage, are disrupted within five years). But see
Pamela J. Smock, Cohabitation in the United States: An Appraisal of Research Themes, Findings, and
Implications, 26 ANN. REV. SoC. 1, 3 (2000) (stating that figure is 60 percent).
91. See BRAMLETT & MOSHER, supra note 89, at 55 & tbl.21.
92. Nor is the average duration of cohabitation increasing. See Bumpass & Lu, supra note 90,
at 33 (reporting that "unions begun by cohabitation have become less stable: ignoring whether or not
the couple married, the proportion who had separated by five years increased from 45 to 54 per cent"
between mid-1980s and mid-1990s); Cherlin, supra note 2, at 135 (summarizing evidence).
93. See LYNNE M. CASPER & SUZANNE M. BIANCHI, CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN THE
AMERICAN FAMILY 44-45 (2002) (stating that in 1978, 35 percent of cohabiting women and 38.5
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the median age of cohabitants is still considerably lower than that of mar-
riage partners.94 At least among men, cohabitants have less education and
lower socioeconomic prospects than their married counterparts. 9 Indeed,
income potential is an important predictor of whether a man will marry.96
Cohabitants and married couples also behave differently. Cohabitants
are much less likely than married couples to have children97 and to support
their partners.98 They more often split expenses instead of pooling funds.'
percent of cohabiting men were age 35 or higher; in 1998, 44 percent of cohabiting women and 48
percent of cohabiting men were). There is some evidence that the association between male income
and marriage is declining, however. See Sharon Sassier & Frances Goldsheider, Revisiting Jane
Austen's Theory of Marriage Timing: Changes in Union Formation Among American Men in the Late 20th
Century, 25 J. FAM. ISSUES 139 (2004).
94. See BRAMLETT & MOSHER, supra note 89, at 11 tbl.C (stating that of women age 20-24,
11 percent were cohabiting and 27 percent were married; among women 40-44, less than 5 percent
were cohabiting and 68 percent were married).
95. See CASPER & BIANCHI, supra note 93, at 52-53 tbl.2.3 (showing that white and black
married men had significantly higher levels of college education and income than cohabiting men;
Hispanic married men had higher income levels but not higher levels of college education); Steven
L. Nock, A Comparison of Marriages and Cohabiting Relationships, 16 J. FAM. ISSUES 53, 66-67 tbl.1
(1995); see also Bumpass & Lu, supra note 90, at 32; Smock, supra note 90, at 4.
96. Obviously there is a strong association between youth and low income. However, there
also appears to be a selection effect for men, whose marriage prospects are significantly associated
with higher income potential. See, e.g., Valerie K. Oppenheimer, Cohabiting and Marriage During
Young Men's Career-Development Process, 40 DEMOGRAPHY 127 (2003) (finding that men with better
long-run socioeconomic prospects were far more likely to marry from either a noncohabiting or
cohabiting state, and that this was particularly true for blacks); Yu Xie et al., Economic Potential and
Entry into Marriage and Cohabitation, 40 DEMOGRAPHY 351, 361 tbl.3 (2003) (finding significant
association between men's income potential and their likelihood of marriage). Male income
prospects also appears to affect the marriage expectations of cohabitants. See Wendy D. Manning &
Pamela J. Smock, First Comes Cohabitation and Then Comes Marriage?, 23 J. FAM. ISSUES 1065, 1080
fig.1 (2003) (finding that, for all racial and ethnic groups, the probability that a cohabitant expects
to marry varies significantly with the man's socioeconomic position).
97. See Judith A. Seltzer, Families Formed Outside of Marriage, 62 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 1247,
1251 (2000) (summarizing research). The percentage of cohabitants who bear children together has
increased substantially, however. See Bumpass & Lu, supra note 90, at 34 tbl.4 (cohabiting couples
had 29 percent of unmarried births in the early 1980s and 39 percent a decade later).
98. See PHILIP BLUMSTEIN & PEPPER SCHWARTZ, AMERICAN COUPLES: MONEY, WORK, SEX 61-
62 (1983) (reporting that "cohabitors believe strongly in each partner's contributing his or her equal share").
99. See id. at 94-101 figs.8-9 (among survey group, 37 percent of male and 44 percent of
female cohabitants opposed income pooling, as compared to 12 percent of wives and 8 percent of
husbands); Marin Clarkberg et al., Attitudes, Values, and Entrance Into Cohabitational Versus Marital
Unions, 74 Soc. FORCES 609 (1995); Kristen R. Heimdal & Sharon K. Houseknecht, Cohabiting and
Married Couples' Income Organization: Approaches in Sweden and the United States, 65 J. MARRIAGE &
FAM. 525, 532 tbl.2 (2003) (stating that 17 percent of U.S. married and 46 percent of U.S. cohabiting
couples report keeping their money separate); Anne E. Winkler, Economic Decision-Making by
Cohabitors: Findings Regarding Income Pooling, 29 APPLIED EcON. 1079 (1997) (stating that most cohabi-
tants, particularly those without children and in short-term relationships, do not pool their incomes).
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They are less likely to demonstrate sexual fidelity."e They are more likely
to be in a physically abusive relationship.''
These behavioral differences appear to reflect underlying attitudinal differ-
ences. Compared to married couples, cohabitants feel less security within their
relationships.0 2 They are more likely to value independence and less likely to
value commitment or express commitment to their partners.' °3
100. See BLuMSTEIN & SCHWARTZ, supra note 98, at 274 fig.49 (stating that both male and
female cohabitants were less likely to be sexually faithful than married men and women at all
relationship-duration levels; the greatest gap was between long-duration married and cohabiting
couples); Renata Forste & Koray Tanfer, Sexual Exclusivity Among Dating, Cohabiting, and Married
Women, 58 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 33, 38-39 tbl.1 (1996) (in 1991 National Survey of Women, 4
percent of married women and 20 percent of cohabiting women reported sexual infidelity); Judith
Treas & Deidre Giesen, Sexual Infidelity Among Married and Cohabiting Americans, 62 J. MARRIAGE &
FAM. 48, 58 (2000) (stating that even after controlling for permissive values about extramarital
cohabitation, twice as many cohabitants as married individuals had engaged in recent infidelity);
Linda J. Waite & Kara Joyner, Emotional and Physical Satisfaction With Sex in Married, Cohabiting, and
Dating Sexual Unions: Do Men and Women Differ?, in SEX, LOVE, AND HEALTH IN AMERICA 239,
268-69 app. 6A (Edward 0. Laumann & Robert T. Michael eds., 2001) (stating that in national sex
survey, 4 percent of married men, 1 percent of married women, 16 percent of cohabiting men, and 8
percent of cohabiting women reported sexual infidelity during the past year).
101. See, e.g., LINDA J. WAITE & MAGGIE GALLAGHER, THE CASE FOR MARRIAGE 155
(2000). Based on analysis of National Survey of Families and Households data,
married people are much less likely than cohabiting couples to say that arguments between
them and their partners had become physical in the past year (4 percent of married people
compared to 13 percent of the cohabiting). When it comes to hitting, shoving, and throwing
things, cohabiting couples are more than three times more likely than the married to say
things get that far out of hand.
Id.; see also Sonia Miner Salari & Bret M. Baldwin, Verbal, Physical, and Injurious Aggression Among
Intimate Couples Over Time, 23 J. FAM. ISSuES 523, 535-36 tbl.1 (2002) (stating that 24 percent of
cohabiting and 7.3 percent of married couples reported experiencing one of the two most serious
forms of physical aggression); Todd K. Shackelford, Cohabitation, Marriage and Murder: Woman-Killing
by Male Romantic Partners, 27 AGGRESSIVE BEHAVIOR 284, 284 (2001) (stating that Canadian and
U.S. studies show that women in cohabiting relationships are about nine times more likely than
married women to be killed by a partner); Jan E. Stets, Cohabiting and Marital Aggression: The Role of
Social Isolation, 53 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 669, 674 (1991) (nearly 14 percent of cohabitants and 5
percent of married individuals admitted to hitting, shoving or throwing things at their partner in the
past year; difference remained even after controlling for factors as education, age, occupation and income).
102. See Larry L. Bumpass et al., The Role of Cohabitation in Declining Rates of Marriage, 53 J.
MARRIAGE & FAM. 913, 923 (1991) (stating that compared with married respondents and adjusted
for duration and age differences, "cohabitators are almost twice as likely to report that they have
thought their relationship was in trouble over the past year"; "in three of every four cohabiting
relationships, at least one partner reports having thought the relationship was in trouble"); see also
Susan L. Brown & Alan Booth, Cohabitation Versus Marriage: A Comparison of Relationship Quality,
58 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 668, 674 tbl.1 (1996) (finding that cohabitants report significantly more
fights and less fairness in their relationships than married couples).
103. See BLUMSTEIN & SCHWARTZ, supra note 98, at 184 fig.26 (stating that 54 percent of
male cohabitants and 67 percent of female cohabitants said that "private time away from one's
partner" was "very important," as compared to 32 percent of husbands and 46 percent of wives);
William G. Axinn & Arland Thornton, The Relationship Between Cohabitation and Divorce: Selectivity
or Causal Influence?, 29 DEMOGRAPHY 357, 361 (1992) (stating that surveyed cohabitants tended to
842 52 UCLA LAW REVIEW 815 (2005)
The contrasting relational perspectives of cohabitants and married couples
emerge in many ways, but attitudes toward money are particularly revealing.
Blumstein and Schwartz, who conducted a pioneering survey of American couples,
analyzed responses to a range of questions on sharing and concluded that "married
couples unconsciously assume a commingling of money and... cohabitors
assume separate finances."'. To explicate this attitudinal difference, Blumstein
and Schwartz offer representative conversations in which couples "discuss[ed]
how they would-together--spend six hundred dollars that they were to pretend
[the researchers] would give them." ' The married couple immediately focused
on a shared goal:
Caroline: I think we should spend it on ourselves.
Chris: Okay, what do we need?
Caroline: We have things we need. Let's spend it on something we
both want, not just something one or the other wanted... I've been
thinking of something like airline tickets to Hawaii. You've been
wanting to go to Maui. I think it would be nice for us.
Chris: Okay, that's perfect. Sold.
The cohabiting couple immediately focused on their individual wants:
Susan: Split it fifty-fifty, right?
Mark: Exactly.
Susan: We're finished.
Mark: Same as always.
Susan: Fifty-fifty.
Mark: I'll spend at least two hundred dollars on photographic equip-
ment..., and probably pay off something to Visa ....
Susan: And I'll spend mine my way. Very simple.'O
express a low opinion about the value of commitment); Marin Clarkberg et al., Attitudes, Values, and
Entrance Into Cohabitational Versus Marital Unions, 74 Soc. FORCES 609, 621-24 (1995) (arguing
that cohabitation is preferred to marriage by those who desire more flexible relationships and reject
marital constraints); Nock, supra note 95, at 65-67 tbl.1, 73 (1995) (stating that cohabiting men and
women reported lower levels of commitment and lower levels of commitment appeared to "foster
poorer assessments of the relationship"); Scott M. Stanley, Maybe I Do: Interpersonal Commitment and
Premarital or Nonmarital Cohabitation, 25 J. FAM. IssuEs 496 (2004) (stating that in a national random
sample, premarital and nonmarital cohabitation were associated with lower levels of interpersonal
commitment to partners); Elizabeth Thomson & Ugo Colella, Cohabitation and Marital Stability: Quality
or Commitment, 54 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 259, 266 (1992) (stating that wives who cohabitated before
marriage were more likely to value individual freedom than those who had not cohabitated). Cohabi-
tants with the lowest level of commitment are also the most likely to split up. See CASPER & BIANCHI,
supra note 93, at 59 tbl.2.5 (stating that the relationship between commitment and relationship survival
held even after age, race, education, income, employment status, relationship duration, and other variables
were taken into account).
104. BLUMSTEIN & SCHWARTZ, supra note 98, at 98.
105. Id.
106. Id.
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Blumstein and Schwartz conclude that "[clohabitors, striving to be inde-
pendent ... avoid the interdependence that pooling brings," while "[tihe
marriage contract ... allows [married couples] ... to trust each other enough
to work as a financial team.W
0 7
The contrasting behaviors and attitudes of cohabitants and married couples
reflect the fact that cohabitation is usually seen, not as a substitute for marriage,
but for being single. 8 In a cohabitant survey conducted during the late 1980s,
only 10 percent of respondents reported that cohabitation was a "substitute for
marriage," while 61 percent said that it was a precursor to or "trial" period to
assess marital compatibility, and 29 percent described it as a form of core-
sidential dating.'O° Two recent surveys suggest that today's cohabitants are
even less marriage-minded than those in earlier generations. In a small survey
of New York City cohabitants, the primary reasons respondents gave for
cohabitation were finances, convenience, and housing needs; only two of the
25 interviewees mentioned discussing marriage prior to moving in with their
partners."' Those respondents who had talked about marriage typically had
cohabited about two years before doing so, but the researchers also found
"substantial variation in the tempo of relationship development.""' In a larger
2002 survey, Wendy Manning and Pamela Smock found that none of the
cohabitants they interviewed were deciding between marriage and cohabita-
tion at the time they began living together. Decisionmaking instead focused
on "whether to cohabit or to remain single, with marriage not seriously entering
the picture." As a twenty-nine-year-old male stock clerk put it: "I wasn't
ready, I mean to get... that close to somebody, and I mean I lived with her
but we still had our freedom we still let each other do what we wanted to do so
I had my space and she had her space."".2 For the men and women Manning
and Smock interviewed, the fact of cohabitation simply could not be interpreted
as an act of marital commitment.
Manning and Smock also found that the line between cohabitation and
living alone was often "quite blurry, with the movement into cohabitation
107. Id. at 110.
108. Cohabitants also more closely resemble single individuals than they do married couples
with respect to home ownership, childbearing intentions, and employment. See generally Ronald R.
Rindfuss & Audrey VandenHeuvel, Cohabitation: A Precursor to Marriage or an Alternative to Being
Single?, 16 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 703 (1990).
109. See CASPER & BIANCHI, supra note 93, at 59 tbl.2.5.
110. See Sharon Sassier, The Process of Entering Into Cohabiting Unions, 66 J. MARRIAGE &
FAM. 491, 498-501 (2004).
111. Id. at 502.
112. WENDY MANNING & PAMELA J. SMOCK, MEASURING AND MODELING COHABITATION:
NEW PERSPECTIVES FROM QUALITATIVE DATA 26 (Bowling Green Working Paper 10-03, 2003),
available at http://www.bgsu.edu/organizations/cfdr/research/pdf/2003/2003-10.pdf.
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often described as a gradual or unfolding process that occurs over a week, or
even months. '.. Thus a twenty-year-old Hispanic packaging technician
reported that he generally stayed at his girlfriend's house three or four days a
week, but
[m]aybe sometimes I'll stay with her 2 weeks, and I won't even be at my
house I'll just show up. I'm like, you'll never know when I pop back in
my house. I pay rent and she's like, "you know, that's stupid. You pay
350 a month and your roommate pays 350 a month and you're not
even there." I'm like, "I know, I could be using that 350 for a place for
me and you."... 4
Many interviewees had difficulty defining when they started living together,
and those who had broken up often had difficulty pinning down when their
relationships ended. Manning and Smock thus conclude that "[t]he process
of deciding to cohabit is not necessarily planned or deliberate and thus
appears to differ in important ways from processes determining entry into
marriage."' 5 These conclusions are not novel; in a pioneering study of cohabit-
ing college students conducted during the 1970s, sociologist Eleanor Macklin
also found that the decision to cohabit was a "gradual, often unconscious,
escalation of emotional and physical involvement""1 6 that "was seldom the
result of a considered decision, at least initially.""1 7
The fact that cohabitants do not typically see their relationships as
marital does not mean that they have rejected marriage. In a 1994 national
survey, more than 90 percent of cohabiting respondents reported that they
planned to marry at some point."8 Although the percentage of cohabitants
who report the belief that they will eventually marry their current partner
has declined, about three-quarters say that they will do so."'
113. Id. at 14.
114. Id. at 17.
115. Id. at 26.
116. Eleanor D. Macklin, Nonmarital Heterosexual Cohabitation, MARRIAGE & FAM. REV.,
Mar./Apr. 1978, at 1, 6, quoted in MANNING & SMOCK, supra note 112, at 7.
117. Eleanor D. Macklin, Heterosexual Cohabitation Among Unmarried College Students, 21
FAM. COORDINATOR 463,466 (1972), quoted in MANNING & SMOCK, supra note 112, at 29.
118. See John D. Cunningham & John K. Antill, Cohabitation and Marriage: Retrospective and
Predictive Comparisons, 11 J. SOc. & PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS 77, 77 (1994); see also Cherlin, supra
note 2, at 135 ("The typically short durations in the United States, along with expressed preferences
for marriage, suggest that marriage is still the goal for most young adults and cohabitation is still seen
as an intermediate status.").
119. See Brown & Booth, supra note 102, at 673 (stating that 76 percent of surveyed
cohabitants "report[ed] having plans to marry their partners"); Bumpass et al., supra note 102, at 922
tbl. 10 (showing that 81 percent of never-married cohabitants and 63 percent of previously married
cohabitants said that they had "definite plans" or "think... [they] will eventually marry" their
current partner); Manning & Smock, supra note 96, at 1073 tbl.1.
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Although much of the research evidence comes from the United States,
foreign reports show fairly consistent patterns. Cohabitation in other countries
also tends to be a short-lived state."' Like their American counterparts,
cohabitants abroad are less likely than married couples to have children and
to pool funds. 2' They have not typically rejected marriage, and often report
that they are likely to marry their partners."'
Because of its relative rarity, long-term cohabitation has produced much
less evidence, both in the United States and abroad. The available research
does not show that long-term cohabitation is more marriage-like than short-
term cohabitation, however: First, cohabitant surveys do not show that longer
cohabitation periods are associated with more resource sharing. In Blumstein
& Schwartz's survey, couples who had cohabited for a period between two
and ten years were no more likely to pool funds than those whose relation-
ships had endured less than two years; 23 a cross-national survey also revealed
that Swedish cohabitants, whose relationships are typically longer than the
120. See, e.g., JOHN ERMISCH & MARCO FRANCESCONI, COHABITATION IN GREAT
BRITAIN: NOT FOR LONG, BUT HERE TO STAY 6 (Inst. for Soc. & Econ. Research, University of
Essex, working paper, 1998) (stating that the median length of U.K. cohabiting relationships is under
two years and only 4 percent of cohabiting relationships last more than ten years), available at
http://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/pubs/workpaps/pdf/98-lrev.pdf; Kathleen Kiernan, Cohabitation in Western
Europe, 96 POPULATION TRENDS 25, 29 tbl.6 (1999) (stating that the median duration of first-union
cohabitations in ten western European countries was 26 months or less; Sweden had a 48-month
median duration); Zheng Wu & T.R. Balakrishnan, Dissolution of Premarital Cohabitation in Canada,
32 DEMOGRAPHY 521, 526 tbl.1 (1995) (stating that in Canada, 28 percent of female respondents'
and 25 percent of male respondents' cohabiting relationships that did not lead to marriage survived
five years).
121. See Helen Glezer & Eva Mills, Controlling the Purse Strings, 29 FAM. MATTERS 35, 36 tbl.2
(1991) (showing that 27 percent of Australian cohabitants and 71 percent of married couples
combined their incomes); Grainer, supra note 11, at 313 (stating that 1996 New Zealand census data
showed that "49.0% of women in de facto relationships did not have children, compared to 12.1% of
married women"); Heimdal & Houseknecht, supra note 99, at 534 (stating that Swedish cohabitants
were not significantly more likely to pool inc,.me than U.S. cohabitants, despite longer duration of
relationships); Clara H. Mulder, The Effects of Singlehood and Cohabitation on the Transition to
Parenthood in the Netherlands, 24 J. FAM. IsSUES 291, 304 (2003) (stating that cohabitation was
associated with a significantly smaller long-term likelihood of becoming a parent and positing higher
dissolution rate of cohabitations as a reason); see also Supriya Singh &Jo Lindsay, Money in Heterosexual
Relationships, 32 AUSTL. &N.Z.J. SoC. 57 (1996).
122. See Lixia Qu, Expectations of Marriage Among Cohabiting Couples, 64 FAM. MATTERS 35,
36 (2003) (stating that in survey of more than 1300 Australian cohabitants, 57 percent of men and
52 percent of men said that they were "likely" or "very likely" to marry their current partner, while
roughly one-quarter felt marriage to be "unlikely" or "very unlikely"); Lyall, supra note 10 (describing
attitudes of European cohabitants who chose to register their partnerships instead of marrying). But
see Lynn Jamieson et al., Cohabitation and Commitment: Partnership Plans of Young Men and Women,
50 SOC. REV. 356, 362 tbl.2 (2002) (stating that 72 percent of never-married 20-29-year-old
Scottish cohabitants said that they had "set[ I up a home" because "I wanted to commit myself to our
relationship").
123. See BLUMSTEIN & SCHWARTZ, supra note 98, at 95 fig.8.
American and European norm, were not more likely to pool resources than
their American counterparts. 4 Second, researchers have found that longer
cohabitation periods are negatively correlated with relationship stability and
quality. Susan L. Brown employed data from the U.S. National Survey of
Families and Households to compare the perceived quality of cohabiting and
marital relationships and found that long-term marriage typically produced
the perception of relationship stability while cohabitation that did not lead to
marriage tended instead to produce a high level of perceived instability.-2
Brown and a coresearcher also report that the duration of a cohabiting relation-
ship is significantly-and negatively--correlated with several variables related
to relationship quality.'26
In sum, the evidence fails to show that marriage and cohabitation are
functionally equivalent or that the law inappropriately distinguishes between
them: Married and cohabiting couples tend to behave and view their relation-
ships differently. Cohabitants are much less likely than married couples to
share or pool resources. Cohabitation usually functions, in the eyes of cohabitants
themselves, as a substitute for being single, not for being married. Cohabitation
thus does not imply marital commitment. Nor, given its typically short
duration and limited sharing, is it likely that cohabitation generally induces
dependency or leads to unjust enrichment.
This is not to say that cohabitation never resembles marriage. In describ-
ing reasons why couples fail to marry, the ALl notes that
Some begin a casual relationship that develops slowly into a durable
union, by which time a formal marriage ceremony may seem awkward or
even unnecessary, for many Americans entertain the widespread, albeit
124. See Heimdal & Houseknecht, supra note 99, at 532-33. However, one economist who
employed a labor-supply model to infer cohabitants' sharing behavior, does report that, using her
model, "income sharing is not rejected" for cohabitants in "longer-term" relationships. Winkler,
supra note 99, at 1079.
125. Susan L. Brown, Relationship Quality Dynamics of Cohabiting Unions, 24 J. FAM. ISSUES
583, 598 (2003). Brown also found that plans to marry were associated with lower levels of relationship
instability in short relationships, but not in long ones. "This finding implies that cohabitors with
marriage plans expect that their unions will be transformed quickly into marriages. When these
expectations are not met, cohabitors perceive greater instability. In contrast, couples who do not
desire marriage gain confidence over time that their relationships will remain intact." Id. at 595-96.
Brown and Booth also found that plans to marry are an important factor in differentiating among
cohabiting relationships. Although cohabitants, in general, reported lower-quality relationships than
married couples, those cohabitants with plans to marry reported relationships of similar quality.
Brown & Booth, supra note 102, at 675.
126. Brown & Booth, supra note 102, at 674; see also Bumpass et al., supra note 102, at 922
tbl. 10 (showing a higher proportion of cohabitants whose relationships had lasted at least three years
said that, during the past year, they had "thought that [their] ... relationship might be in trouble"
than cohabitants whose relationships had lasted less than one year).
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erroneous, belief that the mere passage of time transforms cohabi-
tation into common-law marriage. Failure to marry may reflect group
mores; some ethnic and social groups have a substantially lower
incidence of marriage and a substantially higher incidence of infor-
mal domestic relationships than do others. 127
Ira Ellman also offers the case of Terri and Eliot Friedman 28 as an example of
marriage-like cohabitation.' The Friedmans' relationship endured for 25 years
and produced two children. Terri and Eliot apparently "vowed to be husband
and wife and to strive to be partners in all respects 'without any sanction by
the State' ; 0 they also took title to property as husband and wife, filed joint
income tax returns, and "Mrs." Friedman assumed a marital name."'
The Friedmans and the more general examples offered by the ALl unde-
niably demonstrate marriage-like relationships. Indeed, in a state recognizing
common law marriage, a court would likely find that some, if not all, of these
couples were married. Certainly the Friedmans and the couple who feel that
"a formal marriage ceremony... [is] awkward... [and] unnecessary" because
their relationship has evolved into a common law marriage should be declared
husband and wife.'32 The pair who failed to formally marry because they belong
to an "ethnic or social group ... [with] a substantially lower incidence of [formal]
marriage" may also have entered into a common law marriage.' Conduct
can evidence consent, and Homer Clark, reviewing the case law, reports that
courts thus tend to rely on "the duration and character of the relationship" as
a means of inferring whether there was a marital agreement and "making
good the bona fide expectations of the parties.' 3 4
Conscriptive rules are unnecessary to vindicate the interests of couples
who have made genuine marital commitments; either a revivified common
law marriage doctrine or any of several, narrowly tailored equitable remedies
would avert unjust enrichment in this small group of cases. I will evaluate these
reform possibilities in Part IV. My point here is simply that the existence of
127. ALl PRINCIPLES, supra note 13, § 6.02 cmt. a (emphasis added).
128. Friedman v. Friedman, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 892 (Ct. App. 1993).
129. Ellman, supra note 28, at 1371. For comparable fact patterns, see, for example, Morone
v. Morone, 413 N.E.2d 1154 (N.Y. 1980), and Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204 (I11 1979).
130. Friedman, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 902 (Poch6, J., dissenting).
131. Id. at 901-02 (Poch6, J., dissenting).
132. ALl PRINCIPLES, supra note 13, § 6.02, cmt. a.
133. Id. The ALl also offers the example of couples who "have been unhappy in prior
marriages and therefore wish to avoid the form of marriage even as they enjoy its substance with a
domestic partner." Id. (emphasis added). This example is less likely to represent a common law
marriage given the parties' conscious choice to avoid marriage. The ALl fails to explain why the
once-bitten couple's decision to avoid marriage should not be honored.
134. CLARK, supra note 22, at 50-51.
some, relatively rare cases of marriage-like cohabitation does not justify the
imposition of conscriptive rules on the vast majority of cohabitants whose
relationships are not marriage-like. Rules should be narrowly tailored to avoid
wasteful litigation and ensure consistent results that reflect the relevant
policy goals. Black-letter rules and presumptions should fit the typical case,
not the atypical.
2. Does It Make More Sense to Require Cohabiting Couples to Contract
Out or Contract In?
The evidence on equivalence establishes that it would be grossly unfair
to treat all or even most cases of cohabitation like marriage: despite a small
number of marriage-like relationships, cohabitants typically do not see their
relationships as marital and do not behave like married couples; moreover,
because most cohabitations are short-lived and involve relatively little
sharing, unjust enrichment that might give rise to equitable claims should be
relatively rare.
Perhaps because the evidence does not support the uniform imposition of
marital obligation on cohabitants, both the New Zealand De Facto Relationships
Act and the ALL Principles tend to rely on presumptions instead of black-
letter rules. Except in the case of a couple who "have maintained a common
household... with their common child ... for a continuous period that
equals or exceeds a duration... set in a rule of statewide application," the
ALl Principles merely presume that a couple not related by blood or adoption
are "domestic partners" when "they have maintained a common household"
for a state-specified period.'35 The presumption is invariably "rebuttable by evi-
dence that the parties did not share life together as a couple, as defined by
Paragraph (7).''"6 And paragraph (7) lists thirteen different factors-all of which
require individualized inquiry by the fact-finder-that might singly or in com-
bination provide the basis for such a rebuttal. 7 The New Zealand statute
135. ALl PRINCIPLES, supra note 13, §§ 6.03(2)-(3).
136. Id. § 6.03(3).
137. Paragraph 7 lists the following factors:
(a) the oral or written statements or promises made to one another, or representations
jointly made to third parties, regarding their relationship;
(b) the extent to which the parties intermingled their finances;
(c) the extent to which their relationship fostered the parties' economic interdependence,
or the economic dependence of one party upon the other;
(d) the extent to which the parties engaged in conduct and assumed specialized or
collaborative roles in furtherance of their life together;
(e) the extent to which the relationship wrought change in the life of either or both parties;
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takes an even more individualized approach. In determining "whether two
persons live together as a couple," the statute requires that "a!! the circum-
stances of the relationship are to be taken into account."'' 8 Although the
statute contains a factor list,'39 "no finding in respect of any of the matters
[described in the list] ... , or in respect of any combination of them, is to be
regarded as necessary." The New Zealand and ALl approaches thus reinvent
common law marriage, but redirect-and vastly expand-its focus.
This is an odd choice because common law marriage has fallen from
favor in large part because of the evidentiary problems that individualized
fact-finding entails. At one time, nearly two-thirds of the states recognized
common law marriage; by 2002, only twelve did so,"' and two of the twelve
had adopted strict limitations on its establishment.1
2
(f) the extent to which the parties acknowledged responsibilities to each other, as by
naming the other the beneficiary of life insurance or of a testamentary instrument, or as
eligible to receive benefits under an employee-benefit plan;
(g) the extent to which the parties' relationship was treated by the parties as qualitatively
distinct from the relationship either party had with any other person;
(h) the emotional or physical intimacy of the parties' relationship;
(i) the parties' community reputation as a couple;
(j) the parties' participation in a commitment ceremony or registration as a domestic
partnership;
(k) the parties' participation in a void or voidable marriage that, under applicable law, does
not give rise to the economic incidents of marriage;
(1) the parties' procreation of, adoption of, or joint assumption of parental functions toward a child;
(m) the parties' maintenance of a common household, as defined by Paragraph (4).
Id. § 6.03(7).
138. Property (Relationships) Amendment Act, 2001 § 2D(2) (N.Z.) (emphasis added).
139. Judges are directed to take into account "any of the following matters that are relevant
in a particular case:"
(a) the duration of the relationship:
(b) the nature and extent of common residence:
(c) whether or not a sexual relationship exists:
(d) the degree of financial dependence or interdependence, and any arrangements for
financial support, between the parties:
(e) the ownership, use, and acquisition of property:
(f) the degree of mutual commitment to a shared life:
(g) the care and support of children:
(h) the performance of household duties:
(i) the reputation and public aspects of the relationship.
Id.
140. Id. § 2D(3)(a). Section 3(b) goes on to specify that "a Court is entitled to have regard to
such matters, and to attach such weight to any matter, as may seem appropriate to the Court in the
circumstances of the case." Id. § 3(b).
141. See KRAUSE ET AL., supra note 26, at 87.
142. See TEx. FAm. CODE ANN. § 2.402(b) (Vernon 1998) (requiring affirmation of the
marriage in a state "declaration form"); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-4.5(2) (1998) (requiring establish-
ment of common law marriage within one year of its dissolution).
The decline of common law marriage reflects the sad fact that litigation-
based determination of marital commitment "leads to fraud and uncertainty
in the most important of human relationships. 143 Unsurprisingly, more complex
formulations of the requirements for a common law marriage produce more
fraud and uncertainty than simpler ones. Even a five-factor requirement list
led appellate Judge Jackson of Utah to expostulate that, "[iun litigation[,] each
element becomes a source of dispute." Judge Jackson urged "a simpler scheme
with fewer elements" if the legislature "wants to keep some form of common-
law marriage,"'44 but his clear preference was abolition of the doctrine outright:
"Most American states have already experimented with this doctrine. Based
on their experience, all but ten have repealed common-law marriage. Utah
should not recycle this great experiment.
1 45
The common law marriage "experiment" demands factual inquiry into
only two issues, whether there was a present agreement to be married and
whether the couple publicly held themselves out as married. If these two
facts are so hard to determine that the potential for fraud and uncertainty
outweighs the benefit of the doctrine, then one must assume that the "any-
thing relevant to life as a couple" approach of the De Facto Relationships Act
or ALl Principles would produce even more fraud and uncertainty, with even
less offsetting benefit.
Although the ALl Principles do attempt to reduce uncertainty by estab-
lishing a presumption in favor of a domestic partnership whenever a couple
has maintained a common household for a statutory period,'46 they fail to
specify what facts are adequate to rebut the partnership presumption. Instead,
they direct the fact-finder to consider thirteen different factors that together
encompass virtually every aspect of a relationship. Each of the thirteen factors
is relevant; none is determinative. Most of the factors require an incremental
assessment; none identifies a threshold level of significance.
Thus, under either the ALl Principles or New Zealand statute, many, if
not most, cohabiting couples would be hard-pressed to accurately predict
143. CLARK, supra note 22, at 59; see aLso Cynthia Grant Bowman, A Feminist Proposal to Bring
Back Common Law Marriage, 75 OR. L. REV. 709, 731-50 (1996). Bowman reviewed historical data
and concluded that the abolition of common law marriage reflected the elimination of the
"frontier conditions" rationale for informal marriage; fears of fraud in the transmission of
property; a desire to protect marriage and the family against alternative forms of sexual
unions; racism and eugenics; the movement to maintain vital statistics and enforce various
health-related requirements for marriage through the licensing process; and administrative
and judicial efficiency.
Id.
144. Kelley v. Kelley, 9 P.3d 171, 184 (Utah Ct. App. 2000) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
145. Id. at 185 (Jackson, J. dissenting).
146. ALl PRINCIPLES, supra note 13, § 6.03(3).
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whether their relationships had produced legal obligations or not. As a New
Zealand family law expert rather tamely put it, "the notion of 'de facto
relationship' is not always a certain one":
There will be marginal cases where a court has to decide whether two
people have lived together as a couple in accordance with the statutory
formula. However, even if they have so lived, it will not always be
clear when they started and when they ended a de facto relationship. It
may be that there was an association of several years but it attracted
the quality of "de facto relationship" only after a period of time. When
it actually ended may be a matter of dispute as well, especially if the
quality of the relationship slowly but inexorably declined. The precise
facts of each case will of course have to be carefully weighed.
1 47
Uncertainty is enhanced by the fact that cohabitants do not always
agree about the nature of their relationships. Researchers have found that,
20 to 40 percent of the time, cohabitants express different views on whether
they plan to marry each other. 41 Moreover, in one survey, about a third of
the time, only one cohabitant felt that the couple spent a lot of time
together; and in 26 percent of the cases, only one cohabitant reported a high
degree of happiness with the relationship.'49
Another source of uncertainty lies in the fact that, while marriage
involves only one spouse, de facto relationships may be multiple:
It is quite possible that a person may have a marriage and de facto
relationship occurring at the same time, with the result that the married
and unmarried partner compete for the same property. Likewise, there
could be two de facto relationships. Do they share a third each? Or do
the two competing partners split half of the property down the middle,
getting a quarter each?
5 0
A final source of uncertainty is the lack of prototypes. Neither the ALL
Principles nor New Zealand's De Facto Relationships Act provide any models
of relationships that should produce obligation and those that should not.
Significantly-and despite the claim that cohabitation is a functional equivalent
147. Atkin, supra note 11, at 318; see also Grainer, supra note 11, at 303 (noting that "[the
operative phrase 'living together as a couple' is hardly less vague than the term 'de facto relationship.'
Nor is the matter significantly clarified by the enumerated factors. Taken together, they cover virtually
every aspect of human interaction.").
148. See Susan L. Brown, Union Transitions Among Cohabiters: The Significance of Relationship
Assessments, and Expectations, 62 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 833, 838 (2000); Bumpass et al., supra note
102, at 923; Sharon Sassier & James McNally, Cohabiting Couple's Economic Circumstances and Union
Transitions: A Re-Examination Using Multiple Imputation Techniques, 32 SOC. SCI. RES. 553, 568 (2004)
(stating that 42 percent of surveyed cohabiting couples disagreed about the future of their relationship).
149. See Brown, supra note 148, at 838.
150. Atkin, supra note 11, at 321.
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of marriage-neither statute so much as mentions the word marriage. We thus
cannot assume that a relationship must be "marriage-like" for a court to find
that it has produced marital obligations; indeed, we must assume the opposite.
But neither statute says anything about how close to marriage-in commitment
(to what?), sharing, and intimacy-a relationship must be in order to satisfy the
statutory standard.
In sum, although the individualized approach offered by the ALl and
New Zealand avoids the peril of rigid, counterfactual classification, it instead
produces enormous uncertainty, vastly increases the likelihood that litigation
alone will determine a couple's status, and creates a serious risk of inconsistent
outcomes. This approach does not even tell us what sort of relationship it is
intended to capture, let alone provide structured guidance on how to separate
the right sort from the wrong sort.
Of course, it is possible to avoid individualized inquiry. The ALl has
taken this approach for couples who share a "common child" and have
cohabited for the requisite period.5 ' Some of the Canadian provinces also
utilize a pure passage-of-time-while-coresident rule in determining support
obligations." 2 This passage-of-time approach avoids the uncertainty and
litigation hazard of fact-based inquiry, but it greatly increases the likelihood
that marital obligations will be imposed on those who do not, in fact, have
a marriage-like relationship. Unless the fact of cohabitation itself provides
strong evidence of commitment or another basis for the imposition of mari-
tal obligation-evidence that cannot be found in the research literature
charting systematic differences between cohabitation and marriage-this
approach risks the inappropriate classification of many cohabitants.
Both the ALl and New Zealand approaches do give cohabitants the
right to opt out of conscription, but there are many reasons to doubt that
this will solve the problems. First, few cohabiting couples currently enter
into contracts even though they are legally empowered to do so.'53 Second,
151. ALl PRINCIPLES, supra note 13, § 6.03(2).
152. See Bala, supra note 8, at 42-53.
153. Ira Ellman notes:
Real data on the frequency of contracting are scarce, but the basic claim is not in serious
dispute. Certainly written agreements are rare among the reported cases... [and an experienced
attorney] whose practice focuses on unmarried couples.., told [the author] ... that in his
experience the proportion of such couples who enter written agreements is "miniscule."
Ellman, supra note 28, at 1367 n.17; see also Kirsti Storm Bull, Non-Marital Cohabitation in Norway,
30 SCANDINAVIAN STUD. L. 29,39 (1986) (stating that 5 percent of surveyed Danish and Norwegian
cohabitants had entered into contracts). Ironically, contracts seem to be more frequently employed
by couples with committed relationships. See Jennifer K. Robbennolt & Monica Kirkpatrick Johnson,
Legal Planning for Unmarried Committed Partners: Empirical Lessons for a Preventative and Therapeutic
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because cohabitation often develops over time, there is no obvious event
that signals the need to contract out:
Some couples, for whom it would be preferable to contract out, may
not do so because of ignorance of the need or desirability to do so.
Others may be unrealistically optimistic about the chances of the
success of their relationship, or may be uncomfortable about raising
and addressing issues about property with their partners."'
Still others will be inhibited by the time and high cost of entering into an
agreement.
Even if all cohabitants who should opt out did so, the associated dis-
comfort, expense, and inconvenience are large disadvantages of the conscriptive
approach: Cohabitants in what may well be short-lived relationships will be
required to spend time, money, and emotional energy to protect themselves
against a lawsuit that might eventuate if their relationship doesn't lead to mar-
riage but still lasts long enough to trigger a lawsuit upon its termination. Given
the frequency of cohabitation and the relative youth and poverty of the
typical cohabitant, these costs-and the potential inequity resulting from a
failure to bear them-weigh heavily against the conscriptive alternative.
Of course, the harms associated with conscription would be reduced
with standards that demand a lengthy relationship. Given that 90 percent of
cohabitations end or result in marriage within five years,55 a statute that
required, say, a six-year cohabitation period would automatically eliminate
the vast majority of those who might be affected.'56 A "long-relationship"
Approach, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 417, 436 (1999) (stating that in a survey of 169 "committed" cohabiting
couples, 29 percent had written agreements).
154. Grainer, supra note 11, at 315; see also Bala, supra note 8, at 54-55 ("People are generally
not psychologically prepared to make contracts about their personal relationships, and the evolving
roles and expectations of the partners in non-marital relationships in any event tend to make contracts
problematic when dealing with familial rights and obligations.").
155. See sources cited supra notes 89-90.
156. Professor Elizabeth Scott has proposed revision of the ALl Principles along these lines.
Under Scott's proposal, cohabitation for five years would establish a presumption of intent to
undertake marital obligations. Scott's proposal thus improves on the ALI model by requiring the
fact-finder to focus on marital commitment and sharply limiting the pool of potential cases. See
Elizabeth S. Scott, Marriage, Cohabitation and Collective Responsibility for Dependency, 2004 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 225. Scott argues that a "period of five years or more, for example, supports a presumption
that the relationship was marriage-like and discourages opportunistic and marginal claims. At that
point, the party challenging the contractual obligation can fairly be required to demonstrate that the
parties' intent was not to undertake marital obligations and that the union was of a different kind."
Id. at 259. Scott's assumption that relational duration supports a presumption of marital intent is
based on the claim that, "[flor most parties in relationships of long duration, the presumption that
the union is marriage-like probably represents accurately the parties' explicit or implicit understand-
ing about property sharing and support, and thus the framework simply functions as a standard
majoritarian default." Id.
approach is clearly preferable to current conscriptive rules. But this conscriptive
approach does not resolve any of the problems I have identified; it merely
confines them to a smaller group. Individuals who do not know how long their
relationships will endure must still contract out of obligations in order to
avoid the possibility of expensive, time-consuming litigation. Courts must still
conduct individualized, fact-based inquiries. The potential for fraud, uncer-
tainty, and inconsistency is still high. Most importantly, a long-relationship
model still cannot ensure that cohabitation is associated with marital commit-
ment or dependency-causation. The available evidence simply does not show
that longer relationships are typically marital: Researchers have found that
longer duration of a cohabiting relationship is negatively correlated with
variables related to relationship quality;'57couples who have cohabited for
longer periods do not seem more inclined to pool their resources.'58
The claim that conscriptive rules are practical thus appears to have no
sounder basis than the claim that cohabitation and marriage are functional
equivalents. Individualized inquiry into a couple's understandings and behav-
ior produces highly uncertain obligations that can only be determined after
time-consuming and expensive litigation. Status-based rules that infer marital
obligation from easily ascertained facts such as a common child or the mainte-
nance of a common residence for a defined period avoid the uncertainty and
expense inherent in individualized inquiry, but create serious risks of
misclassification.
C. Disadvantages of Conscriptive Rules: Discordant Values
and the Devaluation of Marriage
Not only does the evidence fail to support the claims made on behalf
of conscriptive rules, but conscription entails other, serious disadvantages.
1. Conscription Erodes the Integrity and Coherence of Our Law
First, because the evidence strongly suggests that marriage and cohabi-
tation only rarely involve similar commitments, behaviors, and dependencies,
conscriptive rules may erode the integrity and coherence both of family law
157. Brown & Booth, supra note 102, at 674; see also Bumpass et al., supra note 102, at 922
tbl.10 (stating that a higher proportion of cohabitants whose relationships had lasted at least three
years said that, during the past year, they had "thought that [their]... relationship might be in trouble"
than cohabitants whose relationships had lasted less than one year).
158. See BLUMSTEIN & SCHWARTZ, supra note 98, at 95 fig.8; Heimdal & Houseknecht, supra
note 99, at 534 (stating that Swedish cohabitants were not significantly more likely to pool income
than U.S. cohabitants, despite longer average duration of relationships).
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and the larger law of relational obligations. As we have seen, both areas of law
have consistently relied on commitment and dependency-causation as justifica-
tions for the imposition of private relational obligations. If private obligations
may be imposed on cohabitants without such a showing, we risk introducing
into our law discordant values that have been rejected in all other cases. This
basic problem is exacerbated by the fact that conscriptive laws run counter to
"the powerful contemporary movement to recognize the parties' freedom to
contract about the terms of their relationship. 1.9  If marital obligations are
based on commitment and individualized negotiation, it is undeniably inconsis-
tent to base cohabitant obligations on a de facto relationship.
Why do we need consistency? Consistency serves to ensure the integrity
of the law, and law lacks integrity when "it must endorse principles to justify
part of what it has done that it must reject to justify the rest."'60 This kind of
"checkerboard" lawmaking violates the ethical norm that like cases receive
like treatment. It denies "what is often called 'equality before the law.' '' 61
Integrity does not demand individualized inquiry. Rules of thumb serve
both efficiency and fairness goals: They save time and money; they provide
clear notice of the applicable legal standard; they ensure that each case is
analyzed in the same way. But integrity does demand classifications that are not
markedly overinclusive or underinclusive in relation to the legislature's aims.
At times, integrity thus demands similar treatment of married and cohab-
iting couples. For example, a domestic violence law limited to married couples
"would lack coherence since exploitation of vulnerable people in relationships
does not occur exclusively in marriages.' '63  Indeed, as we have seen, domestic
violence is more common among cohabitants than married couples. Given that
domestic violence laws aim to protect the vulnerable, they should apply to all
159. David Westfall, Forcing Incidents of Marriage on Unmarried Cohabitants: The American
Law Institute's Principles of Family Dissolution, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1467, 1479 (2001).
160. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 183-84 (1986).
161. Id. at 185; see also JOSEPH RAz, Law and Value in Adjudication, in THE AUTHORITY OF
LAW 180, 201-06 (1979) (explaining reasoning from precedent in terms of shared features of new
and precedent cases and arguing that it serves the purpose of ensuring that a "new rule is a conservative
one, that it does not introduce new discordant and conflicting purposes or value into the law, that its
purpose and the values it promotes are already served by existing rules"); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL
REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 96-100 (1996) (describing virtues of analogical reasoning).
162. For example, licensing statutes of all types exclude those who cannot meet the statutory
standard even if they have the requisite skill; age-based prohibitions prevent some youths who could
show the requisite maturity from engaging in the regulated activity; public benefit laws deny aid to
the applicant who fails to meet the statutory standard, even if he could show special circumstances
that make his need equal to that of a successful applicant; tax assessments are derived from
standardized formulae that ignore an individual's underlying ability to pay.
163. BEYOND CONJUGALITY, supra note 7, ch. 2.
forms of relational violence, marital and nonmarital. It would be discriminatory
to provide remedies to one group that are unavailable to the other.
Conversely, integrity demands dissimilar treatment of married and cohab-
iting couples when, in terms of the law's underlying purpose, the vast majority
are not similarly situated. And the typical cohabitant, who has chosen not to
marry because he or she "wasn't ready.. . to get ... that close to somebody,""'
is not-for purposes of relational obligation-in the same situation as a man or
woman who has consciously and deliberately chosen to assume marital obligations.
2. Conscription Conflicts With the Ideal of Individual Autonomy
Conscriptive rules run counter to one of the most important values in
modem liberal societies, the ideal of individual autonomy. The autonomy
ideal presupposes that, absent some substantial basis for state interference,
individuals should be free to make life choices based on their own goals and
values. It also celebrates human diversity and posits individual choice as
the best means of ensuring individual attainment and happiness:
If a person possess any tolerable amount of common sense and experi-
ence, his own mode of laying out his existence is the best, not because
it is the best in itself, but because it is his own mode. Human beings
are not like sheep.... The same mode of life is a healthy excitement
to one.., while to another it is a distracting burden which suspends or
crushes all internal life. Such are the differences among human beings
in their sources of pleasure, their susceptibilities of pain, and the
operation on them of different physical and moral agencies that, unless
there is a corresponding diversity in their modes of life, they neither
obtain their fair share of happiness, nor grow up to the mental, moral,
and aesthetic stature of which their nature is capable."'
The autonomy ideal thus posits the rightful role of the state as preventing
harm to others, not imposing majoritarian values on those who have chosen a
different life course.166
In keeping with this view, the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that deci-
sionmaking about marriage, procreation, parenthood, and family relationships
is included within the liberty protected under the Fourteenth Amendment:
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a
person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and
164. MANNING & SMOCK, supra note 112, at 26.
165. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 82-83 (Currin V. Shields ed., Bobbs-Merrill 1956) (1859).
166. See id. at 13 (urging that "the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually
or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number is self-protection").
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autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own
concept of existence, of meaning .... Beliefs about these matters
could not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under
compulsion of the State.
167
Conscriptive cohabitation laws do "define attributes of personhood... under
the compulsion of the State' '168 by imposing obligations on those who have not
chosen them. As the Canadian Law Reform Commission put it, conscription
is a blunt policy tool in that it treats all conjugal relationships alike,
irrespective of the level of emotional or economic interdependency
that they may present[, and thus] infringes upon the value of autonomy.
Although people may opt out of certain statutory provisions governing
their relationships, they are not always aware of this possibility.'69
Under conscriptive rules, individuals are no longer free to choose
when, how, and whether to marry; instead, the state-after the fact-
decides for them. Conscriptive rules thus represent a form of state pater-
nalism that our legal system generally rejects and which ordinarily demands
a showing of harm to others.
3. Conscription Sends the Wrong Message About Cohabitation
and Marriage
The extension of marital obligations and rights to those who have not
made marital commitments signals-inaccurately-that marriage and
cohabitation are the same. Such a signal discourages marital commitment
and investment. Such a signal also devalues marriage, a status of enormous
symbolic importance to most citizens and one associated with greater
health, wealth, happiness, and stability than cohabitation.
The symbolic importance of marriage is easily demonstrated by recent
attempts to legalize same-sex marriage. The strong feelings of both those who
oppose and those who favor same-sex marriage make it abundantly clear that
marriage matters. Marriage remains the preferred-some would argue the
only-method of signaling full relational commitment to a partner and the
167. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992); see also Kenneth L. Karst, The
Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 637, 637 (1980) (arguing that "[ilt is the choice to form
and maintain an intimate association that permits full realization of the associational values we
cherish most").
168. Casey, 505 U.S. at 851.
169. BEYOND CONJUGALITY, supra note 7, ch. 4.
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world.7 ' Marriage vows both establish a new, publicly recognized family and
unify the marriage partners' families of origin. For many, marriage vows represent
not just a personal commitment, but an act imbued with profound religious
significance. "Marriage is more than a bundle of rights and privileges.... It's a
word that's sacred to many people, and because of its symbolic value, its
customs and history, it has superior status."''
Young American adults believe that marriage confers a wide range of
private and public benefits,' and the evidence supports their supposition.
Those who are married live longer and are less likely to become disabled than
the unmarried; they get more sleep, eat more regular meals, visit the doctor
more regularly, and abuse addictive substances less frequently.'73 Even after
controlling for age, married men earn more than either single men or cohabi-
tants;174 married couples also have a higher savings rate and thus accrue greater
170. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 71 (1996)
("Getting married signals a significantly higher level of commitment, in part because the law imposes
much greater obligations on the couple and makes it much more of a bother and expense to break
up .... Moreover, the duties and obligations of marriage directly contribute to interpersonal
commitment.").
171. Tamar Lewin, For Better or Worse: Marriage's Stormy Future, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2003,
§ 4, at 1 (quoting historian Nancy Cott). In a 2004 national survey, 28 percent of respondents said
that marriage was "mostly a legal matter," 46 percent that it was "mostly a religious matter," and 22
percent that it was "both equally." Four percent reported no opinion. See Princeton Research
Assocs. Int'l, Newsweek Poll (Mar. 9, 2004) (Question ID USPSRNEW.022104, R26).
172. See Raley, supra note 1, at 34 (stating that most young adults aged twenty to twenty-
nine tend to believe that they would be happier, "more economically secure, have more emotional
security, a better sex life, and a higher standard of living if they were married"); see also BARBARA
DAFOE WHITEHEAD & DAVID POPENOE, NAT'L MARRIAGE PROJECT, CHANGES IN TEEN
ATTITUDES TOWARD MARRIAGE, COHABITATION AND CHILDREN 1975-1995 (1999), available
at http://marriage.rutgers.edu/Publications/pubteena.htm (finding that respondent teenagers over-
whelmingly reported that they would marry and approximately three-quarters reported that a good
marriage is "extremely important").
173. See WAITE & GALLAGHER, supra note 101, at 47-64 (summarizing research). However, the
evidence is conflicting on whether the married rate their health more highly than the unmarried. See
Linda J. Waite, Trends in Men's and Women's Well-Being in Marriage, in THE TIES THAT BIND, supra
note 1, at 368, 375-79. But see Zheng Wu et al., "In Sickness and in Health": Does Cohabitation
Count?, 24 J. FAM. ISSUES 811, 831 (2003) ("Once controls are added, health differences between
the married and the cohabiting lose statistical significance."). Selection effects may also account for
some of the reported differences between married and cohabiting couples. Id.
174. "[TIhe general consensus in the literature is that controlling for other observable
characteristics, married men are simply more productive than unmarried men." Jeffrey S. Gray &
Michel J. Vanderhart, On the Determination of Wages: Does Marriage Matter?, in THE TIES THAT
BIND, supra note 1, at 356, 356. They tend to work longer hours and to choose higher-paying jobs
and professions. See also WAITE & GALLAGHER, supra note 101, at 99-105; Oppenheimer, supra
note 96, at 146-47. The "marriage premium" has declined, however, for reasons that are poorly
understood. See generally Philip N. Cohen, Cohabitation and the Declining Marriage Premium for
Men, 29 WORK & OCCUPATIONS 346 (2002) (reviewing evidence).
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wealth than the unmarried."5 Married individuals rate their happiness and
mental health more highly than the unmarried;'76 they experience less
domestic violence and greater physical security.'77
Some of the benefits associated with marriage undoubtedly result from
"selection" effects rather than marriage itself; if those who marry are
healthier, wealthier, and happier to begin with, they should maintain these
advantages after marriage. Social scientists continue to debate the extent to
which marital benefits derive from the preexisting attributes of those who
marry or the married state. Although preexisting attributes are certainly
important, the evidence also suggests that some portion of the marriage
"premium" results from marriage itself.'75
175. See Joseph P. Lupton & James P. Smith, Marriage, Assets, and Savings, in MARRIAGE
AND THE ECONOMY 129, 143-51 (Shoshana A. Grossbard-Shechtman ed., 2003) (finding that
because married couples have a significantly higher savings rate than any other type of household,
they accumulate far more assets).
176. See Waite, supra note 173, at 373-75 tbl.19.2 (showing that reported happiness levels of
married individuals exceeded those of the never-married, previously married, and cohabiting (which
tended to be comparable) and concluding that "the happiness advantage of the married and the
disadvantage of being unmarried are roughly similar in size for men and women.... [T]he situation
has not changed over the past 35 years."); see also Susan L. Brown, Moving From Cohabitation to
Marriage: Effects on Relationship Quality, 33 J. Soc. Scd. RES. 1, 16-17 (2004) (stating that in a
national sample, cohabitants who married reported higher levels of relationship happiness as well
as lower levels of relationship instability, disagreements, and violent conflict than those who
remained cohabiting, net of time-1 relationship quality and sociodemographic controls); Russell P.D.
Burton, Global Integrative Meaning as a Mediating Factor in the Relationship Between Social Roles and
Psychological Distress, 39 J. HEALTH & Soc. BEHAV. 201, 212 (1998) (concluding that the sense of
purpose associated with marriage was responsible for better psychological health of husbands and
wives); Kathleen A. Lamb et al., Union Formation and Depression: Selection and Relationship Effects, 65
J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 953, 960 (2003) (reporting no evidence of selection of less depressed persons
into either marriage or cohabitation, but a negative effect of entry into marriage on depression, par-
ticularly when marriage was not preceded by cohabitation); Nock, supra note 95, at 68-69 tbl.1
(finding that married individuals reported significantly higher levels of happiness than cohabitants).
177. See Waite, supra note 173, at 381 tbl.19.6, 382 (stating that cohabitants with no plans
to marry are "substantially and significantly" more likely to report couple violence than either
married or engaged couples); sources cited supra note 101.
178. See, e.g., Gray & Vanderhart, supra note 174, at 365-66 (finding that higher divorce
probabilities are significantly associated with lower marital wage premiums); Hyoun K. Kim &
Patrick C. McKenry, The Relationship Between Marriage and Psychological Well-Being: A Longitudinal
Analysis, 23 J. FAM. ISSUES 885, 885 (2002) (finding that data confirmed the strong effects of marital
status on psychological well-being and showed that the transition to cohabiting did not have the
same beneficial effects as marriage for psychological well-being, suggesting that the protective effects
of marriage are greater than those of cohabiting relationships); Pamela J. Smock et al., The Effect of
Marriage and Divorce on Women's Economic Well-Being, 64 AM. SOC. REV. 794, 809 (1999) (reviewing
evidence and concluding that "the economic benefits of marriage are large, even above and beyond
the characteristics of those who marry"); Ingrid Waldron et al., Marriage Protection and Marriage
Selection-Prospective Evidence for Reciprocal Effects of Marital-Status and Health, 43 SOC. SCI. & MED.
113 (1996) (finding significant marriage-protection health effects for women based on a national
sample, but only among women who were not employed).
Why would marriage produce health, wealth, and happiness benefits?
First, "[tihe public commitment and the involvement of friends and relatives
create an enforceable trust that is not present in cohabiting unions. It allows
couples to have more confidence that their investments in the union will be
recouped."'79 Even with today's high divorce rate, marital investments in sexual
fidelity,"s° children, and capital goods such as a home are far more secure than
the investments made by cohabitants.
Second, marriage still "signifies that the partners have successfully ful-
filled their adult social roles":
Marriage has long been seen as a mark of successful adulthood for
women because of its association with childbearing. But it also is crucial
for defining what it means to be an adult male in American society....
Marriage ... leads to noticeable changes in their public behavior:
married men spend more time with relatives or at religious services and
events, and less time with friends and at bars or taverns, than they did
before they married. It is the way that men in American society have
taken on the culturally prescribed roles of wage earner, father, and
public citizen.181
To be sure, higher divorce rates, rising rates of cohabitation, and later
marriage have all weakened both the stability and status associated with mar-
riage. But across nations and cultures, marriage is still associated with higher
levels of subjective well-being.'82
179. Cherlin, supra note 2, at 136-37.
180. Despite large increases in approval of premarital sex, attitudes toward extramarital sex
have remained consistently negative, and "if anything, there has been a movement toward less
freedom for extramarital sex." Arland Thornton & Linda Young-DeMarco, Four Decades of Trends in
Attitudes Toward Family Issues in the United States: The 1960s Through the 1990s, 63 J. MARRIAGE &
FAM. 1009,1027-28 (2001).
181. Cherlin, supra note 2, at 137.
182. See Ed Diener et al., Similarity of the Relations Between Marital Status and Subjective Well-Being
Across Cultures, 31 J. CROSS-CULTURAL PSYCHOL. 419, 434 (2000) (concluding, based on a 42-
nation survey, that the positive relationship "between marital status and subjective well-being" did
not differ by gender and was "very similar" across the world); Steven Stack & J. Ross Eshleman,
Marital Status and Happiness: A 17-Nation Study, 60 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 527, 534 (1998) (finding
that "married persons have a significantly higher level of happiness than persons who are not married.
This effect was independent of financial and health-oriented protections offered by marriage and was
also independent of other control variables, including ones for sociodemographic conditions and
national character."). Although cohabitants had a higher level of happiness than single persons,
their happiness level was still "less than one quarter of [that] ... of married persons." Id. at 531; see
also Arne Mastekaasa, The Subjective Well-Being of the Previously Married: The Importance of Unmarried
Cohabitation and Time Since Widowhood or Divorce, 73 Soc. FORcES 665, 676, 682 (1994) (reporting
that based on study of 100,000+ Norwegians "the married have the highest level of subjective well-
being, followed by the widowed" and that "among those who.., remained divorced for three years or
more the level of well-being is much lower and very similar for the single and cohabiting").
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Given the substantial benefits associated with marriage, family law
should clearly signal that marital commitment matters and promote reliance
on such commitment. Family law should not falsely signal that marriage and
cohabitation are equivalent states.
4. Conscription May Harm Children's Interests
Family policy is increasingly child-centered. "Across the academy, the
courts, classrooms, and election campaigns, the code of family responsibility
is being rewritten in terms of the only ties left-the ones to children." '183
Child custody determinations have replaced fault as the most emo-
tionally charged sources of family conflict and, for all but the wealthiest
parents, the once-neglected issue of child support has become the
most important of the financial determinations made at divorce. The
most heated public debates on the family... involve rethinking family
responsibility in terms of obligation toward children.',
There are good reasons for this policy trend. Children are the most vulner-
able members of our society. They also represent our collective future.
Developing a child-centered family policy is a complex task,'85 but cer-
tainly such a policy would encourage childbearing and rearing within families
that have the best chance of ensuring childhood well-being and adult success.
The evidence unequivocally shows that marital families best meet these goals.
Children born to married parents experience much greater stability than children
born to unmarried parents. 8' Because of that stability, they are exposed to
183. JUNE CARBONE, FROM PARTNERS TO PARENTS: THE SECOND REVOLUTION IN
FAMILY LAW, at xiii-xiv (2000).
184. Id.
185. See infra Part IV.C.
186. See Bumpass & Lu, supra note 90, at 38 tbl.6 (finding that children born to married
parents spend 84 percent of their childhood in two-parent families; children born to cohabiting
parents "may spend about a quarter of their childhood years with a single parent, a quarter with a cohab-
iting parent, and less than half with married parents"); Deborah R. Graefe & Daniel T. Lichter, Life
Course Transitions of American Children: Parental Cohabitation, Marriage, and Single Motherhood, 36
DEMOGRAPHY 205, 215 (1999) (finding that most children who are born into or ever live in a
cohabiting family will experience a change in family structure within a few years); Patrick Heuveline
et al., Shifting Childrearing to Single Mothers: Results From 17 Western Countries, 29 POPULATION &
DEV. REV. 47 (2003) ("In most countries, children born to cohabiting parents are two to four times
more likely to see their parents separate than are children of parents married at the time of birth");
Kiernan, supra note 120, at 31 (finding that within 5 years of the birth of a child, 8 percent of U.K.
married couples have split up, compared to 52 percent of cohabitants and 25 percent of those who
marry after the birth); Wendy Manning et al., The Relative Stability of Cohabiting and Marital Unions
for Children, 23 POPULATION RES. & POL'Y REV. 135 (2004) (finding that children born to
cohabiting parents experience higher levels of instability than children born to married parents).
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fewer financial, ' physical,'88 and educational risks.'89 Unsurprisingly, lower risks
produce higher levels of well-being. Some of the benefits associated with marital
childbearing undoubtedly derive from the fact that married couples tend to be
older and have higher incomes than cohabitants;' 90 both age and income pro-
mote relational and economic stability.' 9' However, there is evidence that the
advantages conferred by marital child-rearing transcend the specific benefits
associated with greater economic resources and lower dissolution rates.'92 There
is even evidence that the marital advantage extends to the next generation-
researchers have reported that "any time spent in an alternative [i.e., nonmarital]
187. See CASPER & BIANCHI, supra note 93, at 111-12 fig.4.3 (finding that in 1998, the
poverty rate of married-parent households was 6.9 percent and that of single-mother households
was 38.7 percent). Noncustodial divorced and never-married parents are also less likely to pass
wealth on to their adult children. See Frank F. Furstenberg, Jr. et al., The Effect of Divorce on
Intergenerational Transfers: New Evidence, 32 DEMOGRAPHY 319, 325 tbl.2, 328 (1995) (finding
that divorce during childhood years was associated with sharp decrease in transfers by fathers);
Nadine F. Marks, Midlife Marital Status Differences in Social Support Relationships With Adult
Children and Psychological Well-Being, 16 J. FAM. ISSUES 5, 22 (1995) (finding that remarried and
single parents professed less belief in parental financial obligation and were less likely to provide
support to adult children than first-marriage parents).
188. Rates of physical and sexual abuse are much higher when children live with an adult
stepparent or cohabitant. See Robin Fretwell Wilson, Children at Risk: The Sexual Exploitation of
Female Children After Divorce, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 251, 262-66 (2001) (surveying data on sexual
abuse of female children); Martin Daly & Margo Wilson, Child Abuse and Other Risks of Not Living
With Both Parents, 6 ETHOLOGY & SOCIOBIOLOGY 197 (1985); Leslie Margolin, Child Abuse by
Mothers' Boyfriends: Why the Overrepresentation?, 16 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 541 (1992).
189. See SARA MCLANAHAN & GARY SANDEFUR, GROWING UP WITH A SINGLE PARENT:
WHAT HURTS, WHAT HELPS 39-63 (1994) (concluding that "[clhildren who grow up apart from
a parent are disadvantaged in many ways relative to children who grow up with both parents.
They are less likely to graduate from high school and college, they are more likely to become teen
mothers, and they are somewhat more likely to be idle in young adulthood."); see also sources cited
infra note 257.
190. See sources cited supra notes 94-95.
191. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS SERIES P-70 No. 23,
FAMILY DISRUPTION AND ECONOMIC HARDSHIP: THE SHORT-RUN PICTURE FOR CHILDREN
(1991) (reporting that 21 percent of children whose fathers left the home within a two-year period
were already poor, a poverty rate double that of married-couple families with children); U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS SERIES P-23 No. 179, WHEN HOUSEHOLDS CONTINUE,
DISCONTINUE, AND FORM (1992) (stating that divorce is about twice is common among couples
below the poverty line as in the general population); see also BRAMLETT & MOSHER, supra note 89
(relationship dissolution is significantly associated with income and age).
192. See Susan L. Brown, Family Structure and Child Well-Being: The Significance of Parental
Cohabitation, 66 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 351 (2004) ("Children living in two cohabiting biological-
parent families experienced worse outcomes, on average, than those residing with two married
biological parents, although among children age 6-11, economic and parental resources attenuated
these differences. Among adolescents ages 12-17, parental cohabitation is negatively associated with
well-being, regardless of the levels of these resources.").
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family increases the likelihood that a woman [will herself] form[ I a union
with characteristics that decrease the likelihood of a successful union.'
93
This marital advantage appears to be universal. Even in the Scandinavian
nations, which have the longest experience with cohabitation as a mainstream
family form and a high level of support for single-parent families, demographers
continue to find that marital childbearing is associated with greater
childhood stability'94 and smaller risks to youthful and adult well-being."5
Family law thus should encourage childbearing within marital relation-
ships, which have the best chance of providing children with income adequacy
and family stability. But "[mlany parents are unaware that children who grow
up with only one parent are more likely to have problems." 96 "The first step
toward helping children... is [therefore] to make sure that parents understand
the potential risks associated with divorce and nonmarital childbearing."'97
193. Jay D. Teachman, The Childhood Living Arrangements of Children and the Characteristics of
Their Marriages, 25 J. FAM. ISSUES 86, 86 (2004).
194. See An-Magritt Jensen & Sten-Erik Clausen, Children and Family Dissolution in Norway:
The Impact of Consensual Unions, 10 CHILDHOOD 65 (2003) (finding that children of cohabiting
parents run a much higher risk of dissolution compared to children in marital unions and that "this
risk is not diminishing as cohabitation becomes more widespread").
195. See Gunilla Ringback Weitoft et al., Mortality, Severe Morbidity, and Injury in Children
Living With Single Parents in Sweden: A Population-Based Study, 361 LANCET 289 (2003) (stating that
based on analysis of national register data in almost a million cases, Swedish children in single-parent
households showed significantly increased risks of psychiatric disease, suicide or suicide attempt,
injury and addiction, and even after controlling for socioeconomic status and confounding factors
such as parental addiction or mental disorder, children in single-parent families still exhibited
"significant increases in risk" for all adverse outcomes); Jan 0. Jonsson & Michael Gahler, Family
Dissolution, Family Reconstitution, and Children's Educational Careers: Recent Evidence for Sweden, 34
DEMOGRAPHY 277, 287 (1997) (stating that even after controlling for all independent variables,
children of divorced and separated parents and children living in reconstituted families have low
school-continuation propensities compared to children living with both biological parents); Helen
Hansagi et al., Parental Divorce: Psychosocial Well-Being, Mental Health and Mortality During Youth and
Young Adulthood: A Longitudinal Study of Swedish Conscripts, 10 EUR. J. PUB. HEALTH 335 (2000)
(stating that in a group of Swedish conscripts, several indicators of low levels of well-being and
mental illness, including alcoholism, were significantly correlated with parental divorce even after
adjustment for antecedents and other factors); see also Tarn H. Makikyro et al., Hospital-Treated
Psychiatric Disorders in Adults With a Single-Parent and Two-Parent Family Background: A 28-Year
Follow-Up of the 1966 Northern Finland Cohort, 37 FAM. PROCESS 335 (1998).
196. MCLANAHAN & SANDEFUR, supra note 189, at 144; see also Paul R. Amato, Good
Enough Marriages: Parental Discord, Divorce, and Children's Well-Being, 9 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 71,
94 (2001). Amato states:
Parents in... "good enough" marriages should stay together for the sake of the
children, . . . [but r]econciliation is only likely to occur.., if parents are aware that by
divorcing, they place their children at risk, if parents remain willing to make a commitment
to salvage the relationship, and have access to supportive resources in the community. We
should think about ways to implement these conditions, if only to help parents make better
decisions-the tough decisions-that dramatically affect their children's lives.
Id.
197. MCLANAHAN & SANDEFUR, supra note 189, at 144.
Conscription cannot serve this tutelary function because it falsely signals that
cohabitation and marriage are equivalent. Worse, by suggesting the equiva-
lence of cohabitation and marriage, a conscriptive regime may actually
encourage childbearing within uncommitted, cohabitational relationships.
Conscription thus risks harm to the interests of children, arguably our most
important public resource.
III. THE "ROOT AND NERVE" OF THE CONSCRIPTIVE MOVEMENT
With all of these negatives and no evidence to support the claims of
equity, equivalence, and practicality, it would be justifiable to dismiss the con-
scriptive alternative out of hand. But we cannot dismiss the fact that legislatures
in three different English-speaking nations have adopted conscriptive rules,
nor can we dismiss the growing number of academics and policymakers who
favor them.'98 Those who support conscription cannot have been persuaded
by the evidence; we must suppose that they have found the claims of
equivalence, equity, and practicality to be intuitively appealing. As Justice
Holmes long ago reminded us, it is "often an inarticulate and unconscious
judgment... [that forms] the very root and nerve of the whole proceeding."'"
What unarticulated judgments form the "root and nerve" of the move-
ment in favor of conscription? Do these judgments offer a convincing basis-
grounded in commitment, dependency-causation, or some other important
public policy goal-that might support the introduction of conscriptive
standards?
In reviewing the literature, I find two very different unarticulated judg-
ments that seem to be important sources of support for conscription. The first
judgment derives from what we might, following Terry Kogan, call the
"Equality Position.'""°° The Equality Position's central claim is that the state
should honor a range of relational choices, but this central idea is often
linked with two different, typically unstated assumptions. One is that marital
198. See, e.g., BEYOND CONJUGALITY, supra note 7; Bala, supra note 8; Grace Ganz
Blumberg, The Regularization of Nonmarital Cohabitation: Rights and Responsibilities in the American
Welfare State, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1265 (2001); Ellman, supra note 28; Martha M. Ertman,
The ALl Principles' Approach to Domestic Partnership, 8 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 107 (2001);
Winifred Holland, Intimate Relationships in the New Millennium: The Assimilation of Marriage and
Cohabitation?, 17 CAN. J. FAM. L. 114 (2000); Nancy D. Polikoff, Making Marriage Matter Less: The
ALI Domestic Partnership Principles Are a Step in the Right Direction, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 353; Mark
Strasser, A Small Step Forward: The ALI Domestic Partners Recommendation, 2001 BYU L. REV.
1135; Willmott et al., supra note 9.
199. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 466 (1897).
200. Terry S. Kogan, Competing Approaches to Same-Sex Versus Opposite-Sex, Unmarried
Couples in Domestic Partnership Laws and Ordinances, 2001 BYU L. REV. 1023, 1031-36.
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obligation is an appropriate tool for regulating relational problems that do not
derive from marital commitment; the other is that conscriptive rules advance
the interests of same-sex couples who cannot marry. The second judgment I
have called the Welfare-Function Position. Its central idea is that cohabita-
tion disadvantages women and the children in their care. This judgment is often
linked with an intuition that conscriptive rules can reduce the public costs
associated with nonmarital childbearing. This part explains, evaluates, and
ultimately rejects arguments that the Equality and Welfare-Function Position
offer in favor of conscription.
A. The Equality Position
1. Should We Reject Marriage as a Legal Category, but Embrace It
as a Legal Remedy?
Discrimination is about sameness and difference. The law discriminates
when it treats individuals with similar interests differently; it also discriminates
when it treats individuals with different interests the same way. Conscrip-
tion's advocates seem curiously uninterested in whether cohabitation is the
same as marriage or different. For example, Lindy Willmott et al., urging that
the Australian national government should adopt conscriptive legislation,
recognize that there are "sociological differences between the two relationships
[marriage and cohabitation]," but nonetheless conclude that those differences
"do not merit denying redress to de facto individuals who need it."' ' In a similar
vein, New Zealand MP Chris Carter argues that the De Facto Relationships
Act "does not say anything about the nature of relationships .... [I]t is about
fairness; it is about looking after people's rights."2 °2
How could anyone imagine that a De Facto Relationships Act is not
about relationships? Or that fairness is served by ignoring meaningful rela-
tional differences?
The views of Carter and Willmott et al. seem to derive from the Equality
Position, which asserts that "[a]ny relationship between two unrelated, loving
adults is as worthy as any other such relationship, irrespective of the sex of
the partners":03
[U]nderlying the Equality Position is a belief that it is wrong for the
State in general to dictate how couples should structure their private rela-
tionships.... IT]he Equality Position believes that those who choose to
201. See Willmott et al., supra note 9, at 9-10.
202. Grainer, supra note 11, at 300 n.97 (quoting statement of C. Carter).
203. Kogan, supra note 200, at 1032.
structure their relationships in a way other than marriage are still
entitled to have those relationships supported with respect to certain
essentials ....204
Based on this view, Equality Position advocates argue that "the State should
be willing to support the needs of all nontraditional families through alter-
native domestic partnership schemes, irrespective of the genders of the partners
at the head of such households." 5 The Equality Position thus begins with
the relatively uncontroversial proposition that the state should not dictate
private relational choices and builds on that position by claiming that the
state should adopt laws supporting such choices.
Whether or not one agrees that relational choice mandates relational
affirmative action, the Equality Position does state a clear and cogent argu-
ment in favor of elective partnership schemes like the various "marriage-lite"
registration options that many European nations now offer."6 Such schemes
confer a wider menu of legally recognized relational options; they enable
couples who are not ready to make marital commitments to choose another
status that provides for a limited number of rights and obligations.
Even after stating the Equality Position, however, it is not obvious why
anyone would imagine that it supports conscription, which offers no choices
at all. Conscription "dictate[s] how couples should structure their private
relationships" by forcing those who are unprepared to make marital com-
mitments to shoulder the very responsibilities that they have avoided.
Conscription thus burdens couples who wish to live outside of traditional
family forms; it forces relationships of many contours into a one-size-fits-all
relational mold.
One simply cannot get from the Equality Position to conscription
without two additional-and internally inconsistent-assumptions. The first
assumption is that marital obligation is irrelevant to the state's legitimate
concerns. The second is that marital obligation is the ideal remedy for
whatever legitimate relational concern the state might address. The Canadian
Law Reform Commission succinctly states the first, marriage-is-irrelevant
assumption:
More often [than not].... Parliament's goal is to achieve some other
outcome-like the support of children, the recognition of economic
interdependence, the prevention of exploitation-that is connected
to, but not exactly congruent with, the marriage relationship. When
204. Id. at 1033.
205. Id.
206. See Caroline Forder, European Models of Domestic Partnership Laws: The Field of Choice, 17
CAN. J. FAM. L. 371 (2000) (surveying regimes); Lyall, supra note 10 (summarizing registry options).
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Parliament uses terms like "spouse" as a proxy for identifying the
kinds of close personal relationships between adults to which such
laws apply, problems of coherence arise.
07
We have already seen that marital obligation rightfully springs, not
from interdependence or relationship or exploitation, but from the plain
fact of marital commitment.208 Even were we to accept the Commission's
view, however, conscriptive rules like the ALl Principles or the New Zealand
De Facto Relationships Act still make no sense unless we also assume that the
best way to achieve the larger legislative goals "connected to, but not exactly
congruent with, the marriage relationship"2" is through a legislative scheme
that provides only one remedy, marital obligation, to only one relational
group, cohabitants.
Although a cohabitants-are-the-right-group, marriage-is-the-right-remedy
assumption is implicit in much of the literature espousing conscription, I
could find no statement in which it was clearly expressed. This is not surprising;
once the assumption is described, its illogicality is apparent. Surely, if the goal
is to prevent exploitation, then the legislature's classification should apply
only to claims of exploitation; or, if the goal is to recognize economic
interdependence or close social relationships, then any and all such states
should be recognized. Whatever the goal, legislative rules should strive to
capture all or most of the cases to which the goal applies. But literally none of
the conscriptive schemes that have been enacted applies to anyone other
than cohabitants."' None rewrites marriage law to require a showing of either
exploitation or economic interdependence for the imposition of obligations
on married couples. Indeed, none requires such a showing for the imposition
of marital obligation on cohabitants.
The logic of marital obligation as a remedy for the various legitimate
legislative goals posited is equally unclear. There are traditional remedies for
exploitation; they include constructive trust, restitution, and quantum meruit
recovery, t ' but certainly not marital obligation. There is also a traditional
207. BEYOND CONJUGALITY, supra note 7, ch. 2.
208. See supra Part I.A.
209. BEYOND CONJUGALITY, supra note 7, ch. 2.
210. The Canadian Law Reform Commission seems to have comprehended this problem. It
has proposed that "[g]ovemments should review all of their laws and policies that employ relational
criteria to ensure that they are pursuing objectives that respond to contemporary social realities in a
manner consistent with fundamental values," and urged broader use of self-designation as "an approach
that allows for the recognition of the relationships that are of primary importance to the sponsor-
which will sometimes include close personal relationships beyond marriage, conjugal or blood ties."
BEYOND CONJUGALITY, supra note 7, ch. 3, pt. 1.
211. See infra notes 321-329 and accompanying text.
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"remedy" for economic interdependence or a close social relationships; it is
nothing at all.212 Why aren't the law's traditional responses appropriate for
the various relational problems posited by Equality Position advocates?
Why is a post-hoc shotgun marriage for cohabitants the right remedy?
Equality Position advocates do not answer, or even address, these questions
because the linkage they posit between relational freedom and conscriptive
rules is not logical, but emotional. As a logical claim, it is absurd to declare that
the state must support choice and then urge rules that allow no choice
whatsoever. It is equally absurd to declare marriage an irrelevance and then
demand, in essence, that cohabitants marry. The emotional appeal of these
illogical propositions is real, however, and lies in their capacity to bind
relational freedom to marriage, the archetype of relational commitment.
Equality Position advocates may overtly deny that marriage is relevant
to legitimate legislative goals, but by employing marital obligation as a uni-
versal remedy for relational dysfunction, they covertly posit marriage as the
normative model for all intimate relationships. The Equality Position's illogi-
cal propositions thus reveal the extent to which "[hlistory and tradition
cement the hold of marriage on individual desires and social ideals":
Turning men and women into husbands and wives, marriage has
designated the ways both sexes act in the world and the reciprocal
relation between them. It has done so probably more emphatically than
any other single institution or social force. The unmarried as well as
the married bear the ideological, ethical, and practical impress of the
marital institution, which is difficult or impossible to escape.114
Even those who deny its relevance seem unable to escape the impress of
marriage: Equality Position reformers who favor conscription have reflexively
turned to marital obligation as the end-point of laws regulating intimate rela-
tionships just as the writer of romance novels concludes each volume with an
engagement ring.
Although the Equality Position does not state a logical argument in favor
of conscription, it is nonetheless important as an indicator of the powerful
hold that marriage retains on the popular and reformist imagination. The
Equality Position is also important as a rhetorical mask: equality talk disguises
an extremely conservative legislative agenda-a one-size-fits-all, retroactive
marital obligation-by cloaking it in liberal principles of relational choice;215
212. See supra notes 30-35, 54-66 and accompanying text.
213. COTT, supra note 32, at 225.
214. Id. at3.
215. There are undoubtedly historical antecedents within family law of a conservative agenda
hiding behind liberal principles. For example, Ariela Dubler argues that, in developing the common
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by weaving the rhetoric of choice with the powerful symbolism of the
marital ideal, the Equality Position also produces a soothing and seductive
mix that obscures the oddity of the combination.
The murkiness of equality talk explains why an advocate of conscription
like New Zealand Green Party MP Keith Locke could trumpet the claim that
he and his partner of twenty years had failed to marry because "[wie want our
relationship to be purely governed by love and concern for each other without
the interference of legal processes and formal ceremonies," and, in the very next
paragraph, proclaim, as "a matter of principle," that the state should retroactively
give him all the legal rights he had sought to avoid."6 It explains the curious
indifference of conscription's advocates to the factual differences between
marriage and cohabitation. It explains why both the ALl Principles and the
New Zealand De Facto Relationships Act avoid any mention of marriage
even as they search for marital equivalents.
But neither the rhetoric of choice nor the relational ideal of marital
obligation offers a justification-grounded in history or logic or public pol-
icy-to support the imposition of marital obligation on couples who have not
chosen marriage. We can profit from understanding the Equality Position,
but it fails to state a case for conscriptive cohabitant obligations.
2. Does Conscription Advance the Interests of Same-Sex Couples?
There is one case-that of same-sex partners who cannot marry-in
which the Equality Position's claim that current law unfairly discriminates
between the married and unmarried is not illogical. The divisive issue of
same-sex marriage is well beyond the scope of this Article. But certainly
those judges, legislators, and citizens who feel that same-sex couples should
have the opportunity to make binding marital commitments would agree
with the Hon. Keith Locke that, as a "matter of principle," same-sex couples
who cannot formally express their marital commitments should have access
to marital rights and obligations.
The ALl notes the case of "domestic partners who are not allowed to
marry each other under state law because they are of the same sex, although
they are otherwise eligible to marry and would marry one another if the law
law marriage doctrine, nineteenth-century courts employed "the language of contract
[that] ... masked a conservative agenda inherent in the preservation of marriage as a status." Dubler,
supra note 31, at 1912.
216. Keith Locke, Speech in Parliament on the Matrimonial Property Amendment Bill (May
4, 2000), http://www.greens.org.nz/searchdocs/speech2917.html (emphasis added) (website contains
preliminary speech notes).
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allowed them to do so, 217 as one reason why couples fail to marry and need
conscription. Of course, the same-sex partners that the ALl describes do not
actually want conscription; they "would marry" if allowed to do so.21 The
logical link between conscription and the interests of same-sex couples is weak.
The evidence suggests that the perceived interests of same-sex couples
have nonetheless been important in building academic and legislative sup-
port for the conscriptive alternative. Indeed, Grace Ganz Blumberg, one of
the reporters responsible for the ALl Principles, has argued that "same-sex
couples have been the dominant force in the movement to regularize non-
marital cohabitation."219
For those who see heterosexual marriage law as discriminatory, conscription
offers the chance to provide same-sex couples with equal access to marital
rights and obligations. Conscription does this in a "back-door" manner; it
provides no access to marriage, but instead makes marriage irrelevant.
To the extent that same-sex marriage remains the ultimate goal, con-
scription also provides important tactical advantages. Conscriptive cohabi-
tation rules erode the privileged status of marriage and thus ineluctably
diminish the disadvantages of a marriage bar. A fuzzier conception of marital
rights and obligations may even produce a climate in which the definition of
marriage is more malleable. Because of these tactical advantages, conscriptive
cohabitation rules might play an important role in a same-sex marriage
agenda even though they do not provide the ultimate goal, same-sex
marriage."'
We cannot precisely estimate the extent to which the perceived interests
of same-sex couples have influenced the popularity and adoption of conscrip-
tive reforms, but the impact of this factor has probably been substantial. In New
Zealand, for example, where "same-sex couples have long agitated for a position
in law that recognises their basic human rights,2 . 1 the "decision to place
unmarried couples on the same basis as married ones was passed by a very
narrow margin.... However, when it then came to the inclusion of same-sex
couples within the notion of a de facto relationship, the margin was far
217. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 13, 6.02 cmt. a.
218. Public survey evidence suggests that this stance is common among same-sex couples. See
Michael S. Wald, Same-Sex Couple Marriage: A Family Policy Perspective, 9 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L.
291,313 (2001).
219. Blumberg, supra note 198, at 1268-69; see also Kogan, supra note 200, at 1031 (urging
that the "Equality Position" adopted by the ALI Principles "is most defensible in terms... of equality
and fairness, and, finally, in terms of the long-term interests of gay and lesbian people").
220. Cf. Kogan, supra note 200, at 1027 ("ALl Principles[ I must be seen as [a] second-best
solution[ ], as but a way station on the road to full marriage rights for gay and lesbian people.").
221. Editorial, Whose Property?, THE PRESS, July 22, 2000, at 10 (N.Z.).
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greater."2 '2 New Zealand's conscriptive law also extended to gay couples the
important symbolic status of next-of-kin and the same property rights-at
death as well as separation-available to married heterosexual couples.
Indeed, the initial draft legislation went so far as to abandon the terms
husband, wife, and marriage in favor of the universal term "partner.""2 3 In
Canada, too, the legal transformation of heterosexual cohabitation has been
closely linked with the legal transformation of same-sex cohabitation. 4
Perhaps the best example of how the perceived interests of same-sex
couples might influence cohabitation law comes not from a foreign parlia-
ment enacting conscriptive cohabitation rules, but from California, which in
2000 adopted legislation that permits all same-sex couples and heterosexual
couples in which one partner is over the age of sixty-two to register as "domestic
partners" and obtain certain rights.225 Puzzling over the oddity of a statutory
regime applicable to all same-sex couples and only a small subset of heterosex-
ual couples, Megan Callan, who had searched in vain through the law's
legislative history for the logic behind this strange coupling, ultimately pondered
the possibility that "supporters of gay and lesbian rights [had] ... use[d] opposite-
sex inclusion... as a fig leaf... to shield the.., legislation from... criticism. 26
She found confirmation of her hypothesis in a phone call to the office of the
sponsoring legislator, one of whose aides confirmed that extension of the
domestic partnership concept to those over age sixty-two was made "as a
direct response to... criticism... [of] efforts to create a statutory recognition
of gay and lesbian couples. 222 Callan thus concluded that the inclusion of
heterosexual couples in the legislation represented little more than "a shield
to prevent criticism ... [and] improve the acceptance of the legislation. 28
There is nothing peculiar here. Politics has always made strange bed-
fellows, and the attempt to garner support for legal reforms has often led to
222. Bill Atkin, From Parental Relocation, Rights and Responsibilities to 'Relationship' Property, in
INTERNATIONAL SURVEY OF FAMILY LAW 323, 333 (Andrew Bainham ed., 2003); see also Grainer,
supra note 11, at 300-01 n.97 ("It is great that the bill proposes the same advantages for same-sex
couples as married and de facto couples .... (quoting Matrimonial Property Amendment Bill: Report of
Select Committee (May 4, 2000) (statement of K. Locke))).
223. See Atkin, supra note 222, at 334.
224. See sources cited supra note 8.
225. CAL. FAM. CODE § 297(b)(5) (West Supp. 2004).
226. Megan E. Callan, Comment, The More, the Not Marry-Er: In Search of a Policy Behind
Eligibility for California Domestic Partnerships, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 427, 453 (2003).
227. Id. at 454.
228. Id.; see also Kiernan, supra note 120, at 56 (reporting that French domestic partnership
legislation was "originally conceived as meeting the demands of gay organizations for a form of legally
recognized marriage ceremony. However, to avoid homophobic attacks from the right wing the gov-
ernment broadened the idea to include heterosexuals.").
52 UCLA LAW REVIEW 815 (2005)
legislative compromises that would make a logician shudder. My point is
not that those who wish to obtain legal recognition of same-sex relation-
ships have done anything wrong or even unusual. It is that the movement
in favor of same-sex marriage has illogically enhanced the appeal of con-
scriptive rules.
A second, perhaps more important, point is that the conscriptive alter-
native is an ultimately unsatisfactory means of advancing the interests of
same-sex couples who want to marry or obtain legal recognition of their
relationships. An initial problem is that conscriptive rules do not provide
legal recognition except retrospectively; gay cohabitants, like all other
cohabitants, cannot be confident of their status until it has been tested in
court. Moreover, as in the case of heterosexual couples, a conscriptive
regime devalues the commitments that the same-sex couple seeking recog-
nition of their relationship would like to make. The fact that same-sex
marriage is the ultimate goal should make it abundantly clear that public,
legally recognized commitments are extraordinarily meaningful to those
who make them. Conscriptive rules thus risk no less harm to the interests
of same-sex couples than those of opposite-sex couples.
A third important point is that conscriptive rules represent an under-
handed method of advancing the interests of a very small group whose
needs and interests could be advanced directly. The evidence suggests that
no more than 5 percent of cohabiting couples are gay,229 and not all of this
small group want to have their relationships recognized; same-sex couples
test the strength of a relationship through cohabitation just like their het-
erosexual counterparts.
Much as one may sympathize with same-sex couples who want to make
marital commitments, it makes no sense to sweep the overwhelming major-
ity of cohabitants who do not want to make such commitments into a con-
scriptive regime in order provide a third-rate solution for the few same-sex
cohabitants who do. The interests of same-sex couples certainly help to
explain the sense that marriage law discriminates. These interests represent
an important source of enthusiasm for conscriptive cohabitation rules. But
the interests of a small group who want to make marital commitments can-
not justify the imposition of marital commitments on a large group who are
not so inclined.
229. See CASPER & BIANCHI, supra note 93, at 65 (noting "that about four percent of
cohabiting couples are in same-sex relationships"); Wald, supra note 218, at 313 (about 3 percent).
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B. The Welfare-Function Position
1. Does Cohabitation Exploit Women and Children?
The ALl argues that "[flailure to marry may... reflect strong social or
economic inequality between the partners, which allows the stronger partner
to resist the weaker partner's preference for marriage."'23 Although the ALl
Principles do not identify the source of relational inequality, more than
twenty years ago, one of the ALI reporters urged that contract was the wrong
approach to cohabitation because women had less power in such relationships
than men:
[Tihe essence of a cohabitation or marriage contract between hetero-
sexual cohabitants is that the man gives up wealth that would otherwise
accrue to him in order to insure the woman some semblance of economic
dignity. Self-interest would lead the man to give up as little as possible.
The woman has scant leverage with which to persuade him otherwise.
She lacks economic power. She needs a stable relationship more than
he does: it is vital to the comfortable exercise of her reproductive
potential, and it is a means of enhancing her wealth and standard of
living.... Thus, the cohabitants' unequal bargaining power leads to
unjust results under contract theory.23" '
While the ALl makes the claim that cohabitation disadvantages women
only indirectly, similar claims have cropped up in other nations during
debates over conscriptive cohabitation laws. For example, the Ontario Attorney
General, responding to concerns about proposed legislation extending support
obligations to cohabitants, argued that the legislation was necessary to
protect "exploited" cohabitants who had been "induced to enter relationships
and to stay at home and rear children." After dissolution of such a
relationship, he argued, "they have nowhere to turn but to the welfare
authorities for support.... [Tihe government of Ontario has paid out family
benefits to over 13,000 unmarried mothers and their 26,000 dependent
children., 232 In New Zealand, one commentator asserted that "[tihe focus of
debate on the property provisions of the [New Zealand] Property Relationships
Bill was essentially on the situation of women in existing relationships. 233
230. ALl PRINCIPLES, supra note 13, § 6.02 cmt. a (emphasis added).
231. Grace Ganz Blumberg, Cohabitation Without Marriage: A Different Perspective, 28 UCLA
L. REv. 1125, 1163 (1981).
232. Holland, supra note 198, at 128 (quoting Ontario Legislative Assembly, Debates, at
4973 (June 9, 1994)).
233. Stuart Birks, LEANZ Seminar on the Property Relationships Amendment Act,
Wellington, N.Z. (Aug. 6, 2001), http://www.massey.ac.nz/-kbirks/gender/econ/pra.htm.
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The Canadian Law Reform Commission has also noted that conscriptive laws
are "generally heralded as a way for governments to prevent the risks of exploi-
tation inherent in a contractual model., 24 The assumption that cohabiting
relationships are exploitive of women and the children in their care thus
seems to have been important in fueling support for conscriptive rules.
If women are typically exploited and disadvantaged when they cohabit,
there would certainly be a dependency-causation claim that the men respon-
sible for such disadvantage should have an obligation to meet the needs of their
dependent partners. Arguably, the extremely high poverty rate of single mothers
and litany of associated public costs23 might also justify a conscriptive approach.
But are women really "induced [by men] to enter relationships and stay
at home to rear children"? Do women have "scant bargaining leverage" as
compared to men? And is cohabitation a state in which men prosper while
women do not? These are complex questions on which we have incomplete
data. But momentarily putting aside the case of women who have children
with a cohabitant, it is not obvious why cohabitation would systematically
exploit either women or men.
First, cohabitation produces economic advantages that will almost
invariably benefit both individuals who make a home together. Given the
economies of scale achieved by sharing a residence, both cohabitants should
have more disposable income. This income advantage is not negligible; the
federal poverty-level income for a family of two is approximately 50 percent
less than that of two one-person families.236 Admittedly, because cohabitants
are less inclined than married couples to pool resources,232 they will accrue
smaller income advantages. But if they engage in any form of expense-sharing,
their overall expenditure on shared goods like rent and household utilities
should decline.
Second, cohabitation reduces the total labor necessary to maintain a
home: there is only one bed to make, one meal to prepare, one kitchen to
clean, and one refrigerator to fill. With less labor required for household
234. BEYOND CONJUGALITY, supra note 7, ch. 4; see also Nicholas Bala, Alternatives for
Extending Spousal Status in Canada, 17 CAN. J. FAM. L. 169, 193 (2000). Bala suggests that:
Canadian courts have rejected the argument that since there was a "choice" not to marry
(or contract), there should be no rights or obligations [because tihere is too much potential
for one party (usually the wealthier or more powerful partner i.e. often the man) to want
the benefits of the relationship, and then if it ends, to want to deny any responsibility for
dependencies that may have arisen.
Id.
235. See sources cited infra notes 253-257.
236. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 2000, at
476 tbl.756 (2001) [hereinafter STATISTICAL ABSTRACT].
237. See sources cited supra notes 99, 104-107.
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chores, both men and women should gain time. Cohabiting women may
even gain more time than their married counterparts as the evidence suggests
that they do less housework.2"' Although women do more housework than
men in both cohabiting and marital relationships,239 sharing should still
produce a time advantage. And even if cohabiting men do no housework, the
women with whom they are living should not expend significantly more time
on household chores than they would have spent living alone.
Third, cohabitation should only rarely induce either a man or a woman
to forgo employment or professional opportunities. As noted in Part II, the
commitments and sharing that typically lead married couples to rely on each
other for continued support seldom take place in cohabiting relationships.
The relatively short duration and limited resource pooling that characterize
cohabiting relationships should also inhibit the growth of dependency.
Moreover, even married women typically engage in paid employment.2" If a
cohabiting woman pursues her usual occupation, it is hard to see how or why
she would be economically disadvantaged by the fact of cohabitation.
Finally, the evidence does not suggest that cohabiting women fail to
marry because men resist the married state. Researchers have found that
cohabiting couples in which the male partner is economically secure are more
likely to marry than those in which he is insecure.24" ' Marriage expectations
are also highly correlated with socioeconomic status; better-off cohabitants
are more likely to expect to marry, and to marry their current partners, than
are worse-off cohabitants.242 These patterns help to explain why cohabitants
as a group have lower incomes and educational credentials than married
couples 243 and to support the claim that male economic instability breeds
cohabitation,2- but they do not demonstrate that men who cohabit are more
reluctant to marry than women. We thus have no evidence that women are
238. See Jeanne A. Batalova & Philip N. Cohen, Premarital Cohabitation and Housework:
Couples in Cross-National Perspective, 64 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 743 (2002) (finding that, across 22
nations, women do more routine housework than men in both marital and cohabitational
relationships); Beth Ann Shelton, Understanding the Distribution of Housework Between Husbands and
Wives, in THE TIES THAT BIND, supra note 1, at 343 (reviewing data).
239. See Batalova & Cohen, supra note 238, at 753; Shelton, supra note 238, at 345.
240. In the United States in 1999, 61 percent of all married women and 70 percent of married
mothers with a child under age eighteen were in the paid labor force. See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT,
supra note 236, at 408-09 tbls.651, 653.
241. See sources cited supra note 96.
242. See Pamela J. Smock & Wendy D. Manning, Cohabiting Partners' Economic
Circumstances and Marriage, 34 DEMOGRAPHY 331, 332 (1997).
243. See Seltzer, supra note 97, at 1250 (summarizing research data).
244. See Valerie Kincade Oppenheimer, The Continuing Importance of Men's Economic Position
in Marriage Formation, in THE TIES THAT BIND, supra note 1, at 283 (reviewing research data).
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typically, or even disproportionately, cohabiting with men they want to
marry who won't marry them. Nor is there an obvious reason why women
would be less inclined than men to move on when faced with a partner's
diffidence.245 Indeed, sociologist Andrew Cherlin has argued that the rising
tide of cohabitation is in part due to improvements in women's bargaining
position:
The bargaining position of women has improved in part because of
their greater earning potential, compared to men .... The bargaining
position of women also has improved because of better birth control
technology... and the availability of abortion. These technological
advances have allowed women to have intimate relationships and
residential partnerships with men without fear of pregnancy. They can
therefore extend their search process to include trial relationships and
246partnerships prior to marriage.
Cherlin concludes that women are "incorporating premarital cohabitation
into the search and bargaining processes because cohabitation provides a better
opportunity to observe men's skills and preferences for home production."
247
Despite their enhanced bargaining position, cohabiting women do, on
average, earn less than cohabiting men.2" As a result of this discrepancy, they
may be comparatively disadvantaged when their relationships end if there has
been resource pooling.2 But a woman would suffer the same kind of financial
disadvantage if she lost a roommate with whom she split the rent. It is not
245. Susan Brown reports that, when the female cohabiting partner is not happy in a
cohabiting relationship but the male partner is, the relationship tends to dissolve. By contrast, when
it is the male partner who is unhappy, the relationship is likely to continue, but the couple is less
likely to marry than if both partners are happy. See Brown, supra note 148, at 841. Married women
also appear to be less reluctant to end a relationship than married men; women are the plaintiffs in a
disproportionate number of divorce actions. See, e.g., Lawrence M. Friedman & Robert V. Percival,
Who Sues for Divorce? From Fault Through Fiction to Freedom, 5 J. LEGAL STUD. 61, 69 tbl.1, 75 tbl.2
(1976); Marsha Garrison, Good Intentions Gone Awry: The Impact of New York's Equitable Distribution
Law on Divorce Outcomes, 57 BROOK. L. REv. 621, 646 n.105 & tbl.2 (1991) (wives were plaintiffs in
about two-thirds of surveyed divorce cases). Although this disproportion might reflect social conven-
tion, in a 1990's national poll of divorced men and women, "more than half of divorced women [said
that] it was their idea to separate, [as] compared with only 44 percent of men." See Paula
Mergenhagen DeWitt, Breaking Up Is Hard to Do, AM. DEMOGRAPHICS, Oct. 1992, at 52, 53; see
also Sanford L. Braver et al., Who Divorced Whom? Methodological and Theoretical Issues, 20 J. DIVORCE &
REMARRIAGE 1 (1993).
246. Cherlin, supra note 2, at 131-32.
247. Id. at 131.
248. See CASPER & BIANCHI, supra note 93, at 53 tbl.2.3.
249. Because spending power within either a marital or cohabiting relationship is typically
correlated with monetary contribution, cohabiting women also likely have, on average, less control
over recreational and "big-ticket" spending than men. See BLUMSTEIN & SCHWARTZ, supra note 98,
at 53-59, 309 (reporting that, three-quarters of the time, monetary contribution was correlated with
the balance of power over income); see also JAN PAHL, MONEY AND MARRIAGE (1989).
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reasonable to view either loss as the result of exploitation: neither the room-
mate nor the cohabitant has made any commitment to engage in continued
sharing on which the woman might have relied; nor is the woman, in any
obvious way, in a worse position than she was before the relationship or rent-
sharing arrangement began.
In sum, it is extraordinarily hard to see why cohabitation, without
children, would exploit women or even comparatively disadvantage them.
Some women may neglect their own careers during a period of cohabitation
in the expectation of continued sharing, but we have no reason to believe
that such cases are common or that they arise from male exploitation.50
2. Nonmarital Childbearing: Can Conscription Reduce Its Private
and Public Costs?
Cohabitation that leads to childbearing is a different case. Childbearing
clearly burdens women, who provide a disproportionate share of child care and
sometimes forgo labor-market opportunities because of child-care responsibili-
ties."' If a woman bore a child with a cohabiting partner in the reasonable
expectation that her relationship and its advantages would survive, she would
be comparatively disadvantaged if it ended. To the extent that her partner
encouraged her expectations and pregnancy, we might even say that she was
exploited.
Close to 90 percent of unmarried women's pregnancies are unin-
tended,252 but it is difficult to estimate the number of the cohabiting women
who decide to continue a pregnancy in the expectation that their relationships
will endure, and even harder to ascertain the extent to which cohabiting
mothers' expectations of relationship survival are encouraged by their male
partners.
250. Although the Canadian Law Reform Commission argues that conscription "may serve the
particular purpose of preventing exploitation," it cautions readers that conscription is also "a tool
that must be used sparingly, where there is evidence of exploitation." BEYOND CONJUGALITY, supra
note 7, ch. 4.
251. See Michelle J. Budig & Paula England, The Wage Penalty for Motherhood, 66 AM. SOC.
REV. 204 (2001); Jane Waldfogel, The Effect of Children on Women's Wages, 62 AM. SOC. REV. 209
(1997).
252. See COMM. ON UNINTENDED PREGNANCY, NAT'L ACAD. OF SCI., THE BEST
INTENTIONS: UNINTENDED PREGNANCY AND THE WELL-BEING OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES 31-
32 tbl.2-2 (Sarah S. Brown & Leon Eisenberg eds., 1995) (stating that 88.2 percent of never-married
and 68.5 percent of previously-married women's pregnancies are unplanned); Wendy D. Manning,
Childbearing in Cohabiting Unions: Racial and Ethnic Differences, 33 FAM. PLANNING PERSP. 217, 221
tbl.5 (2001) (stating that 18 percent of married, 44 percent of cohabiting, 61 percent of single,
noncohabiting women said that their first birth was unintended).
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However, there can be no doubt that the growing number of nonmari-
tal births is a serious public problem:
Never-married mothers are less well educated and less often fully
employed than are divorced mothers. The family income of children
who reside with never-married mothers is only 23 percent of that of
children in two-parent families, the lowest of any group of children
living with single mothers. Almost three of every five children who
live with never-married mothers reside in poverty. Child support
receipt is also much lower for never-married than for other single
mothers. Whereas 60 percent of divorced mothers with custody of
children under age 21 receive some child support from their children's
fathers, less than 20 percent of never-married mothers report receiving
253
such support ....
Even when their children are born within a cohabiting union, the children
of unmarried mothers are disproportionately likely to suffer from poverty,255
family disruption,256 and associated adverse consequences. This combination
of economic deprivation and residential instability poses a serious threat to
children's current and future life prospects. Researchers have repeatedly
found that children in single-parent households are more likely to experience
poor health, behavioral problems, delinquency, and low educational attain-
ment than are their peers in intact families; as adults they have higher rates of
poverty, early childbearing, and divorce.257  Economic deprivation and
residential instability are prime factors in explaining these differences.25
253. CASPER & BIANCHI, supra note 93, at 115-16.
254. The proportion of never-married mothers who are cohabiting has increased substan-
tially over the past twenty years, from 4.7 percent in 1978 to 12.7 percent in 1998. White
unmarried mothers, both in 1978 and in 1998, were most likely to cohabit. See id. at 104 tbl.4.2.
255. See id. at 115.
256. See sources cited supra note 186.
257. See PAUL R. AMATO & ALAN BOOTH, A GENERATION AT RISK: GROWING UP IN AN
ERA OF FAMILY UPHEAVAL (1997); McLANAHAN & SANDEFUR, supra note 189, at 61 (concluding
that "children who grow up apart from a parent are disadvantaged in many ways relative to children
who grow up with both parents. They are less likely to graduate from high school and college, they
are more likely to become teen mothers, and they are somewhat more likely to be idle in young
adulthood."); Bumpass & Lu, supra note 90, at 29-30 (summarizing research data and noting that
"[clhildren from single-parent families are more likely to experience poverty, to do less well in school,
to enter sexual activity earlier and have premarital births, to cohabit, and to marry early and experience
the disruption of their own marriages"); see also WENDY D. MANNING & RONALD E. BULANDA,
PARENTAL COHABITATION EXPERIENCE AND ADOLESCENT BEHAVIORAL OUTCOMES 19, 39 &
tbl.3 (2003) (Bowling Green Working Paper 03-03, 2003) (noting that "[c]hildren born to cohabiting
parents [had] significantly higher odds of... a teen birth"), available at http://www.bgsu.edu/organizations/
cfdr/research/pdf/2003/2003_03.pdf; Wendy D. Manning & Kathleen A. Lamb, Adolescent Well-Being
in Cohabiting, Married, and Single-Parent Families, 65 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 876, 877-78, 890 (2003)
(reporting that neither parental cohabitation nor marriage to a partner or spouse who is not related
to the child is associated with uniform advantage in terms of behavior or academic indicators to
Nonmarital childbearing is also a powerful determinant of a mother's
long-term marriage and economic prospects:
Unwed childbearing may restrict marital search activities and diminish
the willingness of potential marital partners to assume the co-parental
role. These men also bear any additional economic and emotional
costs associated with sharing their wives' time and affection with other
men's children. Indeed, recent studies show that early unwed childbear-
ing significantly reduces the probability of subsequent marriage. Teen
unwed mothers are more than twice as likely as other women... to be
never married by age 35.259
Only 41 percent of women with a nonmarital first birth are currently married,
as compared to 82 percent of women with a marital first birth; unmarried
mothers, regardless of whether they ultimately marry, also experience substan-
210
tially higher rates of poverty than other women.
Rational legislators would certainly seek ways to reduce the private and
public costs of nonmarital childbearing. Grace Ganz Blumberg, explaining the
movement in favor of conscription, also notes that countries with conscrip-
tive reforms have all faced "growing economic pressure on their... welfare
services. ' 261' Blumberg suggests that these nations have responded to pressure
on the public purse with a "robust private law of rights and responsibilities at
divorce and at the termination of nonmarital cohabitation":
[T]he trend has been to substitute private obligations for public obli-
gations, that is, to substitute property division and family support
obligations for public social security. In such cases, the substitution-
ary role of private law ultimately paved the way for uniform inclusion
of all cohabiting couples, whether formally married or not."'
If Blumberg is right, an important source of the movement in favor of
conscription is its potential utility in curbing the costs associated with
teenagers living in single-mother families); Teachman, supra note 193, at 86 ("With the exception of
parental death, any time spent in an alternative [i.e., nonmarital] family increases the likelihood that
a woman forms a union with characteristics that decrease the likelihood of a successful union.").
258. See Bumpass & Lu, supra note 90, at 30 (summarizing research and reporting that "all of
the transformations are inversely related to socioeconomic status"); Smock, supra note 90, at 11-12
(summarizing research and reporting that "the number of changes in family structure is particularly
important. The fewer the changes, the better for children. While children in cohabiting households
may in fact be living with two biological parents.., they are quite likely to experience future family
transitions ...."); see also McLANAHAN & SANDEFUR, supra note 189, at 79-94 (explaining impact
of poverty); id. at 95-133 (explaining impact of family and residential instability).
259. Daniel T. Lichter et al., Is Marriage a Panacea? Union Formation Among Economically
Disadvantaged Unwed Mothers, 50 Soc. PROBS. 60, 63 (2003) (citations omitted).
260. See id. at 70, 73.
261. Blumberg, supra note 198, at 1307.
262. Id. at 1307-08.
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nonmarital childbearing. Certainly, it would not be surprising if the Ontario
Attorney General's support for conscriptive rules was motivated more by the
fact that the provincial government had "paid out family benefits to over
13,000 unmarried mothers and their 26,000 dependent children" than by the
hypothesis that these mothers had been "exploited" and "induced to stay
home and have children." It is altogether understandable that public officials
would hope that conscription might defray some of the public and private
costs associated with nonmarital childbearing. Those costs are large, and "leg-
islators have long imagined that marriage serves the critical social and political
function of attaching dependent women to provider men, thereby creating
'the mechanism through which we can avoid assuming collective (or state-
assumed) responsibility for dependent members of our society.' 263 Indeed, there
is evidence that nineteenth-century courts used the common law marriage
doctrine to "privatize[ ] the dependencies of women and children.., thereby
shielding the state from financial responsibility."2"
However, the same facts that cast doubt on the "cohabitation exploits
women" theory also work to reduce the likelihood that conscription can
either reduce public welfare expenditures or improve the economic circum-
stances of never-married women and their children.
First, a wide range of measures to ensure that unmarried fathers support
their children are already in place. These measures were adopted, many at
the federal level, in direct response to the rising rate of nonmarital birth and
associated public expenses. 26 Taken together, these reforms have revolu-
tionized the establishment, calculation, modification, and enforcement of child
support.2 6 Their effectiveness is inhibited both by the unwillingness of many
unmarried mothers to seek support from their children's fathers267 and by the
economic insecurity of unmarried fathers, who are much more likely than
263. Ariela R. Dubler, In the Shadow of Marriage: Single Women and the Legal Construction of the
Family and the State, 112 YALE L.J. 1641, 1659 (2003) (quotingjeffrey Evans Stake et al., Roundtable:
Opportunities for and Limitations of Private Ordering in Family Law, 73 IND. L.J. 535, 541-42 (1998)
(statement of Martha L. Fineman)).
264. Dubler, supra note 31, at 1920.
265. See Garrison, supra note 16, at 53-54.
266. See KRAUSE ET AL., supra note 26, at 886--87, 1041-43 (describing innovations in support
calculation, collection, and enforcement); Paul K. Legler, The Impact of Welfare Reform on the Child
Support Enforcement System, in CHILD SUPPORT: THE NEXT FRONTIER 46 (J. Thomas Oldham &
Marygold S. Melli eds., 2000) (describing innovations in paternity establishment and support collection).
267. More than 40 percent of mothers eligible for support-and 75 percent of those never-
married-fail to obtain support awards. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CHILD SUPPORT FOR CUSTODIAL
MOTHERS AND FATHERS: 1991, at 11-12 tbl.F (1995) (stating that 34.6 percent of custodial mothers
who had not been awarded child support reported that they "did not pursue a child support award,"
13.9 percent reported that they "did not want child support" and 20.5 percent reported that the
"other parent [was] unable to pay").
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married fathers to be poor, ill-educated, and unemployed. 268 But these inno
vations in paternity and child support law already offer an extensive arsenal
of weapons to ensure that unmarried fathers contribute as much as they can
to their nonmarital children.
Second, the same factors that diminish the success of recent child support
initiatives would also dramatically diminish any chance that conscription
could provide meaningful benefits to nonmarital children, their mothers, or
the public. Conscription would not enlarge child support obligations; current
law already imposes on unmarried fathers obligations identical to those of
their married counterparts. Conscription would, theoretically, expand unmarried
fathers' obligations to include "spousal" support and the sharing of relationship
property. But even among better-off divorcing couples, it is the exceptional
case in which a woman obtains spousal support and significant assets: only
10-20 percent of women, mostly low-wage women married for a long time to
high-wage men, obtain spousal support;269 the median value of property
subject to division is probably no more than $30,000-$40,000.7 Cohabitants
are younger and poorer than divorcing couples:27 How likely is it that
unmarried fathers-many of whom can barely make required child support
payments--will have the capacity to make additional payments.?" How likely
is it that they will have accrued significant assets during their (likely brief)
relationships with the children's mothers?
Third, conscriptive cohabitation laws will not apply to most nonmarital
births. The majority of U.S. nonmarital births occur outside a cohabiting
268. See CASPER & BIANCHI, supra note 93, at 133-35 tbl.5.3 (stating that never-married
fathers are younger than divorced fathers, more likely to be unemployed, and three times less likely to
be college graduates); Elizabeth Phillips & Irwin Garfinkel, Income Growth Among Nonresident
Fathers: Evidence From Wisconsin, 30 DEMoGRAPHY 227, 234 tbl.2 (1993) (noting that 41 percent of
never-married fathers were poor in the year before a support action was filed, as compared to 19 percent
of divorced fathers).
269. See KRAUSE ET AL., supra note 26, at 819 (citing Census Bureau data showing that less
than 15-17 percent of divorced women reported receiving alimony during the 1970s and 1980s, as
compared to 9.5 percent at the turn of the century); Garrison, supra note 245, at 699-705 (showing
significant correlations between the award of alimony and marital duration, employment status, and
proportion of family income earned); Marsha Garrison, How Do Judges Decide Divorce Cases? An
Empirical Analysis of Discretionary Decision Making, 74 N.C. L. REV. 401,467-86 (1996) (same).
270. See Garrison, supra note 245, at 660 tbl.9 (surveying research reports).
271. See sources cited supra notes 94-95.
272. When Australia introduced a new child support system aimed at reducing the level of
government expenditure, the government "was hopelessly optimistic about the level of resources
available to noncustodial fathers and about the cost of collecting small amounts of money from large
numbers of very reluctant payers." Mavis Maclean & Andrea Warman, A Comparative Approach to
Child Support Systems: Legal Rules and Social Policies, in CHILD SUPPORT: THE NEXT FRONTIER, supra
note 266, at 166, 176.
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relationship; 213 conscriptive laws cannot have any impact in these cases.
For those nonmarital births that occur within cohabiting relationships, the
relative instability of cohabitation ensures that many relationships will dis-
solve before the statutory period that gives rise to obligations has passed.7 4
As a result of these impediments, the vast majority of cohabiting couples
with children should escape the reach of conscriptive rules altogether.
Fourth, experts report that post-relationship income transfers have very
limited potential to curb the poverty of children and their custodial parents:
Although the earnings of low-income fathers may rise substantially
over time, divorce and nonmarital childbearing are both significantly
linked with low socioeconomic status. Divorce is approximately twice
as likely for couples below the poverty line as it is for the general pool
of married couples, and nonmarital parenting is even more highly
correlated with low income. Many children in poor single-parent homes
would thus remain poor even if their parents were (re)united.... [No]
support policy can raise the income of a[n]... obligor or recreate the
economies of scale available to an intact household.2 5
Because of these various limitations, experts estimate that, even if the percentage
of children living in mother-only households could be brought back to its
1959 low, childhood poverty would decline by no more than 10 to 20 percent.276
Stable family relationships thus hold the most promise of promoting the
welfare of nonmarital children and reducing associated public costs.2 7 Marriage,
undeniably, is more stable than cohabitation.2 8 Marriage also appears to
reduce the economic disadvantage associated with nonmarital childbearing.2 9
273. See Bumpass & Lu, supra note 90, at 34-35 tbl.4 (finding that 39 percent of first births
to unmarried women occurred within a cohabiting relationship). The U.S. pattern contrasts
sharply with that in Western Europe, where most nonmarital births are to cohabiting couples. See
Seltzer, supra note 97, at 1257 (summarizing evidence).
274. In 1998, only 12.7 percent of unmarried mothers living with minor children were
cohabiting; this percentage includes mothers cohabiting with a partner unrelated to their children.
See CASPER & BIANCHI, supra note 93, at 104 tbl.4.2.
275. Marsha Garrison, The Goals and Limits of Child Support Policy, in CHILD SUPPORT: THE
NEXT FRONTIER, supra note 266, at 16, 23-24.
276. See id. at 22 (summarizing research).
277. See MCLANAHAN & SANDEFUR, supra note 189, at 38 ("If we were asked to design a
system for making sure that children's basic needs were met, we would probably come up with some-
thing quite similar to the two-parent family ideal.").
278. See supra notes 89-92.
279. See Lichter et al., supra note 259, at 74 (reporting that "[tlhe odds of living in poverty
when disadvantaged women marry are similar to odds experienced by low-risk women who marry and
are lower than the odds for low-risk women who remain single. Th[e] evidence supports the 'marriage as
a panacea' view."). By contrast, the data suggest that "unmarried unions are not associated with
improved economic prospects for children over the longer term compared with those whose mothers
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Could conscription induce marriage? A cynic might conclude that this
is the real purpose of conscriptive rules, which significantly erode any
perceived advantage in remaining single.280 Indeed, the ALl argues that its
conscriptive approach "reduces the incentive to avoid marriage because it
diminishes the effectiveness of that strategy."28 ' But if lawmakers intended to
induce marriage through conscription, there is no evidence that they are
succeeding. The marriage rate has not gone up in Australia, Canada, or New
Zealand since the adoption of conscriptive reforms.282 Recent reforms of the
U.S. welfare system, which their advocates hoped would increase marriage
among poor, welfare-recipient mothers, also failed to achieve this goal.283
There are many psychological reasons why conscription would be
unlikely to foster marriage. First, as the relative rarity of both premarital and
cohabitation contracts attests, couples do not tend to think ahead to the
possible dissolution of their relationships."M Second, because of the uncer-
remained single." Donna Ruane Morrison & Amy Ritualo, Routes to Children's Economic Recovery
After Divorce: Are Cohabitation and Remarriage Equivalent?, 65 AM. SOC. REV. 560, 576 (2000).
280. See Strasser, supra note 198, at 1170 (arguing that adoption of the ALl Principles
"might induce some to marry who otherwise would not").
281. ALl PRINCIPLES, supra note 13, § 6.02 cmt. b.
282. See AUSTL. BUREAU OF STATISTICS, 3310.0 MARRIAGES AND DIVORCES, AUSTRALIA
(2003), http://www.abs.gov.au/ (reporting that the Australian marriage rate has been declining since
at least 1981; Australian 2001 marriage rate and New Zealand 1998 marriage rate was 5.3 per 1000
population); Statistics Canada, Marriages, DAILY, Nov. 20, 2003, at http://www.statcan.ca/
Daily/English/031120/d031120c.htm (reporting that in 2001, the Canadian "crude marriage rate [sank]
to a record low of 4.7 marriages for every 1,000 people after holding steady at 5.1 for four years"). The
low reflects a long-term decline in the marriage rate and a rise in the age at first marriage. "In 1950,
during the marriage boom that followed the Second World War, about half of women aged 20 to 24
were married. By 1991, that proportion had fallen to about 20%. Similarly, 75% of men in their
early twenties were single in 1951, compared with 90% forty years later." Statistics Canada, The
People: Marriage, CAN. E-BOOK, at http://142.206.72.67/02/02d/02d_001ae.htm. There is no marriage
data for New Zealand since the 2001 enactment of the De Facto Relationships Act, but the marriage
rate had, to 2001, declined "fairly steadily" since 1971. STATISTICS NEW ZEALAND, DEMOGRAPHIC
TRENDS 2002, at 67 (2003), available at http://unpanl.un.orgintradoc/groups/public/documents/
APCITYfLNPAN01 1140.pdf. Conscriptive case law in the State of Washington has also failed to
raise the marriage rate. See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 236, at 104 tbl.150 (reporting that the
marriage rate in Washington was 9.5 per 1000 population in 1990 and 7.2 per 1000 in 1998).
283. See ANDREW J. CHERLIN ET AL., WHAT WELFARE RECIPIENTS KNOW ABOUT THE
NEW RULES AND WHAT THEY HAVE TO SAY ABOUT THEM (2000) (reporting that less than 1
percent of surveyed welfare recipients said that they had married because of the welfare reform
rules). J.M. Fitzgerald & David C. Ridar, Welfare Reform and Female Headship, 41 DEMOGRAPHY
189 (2004) (finding "little evidence" that welfare reforms had any impact on women's decisions to
become unmarried heads of families); LISA A. GENNETIAN & VIRGINIA KNOX, STAYING SINGLE:
THE EFFECTS OF WELFARE REFORM POLICIES ON MARRIAGE AND COHABITATION (Next
Generation, Working Paper No. 13, 2003) (finding that welfare reform policies had no impact on
cohabitation and marriage decisions), available at http://www.mdrc.org/publications/373/full.pdf.
284. The classic account of this tendency is contained in Lynn A. Baker & Robert E. Emery,
When Every Relationship Is Above Average: Perceptions and Expectadons of Divorce at the Time of Marriage,
tainty inherent in the individualized-inquiry approach, cohabiting couples
may not know that they have already "assumed" marital obligations. 85
Third, there is more reason to suppose that conscription would discourage
formal marriage than induce it: As we have seen, conscription transforms
marriage into a private choice without legal consequences; conscription
also impliedly devalues marriage by signaling that it is not significantly
different from cohabitation.286 For all these reasons, it would be foolish to
expect that conscription has the capacity to push unmarried parents into
formal marital relationships. Quite the reverse-there are serious risks that
it would enhance the appeal of nonmarital childbearing.
In sum, there is no evidence to support the claim that cohabitation per
se exploits women or even that it comparatively disadvantages them. Nonmari-
tal childbearing, whether within or without a cohabiting relationship, does
comparatively disadvantage women, who disproportionately make labor-market
sacrifices in order to provide care to their children. Nonmarital childbearing
also disadvantages children, who are placed at risk both by the low socio-
economic status and the instability associated with nonmarital parenting.
But these disadvantages do not result from cohabitation-nonmarital
childbearing occurs outside cohabiting relationships just as it occurs within
them-nor is there any evidence that conscription promises a cure.
The Welfare-Function Position thus hints at an immensely important
public problem linked with the increased incidence of nonmarital cohabita-
tion. But it fails to offer a justification, grounded in history or logic or public
policy, to support conscriptive cohabitation standards.
IV. How SHOULD FAMILY LAW RESPOND
TO NONMARITAL COHABITATION?
If conscription is the wrong response to the rising tide of nonmarital
cohabitation, what is the right one? To answer this question, we must identify
those cases in which family law's failure to assign private rights or obligations
to cohabitants is out of step with the larger law of relational obligations. The
available evidence suggests that, for the typical cohabiting couple, current
law works well: this couple has made no commitments to each other; the fact
of cohabitation has not induced dependency or worked any unjust enrichment;
and, to the extent that the couple has made a private agreement that might
17 LAw & HuM. BEHAV. 439, 443 (1993), stating that despite awareness of a 50 percent divorce
rate, virtually no surveyed applicants for marriage licenses expected their relationships to dissolve.
285. See text supra notes 137-150.
286. See supra Part II.C.3.
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require enforcement, it will be honored under Marvin287 and its progeny.
However, there are cases288 in which cohabitants have expressly or impliedly
made marriage-like commitments. These private commitments deserve to be
honored just like those of ceremonially married couples. There are also cases
in which reliance on continuation of a relationship has led one party to make
investments which, if uncompensated, would leave the other unjustly enriched.
In these cases, the law of cohabitant obligations should provide appropriate
remedies to the party who has relied to his or her detriment.
A. Honoring Private Marital Commitments
1. A Revivified Common Law Marriage Doctrine
There will always be couples who express marital commitments privately,
without benefit of a formal marriage ceremony. They may choose to do so
because of social or ethnic norms,289 the desire to maintain a public or private
benefit contingent on marital status,29° or simply because they prefer private
vows to public acts.
One obvious way to recognize private marital commitments is through a
revivified common law marriage doctrine; couples who make private marital
commitments have, after all, entered into common law marriages. A revivified
common law marriage rule would also be more certain, more logical, and more
consistent with the law of marital obligation than conscriptive alternatives
like that proposed by the ALl and enacted in New Zealand. But common law
marriage has been fading away for a reason; because the common law marriage
doctrine requires the plaintiff to show a present agreement to be married,
litigation may devolve into conflicting accounts of "who said what to whom"
with little opportunity for either "spouse" to corroborate his or her claims.
287. Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976); see supra note 4.
288. Examples include the couple who have foregone ceremonial marriage because they belong
to an ethnic or social group that typically relies on informal marriage, the same-sex couple who
cannot legally marry but want to make marital commitments, and couples like the Friedmans, who
lived as a married couple for twenty-five years and raised three children together. Friedman v. Friedman,
24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 892 (Ct. App. 1993); seesupra notes 128,130-131 and accompanying text.
289. See, e.g., Teresa Castro Martin, Consensual Unions in Latin America: Persistence of a Dual
Nuptiality System, 33 J. COMP. FAM. STUD. 35, 35 (2002) (arguing that nonmarital cohabitations "in
Latin America are best described as surrogate marriages").
290. California's domestic partnership law is drafted with such a couple in mind. In order to
form a domestic partnership, one of the partners must be at least 62 years old and "meet the eligibility
criteria under Title II of the Social Security Act as defined in 42 U.S.C. Section 402(a) for old-age
insurance benefits or Title XVI of the Social Security Act as defined in 42 U.S.C. Section 1381 for
aged individuals." CAL. FAM. CODE § 297(b)(6)(B) (West Supp. 2004).
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One way to avoid some of the evidentiary problems associated with
common law marriage is to adopt a short statute of limitations.29 ' Such a simple
expedient would prevent litigants from relying on stale evidence and shaky
recollections or waiting to bring a claim until the defendant cohabitant is
dead and unable to speak for himself.292
Another useful reform would recast common law marriage in terms of
the equitable estoppel doctrine. The estoppel principle holds that, "[w]henever
a party has, by his own statement or conduct, intentionally and deliberately
led another to believe a particular thing true and to act upon such belief, he is
not, in any litigation arising out of such statement or conduct, permitted to
contradict it."'293 Family law has long applied the estoppel doctrine to parentage
determinations; a man who has acted as a parent and induced detrimental
reliance on his continued willingness to do so is universally estopped from
denying his paternity and may be required to pay support.294 Most typically
applied to stepparents who discouraged a relationship with the child's biologi-
cal parent, the estoppel doctrine has in recent years been applied both to same-
sex partners who encouraged the birth of a child or supported it for a substantial
period and men who agreed to act as father to a child born through the use of
artificial reproductive technology.295 Courts have also applied the estoppel
doctrine in custody contests, holding that a biological parent who represents
her spouse as a parent is estopped from denying his paternity.296 They have
also utilized it in the context of divorce.297
There is no logical reason why the estoppel concept could not also be
applied to common law marriage.2 9 Applied in this way, the estoppel doctrine
would require that, when a couple act as if they are married and thus
"intentionally and deliberately" lead the world and each other to act on such
291. Cf. UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-4.5(2) (2003) (stating that an action must be brought
within one year following the termination of the relationship).
292. For an example of these problems, see In re Estate of Keimig, 528 P.2d 1228 (Kan. 1974).
293. CAL. EVID. CODE § 623 (West 1995).
294. See sources cited supra note 46.
295. See In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280 (Ct. App. 1998) (husband who had,
with wife, contracted with a gestational surrogate who agreed to be implanted with an embryo
created from donated egg and sperm); L.S.K. v. H.A.N., 813 A.2d 872 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) (same-
sex partner who encouraged mother to utilize artificial insemination to bear a child).
296. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Sechrest, 560 N.E.2d 1212 (I11. App. Ct. 1990); Jean Maby H.
v. Joseph H., 676 N.Y.S.2d 677 (App. Div. 1998); J.C. v. C.T., 711 N.Y.S.2d 295 (Fam. Ct. 2000); In
re Marriage of Hodge, 733 P.2d 458 (Or. Ct. App. 1987). See generally Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child
Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and
Other Nontraditional Families, 78 GEO. L.J. 459, 491-502 (1990).
297. See Kazin v. Kazin, 405 A.2d 360 (N.J. 1979); KRAUSE ET AL., supra note 26, at 591.
298. Indeed, the state of Tennessee has done so. See Bowman, supra note 143, at 771-72
(reviewing case law).
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representations, they are precluded from later denying the existence of a
marital agreement. The advantage of the estoppel approach over the traditional
common law marriage doctrine is that it would focus, not on a subjective
"meeting of the minds," but instead on objective, concrete actions-filing
joint tax returns, taking title to property as husband and wife, using marital
names, holding a commitment ceremony at which marriage-like vows are
exchanged-that would justifiably lead each partner to assume a marital
agreement and rely upon it.
Applied to a case like Friedman, the estoppel approach would permit "Mrs."
Friedman to establish a marriage without proving that she and Mr. Friedman had
mutually vowed to be husband and wife. Instead, proof that she had consistently
used a marital name and that she and Mr. Friedman, over a lengthy period,
had "consistently held themselves out as husband and wife to the Internal
Revenue Service, to their insurers, their bankers, and in numerous real estate
transactions" would suffice.2" By minimizing the use of personal recollections
as evidence, the estoppel approach would make the determination of common
law marriage much more fraud-resistant and predictable.
Courts would, of course, confront cases far more difficult than Friedman.
For example, a couple may inconsistently hold themselves out as husband
and wife, making one type of representation to the Internal Revenue Service
and another to the bank and insurance agency. In such cases, the court's task
would be to determine whether there are sufficient indicia of a marital agree-
ment that a cohabitant would be justified in relying upon it. An occasional
entry in a hotel guest register describing the couple as "Mr. and Mrs." should
not suffice;3°° consistent representations to a government authority or financial
institution should invariably be enough.0 1 Between these two extremes, courts
would be required to exercise their judgment in evaluating the number,
consistency, and types of representations made.
Even when modified by estoppel principles and coupled with a short
statute of limitations, common law marriage will be less certain than formal,
ceremonial marriage. However, the modified doctrine would avoid many of the
evidentiary problems posed by the traditional rules. As compared to conscriptive
standards like those proposed by the ALl or enacted in New Zealand, it would
offer many more safeguards against fraud and a very high level of predictability.3 2
299. Friedman v. Friedman, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 892, 902 (Ct. App. 1993) (Poch6, J., dissenting).
300. See CLARK, supra note 22, at 57 (urging that proof of marital cohabitation should require "a
stay of some duration in the nondomicilary state before evidence of the requisite kind and amount could
become available").
301. See id. at 51 (summarizing case law).
302. See supra notes 146-151.
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These litigation advantages are linked to a more reliable notice function.
The modified common law marriage doctrine would provide, in a nutshell, that
if you act married, you will be married. Compared to the "anything relevant"
approach of the ALL and New Zealand rules, this principle is clear and simple.
It would thus provide much more meaningful guidance to cohabitants about
actions that will alter their relational status.
Because estoppel is an equitable remedy, it is not available to a plaintiff
who comes before the court with unclean hands.3" The modified common
law marriage doctrine would therefore enable courts to deny relief to an individ-
ual who deliberately avoided formal marriage to preserve a benefit" 4 and to
grant relief to the individual who relied on mutual representations of marriage
to his or her detriment. °5
Whether or not the common law marriage doctrine is modified by estop-
pel principles, this approach to cohabitant obligations has the large advantage
of establishing a full marital relationship, with all its rights and benefits. By
contrast, conscription does not establish a marriage, but imposes whatever rights
and obligations the legislature has chosen to attach to "de facto" relationships.
Although New Zealand has attached all marital rights and benefits, the
Canadian provinces and Australian states have not.3Y The ALI's scheme also
provides only for private rights and obligations;0 7 the "domestic partners" on
whom it would impose marital obligations and rights are not married and thus
cannot claim statutory benefits such as the right to file a wrongful death action or
obtain Social Security survivor's benefits. Conscription, like Marvin and its
progeny, thus provides a remedy "tailored primarily to the middle class""3 and
fails to capture all of the rights and benefits of marriage."
303. See, e.g., Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759 A.2d 959, 968 (R.I. 2000) (noting that "generally
speaking, the estoppel doctrine acts as a legal shield rather than a sword").
304. For example, Social Security benefits for a divorced wife are lost when the wife remarries.
See 42 U.S.C. § 402(b)(1) (2000).
305. The Friedman appellate court rejected the plaintiffs attempt to employ equitable estoppel
principles to establish a spousal support obligation on the theory that Terri knew that she and Eliot were
not married. If Terri knew that California had abolished common law marriage, this conclusion is reason-
able and would suffice to deny a plaintiff relief. But in a state that accepts either the traditional common
law marriage doctrine or an estoppel-modified doctrine, a plaintiff who attempted to establish a marriage
based on public representations of marriage could not be denied relief based on such "knowledge."
306. See BEYOND CONJUGALITY, supra note 7, ch. 4 (describing various statutory benefits
and obligations not affected by provincial rules).
307. ALL PRINCIPLES, supra note 13, § 6.01.
308. Bowman, supra note 143 at 774.
309. Cf. CLARK, supra note 22, at 61. Clark notes that the Marvin approach does not confer
marital status and urges that
[t]here is a multitude of legal questions which depend upon the existence of marriage for their
answer. Rights to support, alimony, division of property, inheritance, to sue for wrongful
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Another advantage of common law marriage is the fact that it makes use
of a widely understood relational form. Cohabitation is an "incomplete institu-
tion" that lacks a consistent meaning both for those within such a relationship
and those outside it."' Cohabitation lacks a nomenclature: "There is no
common term in use for referring to one's nonmarital live-in lover, whereas
the terms spouse, husband, and wife are institutionalized.... More important,
cohabitation lacks "social blueprint[s]":
Marriage is... a social institution that rests upon common values and
shared expectations for appropriate behavior within the partnership.
Society upholds and enforces appropriate behavior both formally and
informally. In contrast, there is no widely recognized social blueprint
or script for the appropriate behavior of cohabitors, or for the behavior
of the friends, families, and other individuals and institutions with
whom they interact.312
The multifactor, anything-possibly-relevant approach to cohabitant obliga-
tions of the ALl Principles and the New Zealand De Facto Relationships
Act reflects the wide divergence among cohabiting couples and lack of public
consensus on whether, when, and how relational commitments and depend-
encies worthy of state enforcement arise within such relationships. But
there is no doubt-for those within a marriage and those who interact with
a married couple-about what marriage means.
Finally, a revivified common law marriage doctrine is fully compatible
with traditional principles of family law and the larger law of relational obli-
gations. By relying on commitment as a source of obligation, we maintain a
consistent approach to relational rights and duties instead of introducing
dissonant principles that are found nowhere else in our law.
death, to claim workmen's compensation, social security, to immigrate into the United
States, to file joint tax returns and many others have traditionally been dependent upon the
proof of marriage.
Id.
310. Nock, supra note 95, at 74 ("[Clohabitation is an incomplete institution. No matter
how widespread the practice, nonmarital unions are not yet governed by strong consensual norms
or formal laws."); see also STEVEN L. NOCK, MARRIAGE IN MEN'S LIVES (1998).
311. CASPER & BIANCHI, supra note 93, at 40.
312. Id. (citations omitted). Thus one couple recently profiled in the New York Times wedding
pages who had been together for seventeen years decided to marry, in part, because of their
ambiguous social status. As the husband put it, "I felt the ambiguity was not worth the price of
having to explain to other people what was going on.... Iconoclastic rebellion didn't seem
important any more." When he proposed, his intended's initial answer was "Yes, but why bother?"
She put the ring on her right hand, in "avoidance of convention." But "[olver the ensuing weeks, her
feelings changed. 'I thought I would never care about it, but I kind of like my $8 ring,' she admitted."
Eric V. Copage, Weddings/Celebrations/Vows: Madeline Schwartzman and Jeffrey Miles, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 2, 2003, § 9, at 9.
889The Emerging Law of Cohabitant Obligation
2. A Commitment Alternative for Same-Sex Couples
The common law marriage doctrine can capture most of the cases that
conscription's proponents point to when arguing that couples who fail to
marry need conscription. But whether or not modified by estoppel principles,
common law marriage cannot be utilized to affirm the marital commitments
of same-sex couples because, at least for now, all American states except
Massachusetts define marriage as the union of a man and a woman. The
evidence suggests that the proportion of same-sex couples who would like to
express marital commitments is not insignificant. In surveys of gay and
lesbian individuals,
70% or more of respondents [report that they] prefer being in long-
term monogamous relationships [and] would like to... be able to
marry. Moreover, among gays and lesbians who identify themselves
as living with partners, the vast majority (close to 90%) have made a
long-term commitment to the relationship."'
In states that follow Marvin, same-sex couples can establish private rights and
obligations, like those that would be produced under the ALl Principles,
through a private agreement. 314 But some states have not adopted the Marvin
doctrine.315 Like their heterosexual counterparts, many same-sex couples will
also fail to utilize the contract option.316
The logical reform is a state-sanctioned mechanism by which same-sex
couples can register marital vows. Legislators could provide such a mecha-
nism either by expanding the definition of marriage317 or creating an alternate
status, like that provided under Vermont's civil union law" 8 and various
European domestic-partnership registry options 319 for same-sex couples.
Once such a mechanism was in place, whatever common law marriage rule
313. Wald, supra note 218, at 313-14 (summarizing data).
314. Courts in a number of states have recognized Marvin claims between same-sex partners.
See, e.g., Whorton v. Dillingham, 248 Cal. Rptr. 405 (Ct. App. 1988); Posik v. Layton, 695 So. 2d
759 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997); Silver v. Starrett, 674 N.Y.S.2d 915 (Sup. Ct. 1998); Vasquez v.
Hawthorne, 33 P.3d 735 (Wash. 2001).
315. See cases cited supra note 4.
316. See sources cited supra notes 153-154.
317. The Netherlands and Belgium have both adopted this alternative. See Developments in the
Law: The Law of Marriage and Family, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1996, 2004 (2003). Canada may soon
follow suit. See Clifford Krauss, A Wedding in Canada: Gay Couples Follow a Trail North Blazed by
Slaves and War Resisters, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2003, § 4, at 7 (reporting that Ontario and British
Columbia currently allow same-sex marriages and that the Canadian Parliament is expected to make
same-sex marriage legal everywhere in 2004).
318. VT. STAT. ANN. tit..15, §§ 1201-1207 (2002).
319. See Developments in the Law: The Law of Marriage and Family, supra note 317, at 2007-08
(surveying European developments).
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the state has chosen to adopt should be written so as to apply to same-sex as
well as heterosexual relationships.
B. Avoiding Unjust Enrichment
The vast majority of cohabiting couples have neither made marital
commitments nor sent to a partner false signals that they have done so."'
Because these cases do not involve marital commitments that would induce
reliance and resulting dependency, the law should impose no rights or obli-
gations based purely on the fact of the relationship. Instead, courts should
utilize equitable doctrines-constructive trust,' purchase money resulting
trust,322 or quantum meruit-to avoid unjust enrichment.
As an example of how these equitable doctrines might be applied,
reconsider Friedman. According to the record, Terri and Eliot moved to Alaska
some four years after their relationship began. In Alaska, "they set about
320. See supra Part I1.B.1.
321. As Professors Dukeminier and Johanson explain:
[Clonstructive trust is the name given a flexible remedy imposed in a wide variety of
situations to prevent unjust enrichment. When property has been acquired in such
circumstances that the holder of the legal title may not in good conscience retain the
beneficial interest, equity converts him into a trustee. A constructive trustee is under a
duty to convey the property to another on the ground that retention of the property
would be wrongful. The usual requirements for imposition of a constructive trust are: 1)
a confidential or fiduciary relationship; 2) a promise, express or implied, by the
transferee; 3) a transfer of property in reliance on the promise; and 4) unjust enrichment
of the transferee. But the constructive trust remedy is not limited to these circum-
stances... [and] may be imposed in situations where.., the court is moved simply by the
desire to prevent unjust enrichment.
JESSE DUKEMINIER & STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 585 (6th ed. 2000);
see also 5 AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCoTF, THE LAW OF TRUSTS §§ 461-552 (William F. Fratcher ed.,
4th ed. 1987). A number of courts have endorsed the use of constructive trust principles in cases
involving unmarried cohabitants. See, e.g., Bright v. Kuehl, 650 N.E.2d 311 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995);
Watts v. Watts, 405 N.W.2d 303 (Wis. 1987).
322. A purchase money resulting trust arises when one person pays the purchase price for
property and causes title to the property to be taken in the name of another person. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS §§ 7-9 (2003).
323. "[C]ourts use quantum meruit to compensate a person for services rendered in the absence
of a contract .... [The doctrine] lacks readily ascertainable rules for the determination of the proper
amount of compensation. The technique used to determine recovery varies according to the circum-
stances of each case." Jeffrey L. Oakes, Comment, Article 2298, the Codification of the Principle
Forbidding Unjust Enrichment, and the Elimination of Quantum Meruit as a Basis for Recovery in
Louisiana, 56 LA. L. REV. 873, 874-75 (1996). See generally Judy Beckner Sloan, Quantum Meruit:
Residual Equity in Law, 42 DEPAUL L. REv. 399 (1992) (surveying history and usage of quantum
meruit doctrine). A number of courts have endorsed the use of quantum meruit principles in cases
involving unmarried cohabitants. See, e.g., Maglica v. Maglica, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 101 (Ct. App.
1998); Mason v. Rostad, 476 A.2d 662 (D.C. 1984).
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homesteading, and built a cabin some twelve miles from the nearest town."'324
Both Eliot and Terri contributed to the homesteading enterprise. In Eliot's
words: 'We grew our own food, built our own cabin, had no modem utilities,
and scraped a living from the land as best we could."''" After seven years,
Eliot wanted to return to the Bay Area to attend law school:
[Terri] was reluctant to leave the now developed homestead,
[but] ... did so on the understanding that she too would return to
school. While defendant attended law school plaintiff renovated and
decorated a "fixer-upper" home that they purchased from their
Alaskan savings. The couple had a second child whose poor health
precluded plaintiff from returning to college. Defendant completed
law school and went into practice. Plaintiff began to suffer from back
problems .... 326
If Terri abandoned an agreed-upon plan that she return to school after
Eliot finished in order to devote herself to an ill child, then she should be
entitled to quantum meruit compensation for her sacrifice and the mutual
benefit that sacrifice produced. Had Eliot taken title to the Alaska homestead
as sole owner, Terri's contribution to its establishment and improvement
would justify the imposition of a constructive trust upon the property. Had
Eliot taken title to the "fixer-upper" as sole owner, Terri's renovation and
decoration would also justify the imposition of a constructive trust. If the fair
market value of these properties was inadequate to compensate Terri for her
efforts, she should be awarded quantum meruit relief for the uncompensated
portion of her work in renovating, decorating, and building the cabin, and in
establishing the homestead. In sum, even without indicia of a marital agreement,
a cohabitant may undertake efforts that benefit both. When those efforts are
not compensated through the division of jointly held property, they should be
compensated with a monetary award.
Because the aim of equitable remedies is to avoid unjust enrichment, not
every unpaid effort justifies compensation. When both cohabitants make
relatively equal unpaid contributions to the household, there is no unjust
enrichment. When one cohabitant makes disproportionate unpaid contribu-
tions to the household but those contributions do not significantly exceed
those he would have made to his own, single-person household, there is no
unjust enrichment. When one cohabitant makes disproportionate contribu-
tions but those contributions fail to produce either a significant economic
324. Friedman v. Friedman, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 892, 901 (Ct. App. 1993).
325. Id.
326. Id. at 901-02.
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benefit to the noncontributing cohabitant or a significant economic detriment
to the contributing cohabitant, there is no unjust enrichment. Only when one
or the other cohabitant gains a significant, unearned benefit or suffers a
significant, uncompensated loss should equitable relief be available.327
Courts in a number of states already apply these principles in the
cohabitation context. In general, they have held that compensation for
unpaid services is appropriate "in those situations where it would be reasonable
to expect compensation" '328 and when compensation during the relationship
was inadequate. 29
One type of case-the long-term homemaker or companion-deserves
special mention. Within a familial context, homemaking services and com-
panionship are not normally compensated. For this reason, courts have
sometimes refused to grant a monetary award to the cohabitant whose con-
tributions are of this type.330 At times this reluctance is justifiable. Consider
the case of cohabitants Impoverished and Wealthy and imagine that Wealthy
urges Impoverished to give up his poorly paid employment as a sales clerk in
order to enjoy, full-time, the life of Riley with her. Imagine further that
Impoverished and Wealthy live the life of Riley together for three years and
that Impoverished thereafter goes back to work as a sales clerk. Unless
Impoverished has lost seniority or pension benefits, it is not obvious what
economic loss his three-year holiday would produce. Nor is it obvious what
economic gain Wealthy would have obtained from Impoverished's companion-
ship. But if Impoverished and Wealthy remained together for, say, twenty
years, it is likely that Impoverished would have great difficulty returning to
the wage labor market. Worse, he would have lost many years in which a
327. See Ann Laquer Estin, Ordinary Cohabitation, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1381, 1400
(2001) ("The case law of cohabitation makes it clear that courts will not order compensation for
services performed by one partner that can be characterized as part of the ordinary give-and-take
of a shared life.").
328. KRAUSE ET AL., supra note 26, at 229. For examples of cases applying this principle, see
Whorton v. Dillingham, 248 Cal. Rptr. 405 (Ct. App. 1988) (finding that services as a bodyguard,
secretary, and real estate counselor are compensable); Tapley v. Tapley, 449 A.2d 1218 (N.H. 1982)
(limiting recovery to business services).
329. See, e.g., Tarry v. Stewart, 649 N.E.2d 1 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994) (refusing cohabitant's
reimbursement claim for improvements made to house due to benefit received from living in house
during relationship).
330. See Jones v. Daly, 176 Cal. Rptr. 130 (Ct. App. 1981); Tapley, 449 A.2d 1218; see also
Robert C. Casad, Unmarried Couples and Unjust Enrichment: From Status to Contract and Back Again?,
77 MICH. L. REv. 47, 55 (1978) (arguing that, in cohabitation, "the parties ... probably
contemplated that the benefits they would receive.., would offset the burdens they undertook.
Neither party anticipated paying for the material benefits received from the other except by
contributing to the relationship.... Under those assumptions, neither party's contributions could
unjustly enrich the other.").
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wage earner normally makes advantageous career moves, obtains further
training, and accrues seniority and benefits. Impoverished's lost opportunities
were induced both by Wealthy's original offer to provide support and her later
failure to encourage Impoverished's reentry into the labor market. Because
Impoverished's state of dependency was thus, in a very real way, caused by
Wealthy, it would be fair to require Wealthy to compensate Impoverished for
his lost labor-market opportunities even though Wealthy has obtained no
economic benefit from Impoverished's loss.
A full set of equitable remedies for cohabitants thus should not preclude
compensation for homemaking or companionship simply because these
services are often uncompensated. Within a familial setting, even professional
services like financial management and carpentry typically go uncompen-
sated; outside such a setting, homemaking and full-time, on-call companion-
ship are not obtained without pay.
A full set of equitable remedies for cohabitants has the capacity to avert
unjust enrichment in cases where a cohabitant has made significant uncom-
pensated contributions or has been induced to rely on continuation of the
relationship to his or her detriment. Accordingly, we do not need conscription
to avoid exploitation within cohabiting relationships or other close social
relationships. Use of existing equitable remedies to remedy problems of cohabi-
tant exploitation would also maintain a consistent approach to relational
obligation and compensation.
C. The Need for a Child-Centered Cohabitation Policy
A revivified common law marriage doctrine, a method by which same-
sex couples can publicly make binding commitments, a robust set of equita-
ble remedies, and the enforcement of cohabitation contracts are adequate
to ensure that the relational commitments of cohabitants are honored and
that cohabitants are protected against exploitation and unjust enrichment.
This package of remedies avoids obligations that do not arise from commitment
or dependency-causation; it creates obligations that are firmly rooted in
accepted principles of relational obligation.
This package is also consistent with the interests of children. Unlike
the conscriptive alternative, there is no reason to suppose that it will
encourage nonmarital childbearing; it instead signals, clearly, that marital
commitment matters.
The reform package that I have outlined is only one component of a
child-centered cohabitation policy, however. It cannot protect children
894 52 UCLA LAW REVIEW 815 (2005)
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against either the instability associated with nonmarital childbearing.. or
the risks associated with that instability.332
Innovations in child support and paternity law undertaken over the past
two decades represent additional useful components of such a policy, although
both support and paternity law can still be improved. Despite the lower
educational attainments of children in single-parent households, many states
do not yet have rules permitting courts to order college support;333 despite the
proven risks associated with residential instability, few states have rules that
permit a court to issue an order permitting an unmarried mother and her
children to remain in a residence owned by a cohabiting father; and despite
the proven risks associated with child poverty, virtually none have rules
securing the child support obligation against parental death or disability.334Paterity stabishmet .,3363
Paternity establishment rates vary widely.' So do required levels of support."'
Beyond straightforward improvements in parental-obligation law, poli-
cymakers need to work toward a cohabitation policy that encourages child-
bearing in stable relationships but does not penalize children born in unstable
relationships. This is no easy task; even the outlines of such a policy are well
beyond the scope of this Article. But certainly public education about the
risks of nonmarital childbearing is an important component,3 as are income
support for both single and two-parent families33 and a child-centered focus
on rules governing adult relationships.339
331. See sources cited supra notes 186, 194.
332. See sources cited supra notes 187-189, 191-193.
333. In 2002, sixteen state child support laws explicitly authorized college support orders. See
Linda D. Elrod & Robert G. Spector, A Review of the Year in Family Law: State Courts React to Troxel,
35 FAM. L.Q. 577, 619 chart 3 (2002). Even without explicit statutory authorization, some courts
have interpreted child support laws as authorizing such support. See, e.g., Childers v. Childers, 575
P.2d 201 (Wash. 1978).
334. See KRAUSE ET AL., supra note 26, at 882-83.
335. See id. at 1044-45 (surveying reports).
336. See DIANE DODSON & JOAN ENTMACHER, REPORT CARD ON STATE CHILD SUPPORT
GUIDELINES 25, 28-31 (1994); Laura W. Morgan & Mark C. Lino, A Comparison of Child Support
Awards Calculated Under States' Child Support Guidelines With Expenditures on Children Calculated
by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, 33 FAM. L.Q. 191, 215-18 (1999).
337. See supra notes 196-197.
338. There is no doubt that "affluence is good for the stability of marriages and cohabitations;
poverty is not." BRAMLETT & MOSHER, supra note 89, at 30; see also Morrison & Ritualo, supra note
279, at 569-70 (finding that children whose mothers later cohabit were more likely to be poor prior
to the initial marital disruption; 38 percent of children who later experienced unstable cohabitation
had family incomes that fell below the poverty line before their parents separated or divorced, and
that children whose mothers cohabited had the largest reliance on AFDC prior to disruption-21.6
percent, compared with 9.2 percent and 14.4 percent for those in the married and single-mother
groups).
339. For example, in evaluating legal innovations like the various "marriage-lite" registration
options now popular in Europe, see supra note 206, policymakers should place primary emphasis on
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Adults can make conscious choices about whether and when to
cohabit, marry, and bear children. Family law should honor and respect
those choices. But because children, our collective future, cannot partici-
pate in the choices that may determine their childhood well-being and
adult prospects, the law governing cohabitation-like paternity law, child
support law, marriage law-should foster adult choices that are most likely
to serve children's interests.
CONCLUSION
When the law distinguishes marriage from cohabitation, it neither
condemns those who choose cohabitation nor discriminates against them. It
instead recognizes and honors the individual choices that cohabitants and
married couples have made. Married couples have chosen obligation;
cohabitants have chosen independence. The law recognizes and honors both
choices. "The ability to choose at the individual level.. . does not mean that
all choices will or should have the same standing in the public sphere."3"
The day may come when cohabitation implies marital commitment. If
and when that day arrives, cohabitation should give rise to marital obligations.
But that day is not here: Married and cohabiting couples tend to behave and
view their relationships quite differently. Cohabitants are much less likely than
married couples to share or pool resources. Cohabitation usually functions as a
substitute for being single, not for being married. Cohabitation thus does not
imply marital commitment. Nor, given its typically short duration and
limited sharing, is it likely that cohabitation generally induces dependency or
leads to unjust enrichment.
Because cohabitation neither implies commitment nor induces depend-
ency, conscriptive cohabitation standards cannot rely on any traditional
source of relational obligation. Such standards thus would introduce discordant
values into our law. They would also diminish personal autonomy in relational
choices and falsely signal that marriage and cohabitation are equivalent
states. Because marriage is an advantageous state both for adults and for
children, legal standards should foster marital commitments; by diminishing
their importance, conscriptive standards fail to do so.
Conscription serves no obvious purpose grounded in history or logic or
public policy. Despite rhetoric linking conscription with liberal principles of
the potential risks to children that might arise from legal recognition of nonmarital relationships,
not the interests of adult cohabitants.
340. Seltzer, supra note 97, at 1263.
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relational equality, conscription does not expand choice but diminishes it.
Despite the tactical appeal of conscription as a means of enforcing the relational
commitments of same-sex couples, conscription devalues the commitments of
same-sex couples just as it devalues those of heterosexual couples. Despite the
obvious link between cohabitation and nonmarital childbearing, there is no
evidence that conscription could reduce either the incidence of nonmarital
childbearing or its private and public costs.
Conscription is not needed to protect marital investments or avert
unjust enrichment. The private commitments of cohabitants can be honored
through a revivified common law marriage doctrine that narrowly targets
those couples whose relationships are genuinely committed and marriage-like.
Unjust enrichment can be averted through traditional equitable remedies.
For all of these reasons, policymakers should affirm the role of com-
mitment in the imposition of marital obligation. Consent is necessary.
Conscription is not.

